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ARTICLES
ANTITRUST, HEALTH CARE QUALITY, AND THE COURTS
Peterj Hammer* & William M. Sage**
Antitrust law represents the principal legal tool that the United States
employs to police private markets, yet it often relegates quality and nonprice
considerations to a secondary position. While antitrust law espouses the belief that vigorous competition will enhance quality as well as price, little
evidence exists of the practicalability of courts to deliver on that promise. In
this Article, ProfessorsHammer and Sage examine American health care as a
vehiclefor advancing understandingof the nexus among competition, quality, and antitrust law. The Article reports the results of a comprehensive
empirical review of judicial opinions in health care antitrust litigation between 1985 and 1999, with specific attention to courts' handling of quality
and other nonprice concerns. Professors Hammer and Sage conclude that,
although antitrust law cannot be expected to serve as the sole oversight mechanism for industries as complex and quality dependent as health care,
courts have been successful incorporatingsome nonprice factors into antitrust analysis.
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INTRODUCTION

It is getting harder to compete. Certainly, intensity of competition
has increased with globalization of markets. But the terms of competition
have also become more complex. No longer do competitors think only
about keeping physical output high and prices low. In addition, producers, consumers, and those who monitor them must pay attention to
scope, service, quality, innovation, and various synergies that may result
from product or market interconnections. These considerations influence most markets and dominate a few, such as information technology,
telecommunications, transportation, energy, and various professional
and technical services.
Not coincidentally, many of these important, complex, and evolving
industries are regulated or recently deregulated. Like the proverbial balloon, competition in regulated products responds to the push or pull of
regulatory constraints by channeling energy into, or diverting attention
away from, the areas being left alone. Price caps, for example, erode
competition on nonprice features of products, while price supports en-
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hance nonprice competition.1 When regulation changes in nature or extent, moreover, the intricacies of the competitive response may be
dizzying.
In this environment, what are antitrust enforcers and antitrust theorists to do? Antitrust law represents the principal legal tool the U.S. employs to police private markets. Unfortunately, as the Microsoft litigation
amply demonstrates, antitrust law is not particularly well equipped to address in real time the nonprice dimensions of twenty-first century commerce. 2 In general, modern antitrust law emphasizes basic
microeconomic analysis of the effect of competition on price and output,
with occasional "post-Chicago School" refinements.3 Consequently, antitrust law often relegates quality and nonprice considerations to a secondary position. 4 While antitrust law espouses the belief that vigorous competition will enhance quality as well as price, and therefore purports to
safeguard a wide range of nonprice concerns through its oversight of
price competition, there exists little proof of either the conceptual basis
for such an enterprise or the practical ability of courts to deliver on that
promise.

1. For the first point, at least those of a certain age can think gasoline. Souvenir
glasses, promotional contests, and even check-your-oil "service with a smile" were quick
casualties of price controls in the 1970s. For the second point, think air travel under FAA
regulation. Frequent, uncrowded flights, better food, and other amenities were easy for
airlines to provide at high regulated fares. See, e.g., Stuart M. Butler, The Fatal Attraction
of Price Controls, in Health Policy Reform: Competition and Controls 3, 13-14 (Robert B.
Helms ed., 1993) (discussing the negative effect of price controls on quality of services).
For a formal economic discussion of the symmetries between price competition under
conditions of fixed quality and quality competition under conditions of fixed prices, see
George J. Stigler, Price and Non-price Competition, 76J. Pol. Econ. 149, 149-52 (1968).
2. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001); see Dennis M.
Kennedy, Key Legal Concerns in E-Commerce: The Law Comes to the New Frontier, 18
T.M. Cooley L. Rev. 17, 34 (2001) ("Today's court case often seems to be about last year's
technology. By the time a case has run its course . . . the technology may already be
obsolete or the business environment may have changed drastically."); see also Kenneth C.
Elzinga et al., United States v. Microsoft: Remedy or Malady?, 9 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 633, 634
(2001) (criticizing Microsoft litigation); David S. Evans et al., An Analysis of the
Government's Economic Case in US. v. Microsoft, 46 Antitrust Bull. 163, 166-70 (2001)
(same).
3. Herbert Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust Policy: The Law of Competition and its
Practice §§ 2.2-2.3 (2d ed. 1999) (discussing role and domain of Chicago School
economics in contemporary antitrust law). Populist concern over the fate of small business
has receded in today's predominantly economic antitrust doctrine. Similarly, the historic
emphasis on evil intent as a precondition to antitrust liability has faded in favor of a pure
effects test. Id.
4. For discussions about how contemporary economic approaches to antitrust law
often neglect quality and nonprice competition (even as economically understood), see
Neil W. Averitt & Robert H. Lande, Consumer Sovereignty: A Unified Theory of Antitrust
and Consumer Protection Law, 65 Antitrust LJ. 713, 750-51 (1997); Douglas H. Ginsburg,
Nonprice Competition, 38 Antitrust Bull. 83, 83 (1993); E. Thomas Sullivan, On Nonprice
Competition: An Economic and Marketing Analysis, 45 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 771, 776 (1984).
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In this Article, we examine American health care as a vehicle for
advancing scholarly understanding of the nexus among competition,
quality, and antitrust law. Using a detailed case coding instrument in addition to the textual analysis that is standard fare for law professors, we
conducted a comprehensive examination of health care antitrust enforcement between 1985 and 1999, comprising over 500 judicial opinions and
nearly 100 consent decrees and formal administrative actions. Our results demonstrate that antitrust litigation is commonly employed by private parties (and to a lesser extent by government) to influence the development of medical markets. However, we find that-even in recent years
when competition has been fierce-surprisingly few suits present persuasive claims of competitive harm, whether price or quality related. Furthermore, while courts deal assertively with health antitrust cases and employ standard economic tools in their analyses, they seldom address
quality as a specific competitive dimension, rather than as a regulatory
matter. Interestingly, this institutional limitation does not extend to the
competitive analysis of market choice, which antitrust law approaches
with confidence.
These insights help fill empirical gaps in both the antitrust and the
health policy literatures. Professional activities in general, and health
care in particular, are relative newcomers to antitrust scrutiny. Although
conflicts among physicians or between physicians and other health professionals generated antitrust enforcement activity as early as 1943 in
American Medical Ass'n v. United States,5 medical pricing policies and other
restrictions involving customers rather than rival suppliers did not come
clearly within the ambit of antitrust law until the mid 1970s and early
1980s in cases like Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,6 National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States,7 and Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical
Society. 8 Moreover, few professional economists paid serious attention to
medical markets before the 1960s, 9 and even today's widespread invoca5. 317 U.S. 519, 528-29 (1943).
6. 421 U.S. 773, 792-93 (1975) (holding minimum fee schedule for lawyers illegal
under Sherman Act while observing that the profession may merit special treatment).
7. 435 U.S. 679, 696 (1978) (holding illegal professional ban on competitive bidding,
but allowing that "professional services may differ significantly from other business
services").
8. 457 U.S. 332, 335-37, 357 (1982) (finding price fixing agreement between
"competing physicians setting, by majority vote, the maximum fees that they may claim in
full payment for health services provided to policyholders of specified insurance plans" per
se illegal under Sherman Act).
9. The best known early effort is Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare
Economics of Medical Care, 53 Am. Econ. Rev. 941 (1963) (contending that uncertainties
inherent to medical care-relating especially to the incidence of disease and the efficacy of
treatment-generate special economic problems that contradict the usual assumptions of
the market). For a comprehensive contemporary analysis of Arrow's article and its
influence, see Special Issue: Kenneth Arrow and the Changing Economics of Health Care,
26J. Health Pol., Pol'y & L. 823, 823-1214 (2001) (collecting essays).
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tion of economics to explain behavior in health care continues to provoke an extensive literature critical of market analysis. 10
With the rise of managed care, competition has now firmly taken
root in health care markets once dominated both economically and substantively by professional values and is reshaping the manner in which
medicine is practiced and purchased in America. Antitrust law can take
some credit for this transformation, but it should also bear commensurate responsibility. Most importantly, health care quality is by many accounts threatened by vigorous price competition involving physicians,
hospitals, health insurers, and other medical suppliers. 1 At the same
time, the health care regulatory process shows limited ability to address
quality concerns without significantly restricting the benefits of
competition.
Our study is intended to determine whether antitrust law currently
possesses the tools to take risks to quality into account and to respond
appropriately. The answer to this question can shed light not only on the
preferred model for governing health care markets but on the relationship between competition and regulation generally and the institutional
capacity of private litigation to serve what are in essence regulatory objectives.1 2 A precondition to making sound policy recommendations in
10. See, e.g., Thomas Rice, Can Markets Give Us the Health System We Want?, 22 J.
Health Pol., Pol'y & L. 383, 383-85 (1997) (questioning ability of market forces to channel
health policy in socially appropriate directions).
11. See Jane E. Sisk, Increased Competition and the Quality of Health Care, 76
Milbank Q. 687, 688 (1998) ("As price competition is growing, the challenge is to create
conditions that safeguard the quality of care and reward its improvement over time in a
manner that is consistent with the public's preferences."). Whether markets and
competition will be able to deliver on both price and quality dimensions remains to be
seen. One reason for skepticism is the basic incentive structure underlying systems of
prepayment. See Marcia Angell & Jerome P. Kassirer, Quality and the Medical Market
Place-Following Elephants, 335 New Eng. J. Med. 883, 883 (1996). Angell and Kassirer
observe:
[Q] uality of health care is now seriously threatened by our rapid shift to managed
care as the way to contain costs. Managed-care plans involve an inherent conflict
of interest. On the one hand they pledge to take care of their enrollees, but on
the other their financial success depends on doing as little for them as possible.
Id. Moreover, consumers may not be in a position where they can accurately detect
"stinting." Joseph P. Newhouse et al., Risk Adjustment and Medicare: Taking a Closer
Look, Health Aft., Sept./Oct. 1997, at 26, 27 (defining "stinting" as the underprovision of
services by prepaid plans). Another reason for skepticism is that no simple price-quality
metric exists that permits problems of quality to be reduced to more easily resolved
problems of price competition. Elizabeth A. McGlynn, Six Challenges in Measuring the
Quality of Health Care, Health Aff., May/June 1997, at 7, 8 ("If there were a precise
relationship between price and quality, we would only need to know how to translate
premium prices and other charges into quality units. However, because there is no such
direct relationship, a separate set of quality measures is essential." (footnote omitted)).
12. Our work therefore relates indirectly to a growing body of literature evaluating
control of tobacco, guns, and other commercial activities with health or safety implications
through the courts rather than legislatures and administrative bodies. See The RegulationLitigation Interaction (W. Kip Viscusi, ed.) (forthcoming 2002).
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these areas is a clear baseline understanding of the demands being made
on antitrust law and the institutional competency of courts and enforcement agencies. In this Article we undertake and present such an empirical assessment. We intentionally cabin the scope of policy analysis in this
Article to organizing our empirical findings, and reserve a full theoretical
treatment of the issues to separate work, where we outline the contours of
3
an integrated competition policy in health care.1
I. RESEARCH METHODS
The health care industry has been the subject of substantial antitrust
enforcement and legal scholarship, but to our knowledge our study represents the first systematic attempt to evaluate the role of quality and
other nonprice concerns in health care antitrust litigation, or to assess
the capacity of judges to undertake such forms of analysis. Because our
goals and methods differ slightly from those traditionally associated with
legal scholarship, we present our findings using conventions from scientific research, although we gratefully acknowledge the liberal space allowance that law review publication affords us. We take this approach in
order that readers may evaluate the methods we employed and assess for
themselves the persuasiveness of our findings. Accordingly, this section
describes the manner in which we identified relevant antitrust disputes
and analyzed their content, and it discusses the limitations of our methodology as well as its advantages. We also attach the coding instrument
used to categorize judicial decisions as an Appendix to the Article. Readers who are interested primarily in our findings and how we interpret
them should feel free to turn directly to our presentation of empirical
results in Part II.
Despite the long history of the Sherman Act, there have been relatively few efforts to analyze empirically the nature of public and private
antitrust enforcement. Among previous studies, the most common methodology has been to report on a random sample of antitrust cases filed in
selected federal district courts and to gather data from court dockets,
with occasional follow-up surveys of the attorneys litigating those cases to
13. A conceptual analysis of our empirical results can be found in William M. Sage &
PeterJ. Hammer, A Copernican View of Health Care Antitrust, 65 Law & Contemp. Probs.
(forthcoming 2002). This Article is part of a larger study, titled Competing on Quality of
Care: Comparing Antitrust Law to Market Reality, which is supported by an Investigator
Award in Health Policy Research from the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation. This
project also will examine in greater detail the work of the federal antitrust enforcement
agencies in encouraging quality competition in medical markets and will explore how
antitrust enforcement can be reconciled with other government regulatory and purchasing
objectives as part of a broader "competition policy" for the health care sector. We have
outlined the intellectual framework of the project elsewhere. See William M. Sage & Peter
J. Hammer, Competing on Quality of Care: The Need to Develop a Competition Policy for
Health Care Markets, 32 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 1069 (1999) [hereinafter Sage & Hammer,
Competition Policy].
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gain additional information about settlement practices. 14 The Georgetown Antitrust Project, 15 a NERA study commissioned by the American Bar Association, 1 6 a GAO report of Department of Justice (DOJ)
antitrust enforcement practices,' 7 and an early study by Richard
14. This was the method employed in the Georgetown Antitrust Project, infra note 15,
and the NERA study, infra note 16. Only the Georgetown Antitrust Project sent follow-up
surveys to the attorneys.
15. See Private Antitrust Litigation: New Evidence, New Learning (LawrenceJ. White
ed., 1988) [hereinafter Private Antitrust Litigation]. The Georgetown Antitrust Project
provides the most extensive examination to date of private antitrust litigation. The study
collected data on private antitrust cases filed in five federal districts (Manhattan, Chicago,
San Francisco, Kansas City, and Atlanta) between 1973 and 1983. The sample produced
2357 cases (approximately one-sixth of all private cases filed during the time period). See
Steven C. Salop & Lawrence J. White, Private Antitrust Litigation: An Introduction and
Framework, in Private Antitrust Litigation, supra, at 3-16 (providing an overview of the
data). Data were obtained from the docket files and surveys were sent to the attorneys to
inquire about settlements and fees. The study reports, among other things, distribution of
cases by economic sector, antitrust statute sued under, illegal practices complained of, and
business relationships between the parties. The study does not examine published
opinions, nor does it evaluate the legal reasoning of particular courts. The data, however,
permit fairly extensive investigation of the settlement dynamics of private antitrust
litigation and have spawned substantial scholarship into the nature and social utility of
private antitrust enforcement. See generally Private Antitrust Litigation, supra (collecting
articles by antitrust scholars such as Stephen Calkins, Kenneth G. Elzinga, Thomas E.
Kauper, Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Edward A. Snyder, and Donald F. Turner exploring the
implications of the data generated by the Georgetown Antitrust Project).
16. Nat'l Econ. Research Assocs., Inc., A Statistical Analysis of Private Antitrust
Litigation: Final Report for the American Bar Association Section of Antitrust Law (1979)
[hereinafter NERA, Antitrust Report]. NERA collected data on private antitrust cases filed
in the Southern District of New York between 1973 and 1978. Id. at 7-15 (summarizing
the study methodology). A random sample of cases was selected, representing 55-63% of
all cases each year, for a total sample size of 352 cases. Data were obtained from the docket
files and include information concerning the identities of the parties, the nature of the
dispute (alleged unlawful conduct, statutory violations, and affected products and
markets), procedural aspects of the litigation (class certification, counterclaims, nature
and length of discovery), the resolution (pending status, dismissal, settlements, judgments,
and whether an appeal was taken), and the extent, if any, of public antitrust involvement.
Id. at 17-18. Unlike the Georgetown Antitrust Project, no follow-up surveys were sent to
attorneys, providing less information on settlement practices. The study does not examine
published opinions, nor does it attempt to assess the legal reasoning in particular
decisions. For a discussion of the NERA study, see James P. Melican, Jr., The Treble
Damage Case: Fact and Fiction, 49 Antitrust L.J. 981, 984-86 (1980).
17. Gen. Accounting Office, Justice Department: Changes in Antitrust Enforcement
Policies and Activities (1990) [hereinafter GAO Report]. In 1990, the General Accounting
Office published a report on the antitrust enforcement practices of the Department of
Justice. The GAO examined DOJ resources and enforcement agency activity over a twenty
year period between 1970 and 1989 to determine whether there had been systematic
changes in antitrust enforcement strategies in the 1980s. Id. at 2-3. The GAO also
reviewed summaries of all merger cases challenged by the Department between 1982 and
1987. The merger summaries were prepared by DOJ personnel. Id. at 52. The GAO
found that in the 1980s, the DOJ's policy shifted from civil to criminal enforcement
(primarily bid rigging and price fixing cases). Id. at 53. Between 1980 and 1989, the DOJ
filed an average of 81 criminal cases and 13 civil cases annually (compared with an average
of 20 criminal cases and 48 civil cases annually between 1970 and 1976). Id. at 39-47.
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Posner i8 are the most important previous empirical contributions. The
Georgetown and NERA approaches provide information about not only
the cases that go to trial, but also the cases that settle or are dismissed. To
the extent that these studies document discovery practices and other
events occurring between the filing of a complaint and trial, they also
improve our understanding of strategic behavior during the course of
litigation. Unfortunately, none of these studies focuses on the health
care industry, even as a specific subset of the cases evaluated. Neither do
these studies examine the role of quality and nonprice concerns, or systematically analyze judicial reasoning in the opinions produced by
litigation. 19
We elected to assess the underlying capacity of antitrust courts to
address quality concerns by examining judicial opinions in federal courts.
We reviewed all opinions that were available on LEXIS, including opinions not formally "published" in official reporters. For cases brought by
public antitrust enforcement authorities, we supplemented judicial opinions with settlements and administrative decisions. Admittedly, these
materials capture only part of the universe of health care antitrust litigation. Many cases are dropped or settled without a court's formal involvement, 20 while others run their full course through trial and still do not
Unfortunately, health care is not isolated in the analysis, nor are the activities of the
Professions and Intellectual Property Section of the Antitrust Division or its policies
towards hospital mergers subject to any specific examination.
18. Richard A. Posner, A Statistical Study of Antitrust Enforcement, 13 J.L. & Econ.
365 (1970). Posner examined historical trends in public and private antitrust enforcement
from 1890 to 1969. Posner reports data on the number of filings, the nature of alleged
antitrust violations, length and outcome of proceedings, and choice of remedies. Most of
the information is collected from public sources, such as the CCH Trade Regulation
Reporter, as well as case summaries provided by the federal enforcement agencies. While
Posner's primary focus is on patterns of public enforcement, useful trend data are also
reported on private litigation: comparisons of criminal/civil enforcement ratios, ratios of
private/public suits over time, and outcomes (win-loss ratios). Id. passim. Again, there is
no sector specific analysis and no systematic effort to examine how courts address
particular issues such as nonprice competition.
Posner's work was later extended by William Baxter. See William F. Baxter, The
Political Economy of Antitrust, in The Political Economy of Antitrust 3, 16-26 (Robert D.
Tollinson ed., 1980) (discussing Posner's findings on the mix of public and private
litigation and upon the extremely low success rates among private antitrust plaintiffs). For
further analysis of private litigation prior to 1964, see John D. Guilfoil, Private
Enforcement of U.S. Antitrust Law, 10 Antitrust Bull. 747 (1965) (noting divergence of
judicial opinion and excessive duration of proceedings).
19. But cf. Pauline M. Ippolito, Federal Trade Comm'n, Resale Price Maintenance:
Economic Evidence From Litigation (1988) (performing systematic examination of all 203
public and private litigated cases between 1976-1982 containing allegations of vertical
price fixing to assess competing theories of resale price maintenance). The Ippolito report
also discusses a number of the methodological issues a researcher faces in relying upon a
set of litigated court cases as a database from which to make empirical and theoretical
assessments about the underlying economic conduct. Id. at 25-35.
20. The Georgetown Antitrust Project estimated that some 73% of all filed private
antitrust cases settle or are dismissed before resulting in ajudgment. Salop & White, supra
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result in an opinion. Nonetheless, judicial opinions are the appropriate
unit of analysis for the questions of principal interest to us: "how" and
"how well" antitrust courts have evaluated the quality concerns that are
brought before them. Because antitrust litigation is fact intensive, with
limited controlling precedent, we cannot answer these questions using
traditional legal research methods that try to ascertain "what the law is."
Instead, we use the written opinion as a window into the courtroom to
determine what role quality concerns have played in antitrust litigation,
what types of quality related arguments have been made and in which
settings, how courts define and understand quality in health care (if at
all), and what assumptions antitrust courts make about the effect on quality of competition or specific alleged restraints of trade.
A. Selecting and CodingJudicial Opinions
1. Developing the Coding Instrument. - Given the task of examining
several hundred medical antitrust opinions, a major challenge was to devise a uniform, systematic means of classifying information. We therefore
developed a comprehensive survey instrument to be used to "code" each
opinion, a copy of which is reproduced in the Appendix. The coding
instrument records several descriptive characteristics of the parties, the
procedural posture of the case, case outcomes, the substantive antitrust
allegations discussed by the court, the methods of antitrust analysis performed by the court, and a lengthy set of quality and nonprice concerns. 2 1 Some of these attributes are straightforward and relatively easy
to identify. For example, the instrument requests information about the
plaintiffs and defendant's identities (physician, hospital, insurance company, etc.), their location, and the type of business conduct in question in
the case (for example, merger, exclusive contracting, private credentialing). These subjects can be coded with a fairly high degree of reliability.
By contrast, matters such as "significant" case outcomes and the forms of
antitrust analysis performed by courts require a greater degree of interpretive judgment on the part of the coder and were therefore subjected
to more intensive review.
2. Case Selection. - After developing the coding instrument, we set
out to locate relevant cases. Using LEXIS, we searched electronically for
health care antitrust cases decided between 1985 and 1999. 2 2 Health care
note 15, at 10. The 1979 NERA study placed the private antitrust settlement rate at 84%.
NERA, Antitrust Report, supra note 16, at 44. By coding all published opinions, and not
simply cases that result in a final judgment, we capture cases dismissed by courts in
published opinions and those that may in fact settle without a trial after the motion being
addressed in the opinion is decided. As such, the settled/not settled distinction used
elsewhere does not map well onto our cases.
21. The list of quality concerns is discussed in detail infra Part I.B.
22. We selected this fifteen-year period because it encompassed enough of the recent
history of health care to include reliably a variety of competitive situations but not so much
that the number of cases generated would be unmanageable.
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was broadly defined to include disputes involving pharmaceuticals, medical devices, and other medical products in addition to a range of professional, institutional, and financial services.25 Dentistry, chiropractic and
the like were included; dietary and veterinary cases were not. Our original search identified 3390 cases. 24 A law student research assistant
screened these cases, discarding ones where the underlying dispute
clearly had nothing to do either with antitrust law or with health care.
Cases of doubtful but possible relevance were retained. Screening reduced the number of cases to 988, which were scheduled for full coding.
Using the same search terms in other LEXIS library files, we also assembled a supplemental database consisting of settlements and administrative decisions of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and consent decrees between private defendants and the Department of Justice or state
attorneys general. This process yielded an additional 81 documents,
which were coded in the same manner as the judicial opinions.
3. Coding.- Case coding was conducted by one team of law student
research assistants at the University of Michigan Law School and another
team at Columbia Law School. All research assistants attended an orientation regarding antitrust law, health care, and the details of the coding
instrument, and they were given a primer on antitrust law as a reference.
Initial coding at each site was conducted in a group setting to encourage
questions regarding the coding instrument to be asked and to allow answers to be shared. If students subsequently encountered difficulties applying the coding instrument to particular cases, they sent queries to us
via e-mail, and answers were circulated to all students at both sites. Students were given packets containing approximately twenty-five cases each;
packets were constructed so that all opinions relating to the same dispute
were grouped together. Students worked with printouts of the cases and
were instructed to enter relevant coding numbers in the margins of the
opinion next to the text giving rise to the category. To facilitate subsequent review of the quality coding and to ensure that our analysis would
not become too far removed from the language of the judicial opinions,
students highlighted in yellow the relevant text of all opinions coded as
including any quality related categories.
After each group of cases was coded by one research assistant, it was
given to a different research assistant to be checked. Checking consisted
of a manual review of all coded fields and an electronic search of the
opinion using LEXIS for terms such as "quality," "choice," "skill," and
23. The LEXIS search used in the COURTS file of the GENFED library was as follows:
"Antitrust and date aft 1/1/85 and date bef 6/1/99 and (physician or hospital or health
insur! or HMO or pharmaceutical or nursing or medical device or dentist or chiropractor
or mental health)."
24. We searched LEXIS state court files separately for health care decisions involving
state rather than federal antitrust law and identified 107 opinions that met our search
criteria. We coded these cases in similar fashion to the federal opinions discussed in this
Article and will report their content in a subsequent paper.
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"innovation" to locate quality related considerations potentially missed by
the initial coder. Coding for all cases was reviewed a third time by one of
us and the results were entered onto a spreadsheet for tabulation.
As a check on the initial case screening, research assistants were
asked to verify that the opinions they read were in fact about both antitrust law and health care. If an opinion contained "essentially no antitrust" or "essentially no health care," it was coded as fully as possible, but
removed from the database. This process eliminated an additional 446
opinions, leaving a total of 542 separate health care antitrust opinions in
the final sample. Opinions relating to the same underlying dispute were
grouped together for analysis of certain characteristics. The 539 opinions
in our main database represent 394 separate antitrust disputes. When the
82 DOJ, FTC, and state attorney general consent decrees and other
agency decisions are combined with the 31 opinions in litigated cases
where public parties are plaintiffs, one gets a total of 113 enforcement
agency "opinions" representing 89 separate "disputes."
B. Coding Quality of Care
The most important and difficult assessments in the coding instrument involve the classification of quality. Quality is a slippery concept,
and we are unaware of previous efforts to develop a comprehensive antitrust taxonomy of quality or nonprice competition, either inside or
outside of health care markets. The coding instrument therefore gathers
a range of information regarding judicial beliefs about the general effects
of price and quality based competition in health care markets, the specific effects of the challenged conduct, and the role various quality and
nonprice concerns play in courts' analyses of particular situations.
This is not to say that antitrust law is a blank slate when it comes to
quality. Indeed, one of the challenges in designing the coding instrument was the fact that antitrust lawyers, economists, medical professionals, and health services researchers have very different and often conflicting understandings of what quality means. Thomas Kauper provides a
useful analysis of how antitrust law and economics typically address quality.2 5 Kauper starts with an appreciation of the fact that "the appropriate
25. See Thomas E. Kauper, The Role of Quality of Health Care Considerations in
Antitrust Analysis, Law & Contemp. Probs., Spring 1988, at 273, 276-80, 292-319. While
there is substantial overlap between antitrust lawyers' and economists' understanding of
quality, they are not always the same. Antitrust law often reflects, as a matter of pragmatic
necessity, the simplest core of economic reasoning. Unfortunately, with respect to
nonprice competition, there is no core consensus among economists as to how quality
should be defined or understood. Economists have approached quality in a variety of ways,
depending upon what type of nonprice issue is being addressed. See generally Jean Tirole,
The Theory of Industrial Organization 95-115 (1988) (presenting economic approaches
to product characteristics). In most economic models, it makes a substantial difference
whether consumers have the same preference orderings with respect to quality
characteristics (vertical quality models), or whether consumer preferences over quality vary
(horizontal quality models). See id. at 96-99 (discussing vertical and horizontal
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quality of care is in most instances virtually impossible to define."2 6
Rather than assessing quality in an absolute sense, antitrust lawyers and
economists are prone to understand quality (and other nonprice factors)
27
in terms of their tradeoffs with more traditional price concerns.
Kauper goes so far as to assert that "[q] uality without regard to price is a
relatively meaningless concept."28 Given that resource tradeoffs lie at the
heart of the antitrust analysis, the question then becomes how these
tradeoffs are made. Not surprisingly, antitrust lawyers and economists
view the market as the appropriate mechanism for making tradeoffs between price and quality. From an antitrust perspective, therefore, quality
becomes a dimension of the competitive process itself. "Quality, then, is
not an absolute. It is the result of a competitive process in which consumers have choices, and which provides incentives to producers to improve
'29
goods and services in ways that make them more saleable.
Needless to say, this stands in sharp contrast with the views of the
medical profession. While antitrust law tends to view quality as the outcome of an economic process, health care professionals tend to view quality as the outcome of a medical process. This leads them to frame quality
in absolute terms, divorced from economic context. The Institute of
Medicine's 1990 definition of quality is a case in point. Without incorporating any sense of budgetary constraints or opportunity costs, the Institute of Medicine (IOM) defined quality as follows: "[Q]uality of care is
the degree to which health services for individuals and populations increase the likelihood of desired health outcomes and are consistent with

differentiation). Locational models are often used to examine horizontal quality
competition. These models view the consumer's selection of a quality characteristic as
taking place within a "product space" very similar to the "geographic space" in which the
consumer decides where to purchase a product when the purchase decision is influenced
by transportation costs. See, e.g., Harold Hotelling, Stability in Competition, 39 Econ. J.
41, 45-48 (1929) (developing Hotelling's classic model of locational competition).
Alternatively, Kelvin Lancaster models goods as consisting of different bundles of quality
characteristics and assumes that consumers have preferences regarding the quality
characteristics rather than the particular good. See Kelvin J. Lancaster, A New Approach
to Consumer Theory, 74 J. Pol. Econ. 132, 133-35 (1966). Various other consumer
theories simply try to incorporate consumers' preferences for quality as an aspect of
individual utility and resort to general models of welfare economics. See, e.g. Michael
Spence, Product Differentiation and Welfare, 66 Am. Econ. Rev. 407, 413-14 (1976)
(discussing difficulties modeling consumer preferences and demand). Using these types
of models, economists have tried to examine questions such as the optimum level of
quality that producers should select, whether there are too few or too many products
offered on the market, and the relationship between product quality and imperfect
information.
26. Kauper, supra note 25, at 276.
27. Id. ("[Alt least given limited resources, consumer decisions about quality involve
tradeoffs and consideration of price.").
28. Id.
29. Id. at 293.
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current professional knowledge." 30 These conflicting orientations toward
quality lead in fundamentally different directions. The medical professional wants to impose professionally predetermined restrictions on market processes, while the antitrust lawyer strives to free the market from
such restrictions, with both groups asserting their positions in the name
of quality. 31
Health services research offers yet another perspective on quality. As
defined in the health services research literature, quality consists of both
the "technical" and the "interpersonal" aspects of medical care. 32 Health
services researchers also allow that patients (consumers) will be concerned about the "amenities" associated with the provision of care. 33 The
most widely used tool to operationalize these quality concerns is
Donabedian's examination of the structure, process, and outcomes of
providing medical care:
Quality of care can be evaluated on the basis of structure, process or outcome. Structural data are characteristics of physicians and hospitals (e.g., a physician's specialty or the ownership
of a hospital). Process data are the components of the encounter between a physician or another health care professional and
a patient (e.g., tests ordered). Outcomes data refer to the patient's subsequent health status (e.g., an improvement in symptoms or mobility).34
30. 1 Comm. to Design a Strategy for Quality Review and Assurance in Med., Inst. of
Med., Medicare: A Strategy for Quality Assurance 21 (Kathleen N. Lohr ed., 1990). While
a useful starting point, there are a number of limitations with the IOM approach. Most
significantly, the definition does not consider the opportunity costs involved with
providing increased levels of care. See R. Adams Dudley et al., The Impact of Financial
Incentives on Quality of Health Care, 76 Milbank Q. 649, 652 (1998) (noting that "[t]he
IOM explicitly chose to ignore resource constraints in formulating its definition of
quality"). For additional discussions of the IOM definition, see Mark R. Chassin & Robert
W. Galvin, The Urgent Need to Improve Health Care Quality: Institute of Medicine
National Roundtable on Health Care Quality, 280 JAMA 1000, 1001 (1998); Sisk, supra
note 11, at 688-89; McGlynn, supra note 11, at 7, 8.
31. Kauper again articulates the prevailing view among antitrust scholars. "There is in
most cases a fundamental contradiction in the argument that quality can be enhanced
through restraints among producers (providers) that significantly restrain the competitive
process and result in adverse price and output effects." Kauper, supra note 25, at 293.
32. 1 Avedis Donabedian, Explorations in Quality Assessment and Monitoring: The
Definition of Quality and Approaches to its Assessment 4 (1980).
33. Id. at 5. Donabedian incorporates into his definition of health care "quality" only
those aspects of amenities that affect the interpersonal dimensions of medical services. Id.
If one views the interaction not through the physician-patient lens, but through the
provider-consumer lens, then all amenities, even those that do not directly impact the
interpersonal dimensions of medical care, would be relevant to analyzing the transaction.
This also helps illustrate the differences between "quality" and "nonprice" concerns. From
an economic perspective, "quality" as understood by Donabedian and other health services
researchers would be a subset of a broader range of relevant nonprice concerns for
antitrust purposes.
34. Robert H. Brook et al., Measuring Quality of Care, 335 New Eng.J. Med. 966, 966
(1996). For a detailed discussion of the structure, process, outcome paradigm, see 1
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The health services research literature therefore refines the traditional
medical approach without bridging the philosophical gulf between
health care professionals and economists.
Which of these understandings of quality (antitrust economic, medical professional, or health services research) are most appropriate depends largely upon the object of the inquiry. Our challenge was to develop a defensible system of evaluating the ways in which judicial
opinions struggle with-or simply ignore-quality concerns. How should
one expect antitrust courts to approach health care quality? Because any
serious attempt to describe, understand, or discuss quality concerns
would likely resort to themes reflected in the health services research
literature, the presence or absence of language characteristic of that literature may provide a clue to the intensity of judicial interest in quality.
Similarly, if quality concerns were being litigated with any regularity, then
expert witnesses would likely draw upon similar language and concepts,
which would also frequently be evident in judicial opinions.
Alternatively, antitrust courts may attempt to bypass the unfamiliar
language of health services research, preferring to rely on proxy doctrines or other conventional legal devices. Kauper suggests that antitrust
courts may be just as likely to avoid as engage quality concerns in health
care. 35 Furthermore, Kauper argues that health care quality concerns
must first be translated into economic concerns before they will register
in an antitrust analysis. 36 If this is true, then courts would be more likely
to speak of quality in terms of actions taken to reduce malpractice liability
exposure or efforts to build a general reputation for good service, rather
than employing the language of health services research, because reDonabedian, supra note 32, at 79-85; see also R. Adams Dudley et al., supra note 30, at
663-73 (applying the structure, process, outcome framework to evaluate the results of
different studies on the effects of fee-for-service and HMO financial incentives on the
"quality" of patient care); Daniel R. Longo et al., Consumer Reports in Health Care: Do
They Make a Difference in Patient Care?, 278 JAMA 1579, 1581 (1997) ("[Sltructural
variables describe the nature, type and organization of ...

services ...

; process variables

address the care process . . . . Variables indicating the outcome of care include . . .
mortality and patient satisfaction."); R. Heather Palmer, Considerations in Defining
Quality of Health Care, in Striving for Quality in Health Care 1, 28 (R. Heather Palmer et
al. eds., 1991) ("Structural data describe features of health care facilities, equipment,
professional and nonprofessional staff, and organization for delivery of care. Process data
describe the things actually done to or for a patient. Outcome data describe the change in
health status of a patient that is attributable to health care.").
35. See Kauper, supra note 25, at 278. To the extent that the motivation to avoid
quality concerns is based upon the belief that the tradeoffs implicit in quality assessment
are better left to legislators than judges, our instrument should capture this reasoning. See
infra Appendix §§ 5-1-7, 5-1-8, 5-1-9 (coding for discussions pertaining to whether courts
should be cautious applying the antitrust rules to health care because of the professional
values or social imperatives at stake, or whether courts should strictly apply the antitrust
rules in health care in lieu of some express legislative direction to do otherwise).
36. See Kauper, supra note 25, at 296 (arguing that the range of legitimate quality
concerns under antitrust law consists of efforts to ameliorate market failures, actions that

increase efficiency, and actions that would permit providers to compete more effectively).
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duced liability and increased goodwill can be described as enhancing effi37
ciency or competitiveness.
In constructing the coding instrument, we endeavored to be inclusive and tried not to prejudge how courts would approach quality concerns. As a result, we drew freely from all the aforementioned perspectives. A complete list of quality related factors can be found in section 5
of the coding instrument (reproduced in the Appendix). Sections 5-3, 54, and 5-5 track concerns raised in the health services literature, although
the instrument bifurcates the structural component of the structure-process-outcome triad into clinical structure and firm administration.
Clinical structure includes advanced technology, qualifications of physicians and other licensed health professionals, adequacy of staffing, adequacy of physical facilities, continuity of care, accreditation, and certification. Firm administration includes solvency, firm governance, provision
of charity and uncompensated care, bureaucratic restrictions, grievance
procedures, consumer education, and amenities. Because sophisticated
methods for assessing outcome are likely inaccessible to courts, the coding instrument folds clinical outcomes into process, which includes malpractice and negligence concerns, rankings in quality surveys (report
cards), qualitative success scores, provision of preventative services, product defects, and the potential for clinical innovation.
Antitrust law generally analyzes markets rather than individual firms.
We therefore distinguished in the coding instrument between firm-level
and market-level attributes of quality. Antitrust law is also concerned with
issues of product differentiation, consumer choice, and the role of information in the efficient operation of the market. Section 5-7 of the instrument examines these concerns by coding for the range of products and
services available on the market, geographic location, freedom of choice
among health care providers, the market effect of information, professionalism, and the market- or system-wide dimensions of physician qualifications and the quality of health care facilities. The result is a list that we
believe casts a wide net for quality concerns of interest to health care
policymakers that could plausibly be present in the case law.
C. Limitations of the Methodology
Scholarship purporting to conduct empirical assessments of legal issues is increasingly popular. 38 The term "empirical" is used to describe a
variety of topics and methodologies (and, arguably, to cover a variety of
37. Id. at 302-06 (discussing how actions taken to reduce malpractice liability or
create a general reputation for high quality can be framed as improving efficiency or being
procompetitive for antitrust purposes).
38. For a discussion of this approach to legal scholarship, see generally Michael Heise,
The Importance of Being Empirical, 26 Pepp. L. Rev. 807 (1999). For an evaluation and
critique of empiricism in legal scholarship, see Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of
Inference, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2002).
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sins).39 This is a confused area of legal scholarship, with few clear norms
or standards to guide researchers. There is a tendency for each new enterprise to invent its own wheel, often in a fairly ad hoc manner. In some
respects we are no different. Several previous studies are comparable to
our own because they also treat judicial opinions as "data" for social science purposes and subject coded characteristics to various forms of statistical analysis. 40 One of us is on record expressing skepticism about efforts
39. See, e.g., Saul M. Kassin, An Empirical Study of Rule 11 Sanctions, Federal Judicial
Center 8-15 (1985) (discussing federal judges' responses to survey posing Rule 11 sanction
questions under certain fact patterns); Thomas E. Willging et al., Empirical Study of Class
Actions in Four Federal District Courts: Final Report to the Advisory Committee on Civil
Rules, Federal Judicial Center 1-5 (1996) (studying practices and effects of class
certification in four federal districts between 1992 and 1994); David C. Baldus et al., Racial
Discrimination and the Death Penalty in the Post-Furman Era: An Empirical and Legal
Overview, with Recent Findings from Philadelphia, 83 Cornell L. Rev. 1638, 1643, 1662-75
(1998) (studying effects of victims' and defendants' race on death penalty trials in
Pennsylvania); Melinda Gann Hall & Paul Brace, Towards an Integrated Model of Judicial
Voting Behavior, 20 Am. Pol. Q. 147, 147-48, 155-58 (1992) (studying judicial voting
patterns in state death penalty cases); Michael Heise, State Constitutional Litigation,
Educational Finance, and Legal Impact: An Empirical Analysis, 63 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1735,
1735-39 (1995) (studying school finance litigation as a variable in determining levels of
state spending on education); Robert M. Lawless & Dylan Lager Murray, An Empirical
Analysis of Bankruptcy Certiorari, 62 Mo. L. Rev. 101, 102-04 (1997) (studying 611
bankruptcy certiorari petitions to determine the relationship between case characteristics
and the grant of Supreme Court review); William H. Manz, Cardozo's Use of Authority:
An Empirical Study, 32 Cal. W. L. Rev. 31, 31-35 (1995) ("surveying the use of authority in
all the opinions of Benjamin N. Cardozo and his contemporaries on the New York Court of
Appeals and the United States Supreme Court"); John H. Merryman, Toward a Theory of
Citations: An Empirical Study of the Citation Practice of the California Supreme Court in
1950, 1960, and 1970, 50 S. Cal. L. Rev. 381, 381-82 (1977) (studying the types of authority
relied upon in judicial opinions); Gregory C. Sisk, Michael Heise & Andrew P. Morriss,
Charting the Influences on the Judicial Mind: An Empirical Study of Judicial Reasoning,
73 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1377, 1380-84, 1438-51 (1998) (studying effects ofjudges' backgrounds
on legal outcomes under federal sentencing guidelines); Robert H. Smith, Justice Souter
Joins the Rehnquist Court: An Empirical Study of Supreme Court Voting Patterns, 41 U.
Kan. L. Rev. 11, 11-19 (1992) (examining voting patterns ofjustices to assess impact of
changing membership of the Court).
40. See, e.g., Gerard Anderson et al., When Courts Review Medical Appropriateness,
36 Med. Care 1295, 1296-97 (1998) (coding and statistical analysis of judicial opinions in
state and federal insurance coverage cases); Mark A. Hall et al., Judicial Protection of
Managed Care Consumers: An Empirical Study of Insurance Coverage Disputes, 26 Seton
Hall L. Rev. 1055, 1056-59 (1996) (same); James A. Henderson, Jr., Judicial Reliance on
Public Policy: An Empirical Analysis of Products Liability Decisions, 59 Geo. Wash. L. Rev.
1570, 1571, 1586-89 (1991) (coding of 2517 judicial opinions in products liability cases
with analysis of the type and frequency of different forms of judicial reasoning); Ann
Juliano & Stewart J. Schwab, The Sweep of Sexual Harassment Cases, 86 Cornell L. Rev.
548, 549-50, 555-60 (2001) (coding and statistical analysis of 650 judicial opinions in
federal sexual harassment cases between 1986 and 1996); Vicki Schultz & Stephen
Petterson, Race, Gender, Work, and Choice: An Empirical Study of the Lack of Interest
Defense in Title VII Cases ChallengingJob Segregation, 59 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1073, 1089-95
(1992) (coding and statistical analysis of federal judicial opinions between 1965 and 1989
in Title VII cases); Peter D. Jacobson et al., The Role of the Courts in Shaping Health
Policy: An Empirical Analysis, 29J.L. Med. & Ethics 278, 280-86 (2001) (coding judicial
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to treat judicial opinions in an overly quantitative manner. 4 1 The key
question in our minds is whether an appropriate fit exists among the
problem being examined, the methodologies employed, and the specific
questions that the researcher seeks to answer. For many purposes, we
doubt that statistical methods substantially improve on traditional forms
of legal analysis, although the effort systematically to examine a broad
sweep of cases can bring new information to light. We therefore consciously designed our coding instrument to ensure that extracted data
would not become too far removed from the underlying text of the opinions. All of our quality related codes are tied to highlighted passages in
the judicial opinions, and we analyze and present our results in light of
the context in which these discussions take place.
In assessing the strength and limitations of our methodology, the
objective of the coding exercise must be kept in mind. The coding exercise is not intended as a means of determining "what the law is." 42 Instead, each opinion is treated as a discrete unit of analysis, a social artifact
recording how a particular legal decisionmaker frames, understands, and
decides a problem. In other words, the opinions are treated as data, not
precedent. Since the opinions are not being treated as sources of law, the
instrument does not differentiate between appellate and district court
antiopinions. Each opinion is accorded the same weight, an approach
43
thetical to the structured hierarchy that is normally the law.
opinions and assessing the relationship between types of judicial reasoning and case
outcomes).
41. See William M. Sage, Judicial Opinions Involving Health Insurance Coverage:
Trompe L'Oeil or Window on the World?, 31 Ind. L. Rev. 49, 61-68 (1998) (identifying
small sample size, long time lags, selection bias, publication bias, and unstated rationales as
limitations of the judicial dataset).
42. The principal difference between traditional legal research to determine "the law"
and empirical studies of judicial opinions is that, particularly with respect to federal cases,
the former is a much more selective enterprise. Legal treatises, casebooks, and law reviews
typically focus their attention on disputes that reach the highest federal courts, and tend to
ignore (often for good reason) the larger landscape. Decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court
are authoritative. Decisions by federal appeals courts come next in the hierarchy, and
certain courts are accorded substantial deference even if their rulings are not strictly
binding on litigants in other jurisdictions. Decisions in federal district court, the lowest
rank, have precedential value only for other federal courts in the same district, although
such opinions may be considered persuasive by courts elsewhere if they involve comparable
facts or if authored by a particularly respectedjudge. Because our sample of cases includes
judicial opinions from each tier of the court system and our coding instrument makes no
attempt to differentiate the persuasiveness of the legal analysis, our methodology is an
imperfect guide to what the law is.
43. Some may still want to privilege the views of appellate courts, and it is possible to
reconcile such desires with our study methodology. We examine judicial opinions over a
fifteen-year period. One can view a district court opinion as reflecting the wisdom and
advice of past appellate court decisions. As such, the district court opinion is a lagging
indicator of appellate court developments. Over time, one should be able to observe the
influence of particular appellate decisions as they are followed in subsequent cases. If an
appellate opinion comes up with an innovative means of addressing quality claims, that
would get coded not simply for the one appellate case, but for every subsequent occasion
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The coding exercise should be able to shed light on two distinct sets
of questions. First, what are the core characteristics of medical antitrust
litigation-who is suing whom, on what theories, and with what outcomes? Second, and more central to our long term project, what role do
considerations of quality and nonprice competition play in medical antitrust litigation? In assessing these results, the reader needs to be sensitive
to a number of possible limitations in our study design.
Any study of legal disputes raises questions of selection bias. Why are
some antitrust cases brought while others are not? Which cases are likely
to settle and which are likely to be litigated? Which cases are likely to be
appealed and which will end at the trial court level? Not surprisingly, our
study reveals the full pyramid of federal judicial activity. Federal district
courts accounted for 347 of the 542 opinions in our database (64%), federal appeals courts for 191 opinions (35%), and the Supreme Court for
44
merely 4 opinions (1%).
While one must consider the implications of a possible settlement
bias in our sample, this issue may be less pronounced for us than for
other researchers. By including all medical antitrust cases that generate
an opinion, our sample includes cases that are litigated through final verdict and appeal as well as cases that settle after the issue in question is
resolved by the court. 45 As a result, the "settled"/"not settled" distinction
the same reasoning was invoked. Alternatively, if one believes that legal changes take place
through periodic flashes of judicial insight, our process of highlighting and subsequently
reviewing the text of quality related codes should detect these watershed events.
There are additional reasons for being particularly concerned with district court cases.
In assessing judicial capacity to address quality and nonprice concerns, we are interested in
the law in practice. Medical antitrust litigation is fact intensive, product and geographic
markets in health care are frequently small, and repeat players are few. Moreover, to the
extent that a central part of our objective is to examine howjudges think about quality and
nonprice concerns, a focus on judicial opinions, and particularly district court opinions, is
both natural and expected.
44. Cal. Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756 (1999); Summit Health Ltd. v. Pinhas, 500
U.S. 322 (1991); Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94 (1988); FTC v. Ind. Fed'n of Dentists, 476
U.S. 447 (1986). Two other significant Supreme Court opinions involving health care
shortly preceded our sampling period and unquestionably exerted influence over the cases
we studied. See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984); Arizona v.
Maricopa County Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982).
45. George Priest and Benjamin Klein have illustrated how "disputes selected for
litigation (as opposed to settlement) will constitute neither a random nor a representative
sample of the set of all disputes." George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of
Disputes for Litigation, 13J. Legal Stud. 1, 4, 17-20 (1984). Instead, when the assumptions
of the Priest-Klein model are satisfied, litigated disputes tend to group in a fairly symmetric
manner around the controlling "standard of decision," whatever that standard may be. Id.
at 4, 14-15. It is difficult to assess fully the selection bias in our sample. Unlike Priest and
Klein's binary distinction between "litigated" cases (only those cases where a verdict is
rendered) and "settlements" (all other cases), our sample includes a variety of legal
disputes: motions to dismiss, motions for summary judgment, new trial motions, and
appeals. As such, our sample can be viewed as multiple Priest-Klein clusters around a
range of different "decision standards." Id. We do not pretend that this collection
produces a full representative sample, but it should produce a fuller, although perhaps
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does not map well onto our case sample. One might be more concerned
about possible selection bias if one believed that cases raising different
types of quality claims were systematically more likely to settle and therefore escape our notice. We do not believe this to be the case. The
nuanced understandings of quality and nonprice claims that would engender such settlement practices do not yet exist in the literature or case
46
law, and are not part of the folklore among experienced practitioners.
A more serious problem for us may be a publication bias rather than
a settlement bias. We examine only those cases resulting in a written
opinion. A case may settle before an opinion issues, or a case may work
its entire way through the legal process and result in a jury verdict without an accompanying opinion. The seriousness of this limitation is difficult to assess. By relying upon LEXIS rather than the official reporters,
we capture and code many cases not formally destined for "official" publication. In addition, cases treating novel issues and cases creating new law
are the strongest candidates for publication. To the extent that sophisticated discussions of quality and nonprice competition fall into these categories, we are relatively confident that they will end up in our sample.
A related selection problem is that legitimate health care quality concerns may simply not be litigated. Antitrust litigation is expensive. If litigating quality related claims requires expert testimony or detailed economic analysis, such claims would more often be pursued in cases where
the stakes are high and the litigants well funded. The fact that, compared
to price claims, quality claims are likely to represent higher risk strategies
with lower expected payoffs would tend to accentuate this effect. Alternatively, because contemporary antitrust law does not create many obvious
placeholders for nonprice concerns, quality may be litigated under alternative guises. It is difficult for any coding instrument to detect claims
that are not brought, or that are brought (or resolved) in camouflaged
doctrinal form. As a partial solution, our coding instrument liberally employs categories for "other" and "unspecified" quality concerns to detect
some of these instances, and our review of the cases was done with these
47
possibilities in mind.
Various strategic biases may also be in play. In general, empirical
assessments of litigation from an "objective" social science perspective
noisier sample than would result from a focus on a narrow subset of disputes. A more
serious issue for us may be accounting for the biases attributable to the factors influencing
whether or not a judicial decision or legal outcome results in a published opinion. We
explore the extent to which the cases in our sample comply with or deviate from the PriestKlein hypothesis. See infra notes 129-133 and accompanying text.
46. Uncertainty may discourage settlement because the parties are less likely to have
convergent expectations about the probability of particular outcomes and therefore the
value of the case. On the other hand, greater uncertainty may increase the incentives of
risk averse parties to settle claims. Which effect predominates may determine whether
quality claims are under or overrepresented in a sample of litigated (unsettled) cases. For
further discussions of settiement models, see infra notes 129-138 and accompanying text.
47. See, e.g., infra Appendix §§ 5-4-7, 5-6-3, 5-7-9.
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often underappreciate the extent to which outputs of the legal process
are determined by adversarial proceedings fraught with strategic behavior, including at the stage of drafting ajudicial opinion. Specifically, not
all "quality" claims are equally meritorious. There is a long history in
antitrust law of quality claims being used to rationalize behavior that is
patently anticompetitive. Quality may even be invoked strategically to
confuse issues or introduce greater uncertainty into the litigation. Judges
also have various motives for writing opinions, and do not necessarily reveal the true reasons for their decisions in text. 48 Our coding instrument
cannot detect strategic behavior on the part of litigants or judges, although information we adduce about the scope of legal analysis and comparisons between quality claims and case outcomes can help shed light on
this question.
Finally, we have kept statistical analysis to a minimum in reporting
our results. Formal predictive models should be reserved for situations in
which the specific legal question examined in each case is similar. 49 Our
sample, on the other hand, involves every type of antitrust claim. Nevertheless, several comparisons and associations we report require statistical
validation. The general model for these analyses used simple bivariate
cross-tabulations of categorical data. Statistical significance of observed
relationships was determined using tests of association, including chisquare tests. Where coded information involved multiple but not mutually exclusive categories, we examined cross-tabulations that permitted
overlapping responses. Results were significant at p _<.05 unless otherwise specified.

II.

EMPIRICAL RESULTS

We divide the results of our case review into three parts: information
about the universe of private disputes involving the health care industry
that arise under federal antitrust law, information pertaining to the formal antitrust enforcement activities of public agencies, and, finally, specific observations about judicial and enforcement agency treatment of
nonprice competition and health care quality.
We report some results in terms of the number of judicial opinions
in our sample (N=542) that exhibit particular characteristics. These include the procedural question giving rise to a particular judicial determination (for example, summary judgment, motion to dismiss, appeal of
48. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize? (The Same
Thing Everybody Else Does), 3 Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. 1, 25-30 (1993) (describing how the
motivations of judges affect judicial opinions).
49. Anderson et al., supra note 40; Juliano & Schwab, supra note 40; and Schultz &
Patterson, supra note 40, fall into the category of collecting and analyzing comparable
legal questions and are more appropriate candidates for the statistical methods those
authors employ. Of course, similar methods of analysis could apply to subsets of a
heterogeneous sample if the subset contained sufficiently analogous legal questions and
was sufficiently large.
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jury verdict), the resolution of each such question (both the party favored
by the court and the specific remedy granted or withheld), the alleged
violations of antitrust law considered by the court, and the type of legal
analysis performed. However, in order to avoid skewing our conclusions
toward parties or fact patterns that for one reason or another gave rise to
protracted litigation that occupied the courts over a series of opinions, we
report other results (for example, characteristics of the parties, the business conduct involved, the geographic market implicated) in terms of the
number of distinct disputes (N=394) represented by the opinions in our
sample.5 0 Where dates were needed for disputes as opposed to individual
opinions, we used the date of the first opinion generated by the dispute.
A. Private Medical Antitrust Litigation
Federal antitrust law provides several enforcement avenues: criminal
and civil enforcement by the Department of Justice (DOJ), civil administrative enforcement by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), civil enforcement by state attorneys general, and civil actions by private parties
with the prospect of treble damages (as well as defensive antitrust pleadings by private parties in civil litigation). As might be expected, public
enforcement concentrates on conduct deemed by the government most
likely to threaten social welfare, and accordingly it is likely to attract
5
greater attention from legal scholars. '
Empirical evidence reveals a different picture. Between 1985 and
1999, private antitrust suits dominated public ones in terms of the number of cases resolved by courts. In our review, litigation by public enforcement agencies generated only 22 of the 394 health care antitrust disputes
we identified (6%). By contrast, private plaintiffs were involved in 372
50. Of the disputes associated with multiple opinions, 5 disputes generated 5
opinions, one dispute generated 4 opinions, 22 disputes generated 3 opinions, and 78
disputes generated 2 opinions. These numbers are relatively small because, as noted
above, we only coded opinions that, considered in themselves, involved both health care
and antitrust law. If one includes opinions on procedural and other matters that do not
meet our test for relevance, one dispute (In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust
Litig., 123 F.3d 599 (7th Cir. 1997)) generated 42 opinions, 2 disputes generated 8
opinions, 2 disputes generated 7 opinions, 4 disputes generated 6 opinions, 5 disputes
generated 5 opinions, 8 disputes generated 4 opinions, 28 disputes generated 3 opinions,
and 117 disputes generated 2 opinions.
51. This is at least true for public litigation. By contrast, the underbelly of public
enforcement, which consists of consent decrees, business review letters, and advisory
opinions, is often neglected. See infra Part II.B. This is a potentially serious oversight.
While the figures are a little dated, it is reported that between 1973 and 1981 some 92% of
civil antitrust actions ended in the entry of consent decrees. Janet L. McDavid et al.,
Antitrust Consent Decrees: Ten Years of Experience Under the Tunney Act, 52 Antitrust
L.J. 883, 883 (1983). Moreover, as antitrust enforcers act increasingly as regulators rather
than prosecutors, what happens outside of the courtroom may be more important than
what is litigated and reported in judicial opinions. The DOJ's and FTC's regulatory roles
are explored in greater detail infra notes 155-160 and accompanying text.
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disputes (94%). Therefore, we present results relating to private litigation before turning to public antitrust enforcement activities.
1. Parties.- Most private cases involved more than one plaintiff and
more than one defendant. Physicians in solo or small group practice
were by far the largest plaintiff group, accounting for 195 private disputes
(53%). Pharmaceutical companies and medical device manufacturers
were the second largest plaintiff group (45 disputes; 12%), followed by
nonphysician health professionals such as nurses and chiropractors (26
disputes; 7%) and hospitals (23 disputes; 6%). All but one of the disputes with nonphysician health professionals as plaintiffs occurred in the
first five years of the study period (1985-1989). Hospitals constituted the
largest defendant pool (225 disputes; 61%), followed by solo or small
group physicians (124 disputes; 33%).52 Professional associations served
as plaintiffs in 11 disputes (3%), and as defendants in 24 disputes (6%).
Large physician groups were plaintiffs in only 5 disputes (2%) and defendants in 9 disputes (2%). Although there are 17,000 nursing homes
in the United States, and long-term care accounts for approximately $90
billion annually in spending, 53 a trivial amount of antitrust litigation involved nursing homes (2 disputes as plaintiffs; 2 disputes as defendants).
For reasons that will become clear below, the most common plaintiffdefendant pairing in our data pits physicians against hospitals (166 disputes; 45%), and the second most common pairing pits physicians
against other physicians (105 disputes; 28%). Hospitals sued each other
far less often than they were sued by physicians (17 disputes; 5%) and
even more rarely sued physicians (7 disputes; 2%), reflecting the historical relationship between the two in which hospitals treated physicians as
customers rather that co-producers because of physicians' control over
54
hospital use by patients.
Pharmaceutical companies, medical device manufacturers, and
other health care suppliers became embroiled in litigation from time to
time as both plaintiffs (59 disputes; 16%), and defendants (57 disputes;
15%), most of the time against one another (38 disputes; 10%). Disputes
with pharmaceutical company defendants increased from 7 in 1985-1989
to 21 in 1995-1999. It was rare for providers of medical goods (e.g., pharmaceutical companies) and providers of medical services (e.g., hospitals)
52. Because plaintiffs commonly sue more than one defendant, the number of
defendants in our sample greatly exceeded the number of distinct disputes.
53. See Robert Pear, U.S. May Ease Rein on Nursing Homes, N.Y. Times, Sept. 5,
2001, at Al; Katharine Levit et al., Health Spending in 1998: Signals of Change, Health
Aff.,Jan./Feb. 2000, at 124, 125 (reporting that $87.8 billion was spent on nursing homes
in 1998). One possible explanation is that long-term care is chronically underfunded, with
state Medicaid agencies financing approximately half of expenditures. As a result, few
competitors have sought to serve that sector, and nonprofit organizations still account for
nearly half of nursing homes (this may be changing as the aging population creates greater
paid demand for these services). Perhaps most importantly, affiliations with nursing
homes are not important to most physicians' livelihoods.
54. Paul Starr, The Social Transformation of American Medicine 161-69 (1982).

2002]

ANTITRUST AND HEALTH CARE QUALITY

to square off against one another. Part of this is attributable to rules of
antitrust standing that generally preclude suits by indirect as opposed to
direct purchasers. 55 Another part may reflect the relative paucity of cases
in our sample from vertically integrated sectors of health care markets,
even though the extent of integration is increasing with the growth of
managed care. One exception to this claim was In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litigation, a dispute that was prompted by contractual
ties among health insurers, hospitals, and pharmaceutical companies
by
through pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs), which were challenged
56
discrimination.
price
unlawful
as
pharmacies
independent
Two additional observations are worth making from these data.
First, in the rapid transition to managed care over the time period studied, insurance companies, HMOs, and other financing intermediaries
were more likely to be involved in private litigation as defendants (61
disputes, 16%) than as plaintiffs (19 disputes; 5%). The most common
plaintiffs in cases with insurance related defendants were physicians (19
disputes; 5%), followed by other insurance related organizations (14 disputes; 4%). Second, because physicians were the most common plaintiffs
and hospitals the most common defendants, a lot of antitrust litigation
involved for-profit plaintiffs suing nonprofit defendants (89 disputes;
24%). 57 Private, nonprofit organizations were seldom plaintiffs in the
cases we studied (18 disputes; 5%).
2. Business Conduct. - What types of commercial arrangements lead
to antitrust litigation in health care? The business conduct at issue in the
disputes we reviewed is shown in Figure 1, which compares private plaintiffs with public enforcement (combined litigation and settlements). In
55. A private antitrust plaintiff faces a number of possible hurdles in terms of standing
and injury requirements. Private plaintiffs must suffer some form of antitrust injury.
Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977). In addition,
plaintiffs must suffer an individual injury to their "business or property," 15 U.S.C. § 15(a)
(1994), that is of a direct rather than an indirect nature. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431
U.S. 720, 735 (1977). These rules reflect an effort to achieve a difficult balance. The
policy objective is to align the private interests of those granted standing with the public
interests of the antitrust laws and to ensure that the entities granted standing have
sufficient incentives to pursue valid claims, while at the same time avoiding the possibility
that the antitrust laws themselves are coopted to serve anticompetitive ends in the hands of
one competitor against another. For a general discussion of antitrust standing, see
Hovenkamp, supra note 3, §§ 16.2-16.6. The issue of whether these private standing
doctrines have been effective in presenting and framing issues in a manner that advances
the public interest in medical antitrust cases is addressed infra note 146 and accompanying
text.
56. 123 F.3d 599 (7th Cir. 1997). The appeal primarily involved claims under section
1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1, alleging a price fixing conspiracy by drug
manufacturers. Id. at 602.
57. Approximately 60% of acute care hospitals in the United States are private,
nonprofit organizations. Bradford H. Gray, Hospital Ownership Form and Care of the
Uninsured, in The Future U.S. Healthcare System: Who Will Care for the Poor and
Uninsured? 207, 208 (Stuart H. Altman, Uwe E. Reinhardt & Alexandra E. Shields eds.,
1998).
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private litigation, 62% of the disputes involved dealings between physicians and hospitals, and followed two dominant patterns. The most common type of private claims involved staff privileges (129 disputes; 35%),
with a physician denied membership on a hospital medical staff suing the
hospital and the staff physicians involved in the denial alleging that the
action was taken to prevent competition from the newcomer. 58

(Some

staff privileges disputes involve current members of the medical staff
whose privileges are curtailed or revoked, rather than prospective members). The second, related pattern challenges a hospital's decision to
grant an exclusive contract to one physician or physician group to provide professional services in a department of the hospital, such as an
emergency room or radiology suite (106 disputes; 28%).59 Of the 143
disputes that did not fall into one of these two categories, corporate combinations (mergers and joint ventures) were at issue in 23 disputes, insurance arrangements were at issue in 50 disputes, 30 disputes involved information, and 62 disputes involved other matters. 60 The information
cases included matters such as membership decisions by professional as-

sociations, accreditation decisions by private self-regulatory organizations,
restrictions imposed by professional bodies on advertising and marketing
61
activities by members, and sharing information among competitors.
Figure 2 shows the distribution of cases over time. 62 The total number of disputes was essentially constant from the first period studied
58. The "medical staff' of a hospital consists of the physicians who treat patients at
that hospital, and is typically a self-governing body independent of the hospital's corporate
organization. Most American hospitals have an "open medical staff," meaning that any
qualified physician can seek the privilege of admitting patients to and caring for patients at
that hospital. Membership on a medical staff is usually determined by a committee of the
current members, who tend to be physicians in private practice in the community. Barry
R. Furrow et al., Health Law 795-96 (4th ed. 2001). Because new applicants to a medical
staff are judged through collective action by their potential competitors, medical staff
disputes map easily onto the template of possible Sherman Act section 1 violations. See,
e.g., Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94, 105-06 (1988) (finding that medical staff admissions
are not sheltered by the state action doctrine from antitrust enforcement in the absence of
active state supervision, and upholding a nearly $2 million judgment in favor of a surgeon
denied staff privileges); see also Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 11,101-11,152 (1994) (granting antitrust immunity to medical staff admission processes
that meet certain standards).
59. Approximately two-thirds of the exclusive contracting disputes followed this
physician-hospital pattern. The remaining one-third of exclusive contract cases involved
pharmaceutical companies, other medical suppliers, or insurance companies entering into
exclusive relationships rather than hospitals.
60. Approximately 10% of the cases involved more than one category of conduct, so
that the sum of the private cases according to business conduct exceeds 372.
61. See infra notes 199-208 and accompanying text.
62. Because litigation is time consuming, it may take several years for a dispute to
generate a published judicial opinion. The Georgetown Antitrust project reports the
mean length of private antitrust cases generally to be 24.9 months Oust over two years)
from filing to termination, with the median length of 16.6 months Oust under a year and a
half). Salop & White, supra note 15, at 10. NERA reports an average time of nearly
nineteen months between filing and disposition. NERA, Antitrust Report, supra note 16,
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(1985-1989) to the last (1995-1999). Staff privileges cases declined from
51 in 1985-1989 to 34 in 1995-1999, probably reflecting the facts that
very few of these cases are decided in favor of plaintiffs and legislation
making it even harder for plaintiffs to prevail was enacted in 1986.63 Information cases also decreased in frequency from the earliest to the most
recent part of the study period. Specifically, claims involving private
credentialing and conduct by professional organizations-both physician
dominated categories-declined over time, providing further support for
the erosion of physicians' economic power in recent years. On the other
hand, exclusive contracting cases increased slightly over time (although
the difference is not statistically significant), overtaking staff privileges
at 51. Regardless, the litigation process is highly variable, so time series data should be
interpreted cautiously.
63. Health Care Quality Improvement Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11,101-11,152 (making it
more difficult to sue doctors successfully by granting qualified immunity to doctors
engaged in a peer review process).
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cases as the most common fact pattern in 1995-1999. In addition, rising
pharmaceutical and medical product litigation led to an increase in
"other" cases in 1995-1999.
FIGURE 2: PRIVATE LITIGATION BY DATE AND BUSINESS CONDUCT
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Our data show some impact of the horizontal consolidation (for example, large hospital systems) and vertical integration (for example, ventures between insurance companies and health care providers) that have
been prominent features of the health care landscape of the last decade. 64 Including public litigation (private challenges to mergers are uncommon), disputes involving corporate combinations rose from 6 in
1985-1989 to 15 in 1995-1999. Despite managed care, insurance cases
have decreased over time. While case involving contractual terms set unilaterally by defendants (mostly insurance companies) generated 6 disputes in both 1985-1989 and 1995-1999, disputes over noncontractual
payer standards and practices dropped sharply from 14 in 1985-1989 to
2 in 1995-1999. A possible explanation for this is that the latter category
frequently involved insurers placing limits on coverage of services by nonphysician health professionals such as chiropractors, raising concerns
that physicians were conspiring with one another and with insurers to
exclude their competitors. These cases have faded, while contract of adhesion cases have not, because managed care has increased the power of
insurers and allowed them to dictate terms to physicians rather than vice
65
versa.
64. See generally James C. Robinson, The Corporate Practice of Medicine 63-210
(1999) (describing patterns of integration and consolidation); William M. Sage, "Health
Law 2000": The Legal System and the Changing Health Care Market, Health Aff., Fall
1996, at 9, 15-24 (describing the legal consequences of integration and consolidation in
health care).
65. The change over a relatively short period of time is fairly dramatic. Compare Va.
Acad. of Clinical Psychologists v. Blue Shield of Va., 624 F.2d 476, 485 (4th Cir. 1980),
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3. Geography. - The physical location of antitrust disputes has important legal and public policy implications. For several reasons, one
might expect more antitrust activity in health care than in other sectors
of the economy, with that activity concentrated in smaller geographic
markets. First, it is more difficult to transport services than to transport
goods. Therefore, geographic markets for care by physicians, hospitals,
and other service providers tend to be smaller than for manufactured
items such as pharmaceuticals and durable medical equipment. 6 6 Second, the importance of coordination in health care service delivery enhances the need for familiarity among the participants, and therefore geographic proximity. Third, the professional nature of health care
increases the role of informal information networks based on personal
relationships. Fourth, patients requiring health care are often sicker and
less mobile than is the case for most services in the general economy.
These aspects of health care reduce demand and supply substitution,
making it more likely that producer concentration will confer market
power or that collusion might arise, provoking an antitrust complaint.
Smaller, rural markets also have been the focus of efforts by the health
care industry to obtain legislative relief from antitrust enforcement on
the grounds that hospitals and physicians in those areas are "failing firms"
or perhaps even "natural monopolies," combining or acting in concert
67
simply in order to survive economically.
where the court was concerned about the extent to which physicians might be powerful
enough to co-opt the independent decisionmaking authority of the payor and exploit it
towards anticompetitive ends, with Ambroze v. Aetna Health Plans of N.Y., No. 95 CIV.
6631 (DLC), 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7274, at *13-*14 (S.D.N.Y. May 28, 1996), vacated by
No. 96-7778, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 1048 (2d Cir. Jan. 24, 1997), where the plaintiff
physicians' theory of the case was that managed care plans are so powerful that they can
dictate contractual terms to physicians that might impair their ability to exercise
independent professional judgment.
66. See Hovenkamp, supra note 3, § 3.6b (discussing geographic markets for
stationary goods and services). One effect of managed care has been to expand
geographic markets for services by transporting customers to the service. For example,
some managed care organizations give patients strong financial incentives to utilize more
distant hospitals, especially for specialized services (so-called "tertiary care" or "quaternary
care") such as cancer care or organ transplantation. This ability has been central to the
geographic market definition and market power analysis in several recent hospital merger
cases. See, e.g., FTC v. Tenet Health Care Corp., 186 F.3d 1045, 1049-55 (8th Cir. 1999)
(citing increasing tendency of managed care plans to "steer" patients in justifying a
broader geographic market than defined by district court and therefore reversing district
court's grant of preliminary injunction blocking defendants' hospital merger).
67. Most of this legislative activity has taken place at the state level. Before state law
can extend antitrust immunity to private actors, however, it must satisfy the requirements
of the state action doctrine. See U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, Pub. No. HEHS-94-220,
Health Care: Federal and State Antitrust Actions Concerning the Health Care Industry
10-13 (1994) (detailing efforts of states to grant hospitals and other health care providers
immunity under state action doctrine); Fred J. Hellinger, Antitrust Enforcement in the
Healthcare Industry: The Expanding Scope of State Enforcement, 33 Health Services Res.
1477, 1480-86 (1998) (summarizing recent activities of states that have attempted to
exempt health care conduct from antitrust liability under state action doctrine).
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Our data show a wider geographic range of antitrust activity than the
preceding analysis would predict (see Figure 3), with litigation seeming
to track prosperity and financial resources as much as any other factor.
Smaller market areas accounted for 139 disputes (37%); larger market
areas for 233 disputes (63%).68 Setting aside disputes occurring in statewide, regional, national, or global markets, most of which involved health
care goods rather than services, nearly as many antitrust disputes arose in
large cities and suburbs as in smaller communities. Suburban locations
accounted for 46 disputes (12%), raising the possibility that increased
competition and the restructuring of economic relations that accompanies it are as likely as diminished competition to lead to antitrust litigation. 69 Rural areas generated only 30 disputes (8%), far less than political rhetoric would suggest. The distribution of disputes between larger
and smaller market areas was stable over the time period we studied.
However, controversies in large cities were less common in 1985-1989
(11 disputes) than in 1995-1999 (28 disputes), while those in suburban
areas were less common in 1995-1999 (10 disputes) than in 1985-1989
(21 disputes).
68. We defined geography by locating in an atlas the businesses whose conduct
prompted antitrust litigation. Cities with populations less than 100,000, not within the
metropolitan area of a larger city, were deemed "small." Towns with populations less than
10,000, not clustered with other towns of similar or larger size, and areas with diffuse
populations, were deemed "rural." Towns within the metropolitan area of cities with
populations greater than 100,000 were deemed "suburbs." Some disputes involving
professional associations or governments were judged "statewide" or "regional." Disputes
involving manufactured goods were judged "statewide," "regional," or "national/global"
depending on the circumstances. Some cases involved conduct taking place across
different economic markets. The existence of multiple coding explains why the coded
categories slightly exceed the number of total disputes.
69. Prior to the health care cost crisis of the 1980s, emerging suburbs were natural
locations for new health facilities. These locations benefited from rising real estate values
and low charitable care loads and could predictably cover expenses with payments from
Medicare and private insurers. More recently, private managed care and Medicare's
prospective payment system, implemented in 1982, subjected these organizations and the
physicians who practiced in them to a much harsher financial environment. See Furrow et
al., supra note 58, at 695-98.
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Dividing the cases according to business conduct, nearly half of staff
privileges disputes involved small cities or towns (57; 44%), with most of
the remainder split about evenly between large cities (25; 20%) and suburbs (23; 18%). Exclusive contracting disputes were more broadly distributed, with the hospital related cases largely resembling staff privileges
cases, but with the pharmaceutical and insurance related exclusive contracting cases implicating larger geographic markets. Approximately
10% of staff privileges and exclusive contracting cases involved rural
areas.
4. Court. - The distribution of cases among the federal appellate
circuits in the United States is given in Figure 4. The greatest number of
cases arose in the Third, Second, and Ninth Circuits, and the fewest in
the First and Eighth Circuits. Dividing cases according to business conduct (see Figure 5), staff privileges disputes were concentrated in the
Fifth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits, and exclusive contracting disputes
were concentrated in the Fourth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits. These differences basically track regional variations in the structure of health care
delivery and in the competitiveness of hospital markets. Not surprisingly,
courts in the Second and Seventh Circuits heard the most cases involving
business conduct other than staff privileges or exclusive contracting, with
many of these disputes relating to pharmaceuticals or other medical
products.
FIGURE
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5. ProceduralPosture and Outcome. -

Motions heard by federal district

judges accounted for 331 (65%) of the 511 private opinions in our
database, most of which (286) were defense motions for summary judgment, with the remainder including motions by plaintiffs for injunctive
relief, post-trial motions, motions in limine to exclude evidence, and
fights over the scope of discovery. The remaining 178 opinions (35%)
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were written by appellate courts, over 80% of those (145 opinions) resolving appeals by plaintiffs. These results imply that defendants in health
70
care antitrust cases usually succeed in deflecting suits prior to trial.
The infrequency with which plaintiffs prevail in private health care
antitrust disputes is confirmed by our results regarding significant dispositions in favor of one party or the other. We considered a disposition to
be "significant" if it determined or substantially influenced the overall
outcome of the dispute between the parties. Minor procedural rulings in
favor of one party were not considered significant. We counted denial of
a summary judgment motion made by the defendant as a plaintiff victory,
because it imposes potentially large trial costs on defendants even if they
eventually prevail, and therefore promotes settlement. 7 1 We also
counted a significant outcome for the plaintiff in a given opinion as a
plaintiff victory regardless of whether it was subsequently reversed on appeal. 72 Even with this expansive definition of plaintiff victory, only 70
(14%) of the opinions in our database favored plaintiffs, while 341 (67%)
favored defendants and 100 (20%) did not significantly benefit either
party.
Separating opinions according to business conduct (see Figure 6),
plaintiffs were least successful in staff privileges cases, prevailing in only
12 opinions (7%).73 Plaintiffs were most successful in cases involving information, prevailing on 11 occasions (26%). Exclusive contracting
cases, insurance cases, and "other" cases (for example, pharmaceutical
disputes) showed intermediate rates of plaintiff victories.
Several other attributes of private cases were significantly correlated
with the disposition of judicial opinions, some of which were likely mediated by the business conduct at issue. Physician plaintiffs were less likely
to obtain favorable rulings than other types of plaintiffs such as hospitals,
insurance related organizations, or pharmaceutical companies. Insurance or pharmaceutical company defendants were less likely to obtain
favorable rulings than physician or hospital defendants. Opinions from
70. As noted previously, a limitation of our study is that we cannot determine the
percentage of cases that settle or the terms of such settlements. See supra text
accompanying notes 45-46. For example, it is possible that denials of medical staff
privileges are revisited when legal complaints are filed, and membership subsequently
granted. Our sense based on experience, however, is that these suits are more likely to be
dropped by plaintiffs than to be settled by defendants.
.71. In the process of briefing and arguing the defendant's unsuccessful summary
judgment motion, the parties also obtain additional information about the merits of their
rival's case, as well as the judge's disposition toward the underlying claim. The reduction
in uncertainty created by the new information may lead the parties' expectations to come
closer together, which may induce settlement.
72. Again, this approach differs from traditional forms of legal analysis that focus
primarily upon the outcome at the final stage of the legal process. As made clear in our
discussion of methodology, judicial opinions are being viewed as social science data, not
precedent, and as discrete social artifacts, not sources of law.
73. Plaintiffs were also unsuccessful in challenging corporate combinations, although
the number of cases in this category was too low to draw conclusions with confidence.
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courts in the Tenth, Fourth, and Second Circuits were more likely to find
for plaintiffs than courts in the First, Eleventh, or Sixth Circuits. 74 The
findings regarding the Fourth and First Circuits are surprising because
the former heard a comparatively large percentage of staff privileges and
exclusive contracting claims, which are hard to win, while the latter heard
relatively few of those cases.
Interestingly, the size of geographic market did not correlate with
outcome. Nor did the five-year period during which an opinion was issued influence its disposition, except that opinions issued in 1990-1994
were more likely to be indeterminate than to favor defendants, while
opinions issued in 1995-1999 were more likely to favor defendants than
to be indeterminate (the proportion favoring plaintiffs remained constant). This difference was primarily attributable to staff privileges cases,
raising the possibility that the courts required a few years to develop confidence applying the Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986.
Only 14 disputes (4%; generating 22 opinions) resulted in courts
granting remedies to private plaintiffs. Damages were awarded in just 6
disputes (generating 10 opinions). 75 Injunctions were granted in just 3
74. A caveat is that the absolute number of cases in some of these jurisdictions was
small, making these findings unstable despite their statistical significance.
75. Brown v. Presbyterian Healthcare Servs., 101 F.3d 1324, 1336 (10th Cir. 1996)
(reversing district court's order vacating jury's award of compensatory and punitive
damages on plaintiff's tortious interference claim; affirming denial of punitive damages on
antitrust claim and affirming jury's finding of antitrust liability and damages); Oltz v. St.
Peter's Cmty. Hosp., 656 F. Supp. 760, 765 (D. Mont. 1987) (upholding jury verdict in
favor of plaintiff nurse anesthetist on antitrust liability, but granting defendant's motion
for new trial on damages), aft'd, 861 F.2d 1440, 1452-53 (9th Cir. 1988) (affirming district
court's finding of liability and holding that ordering new trial on damages was not abuse of
discretion), remand to No. CV 81-271-H-JFB, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20594, *24 (D. Mont.
May 10, 1991) (excluding certain of plaintiffs proffered evidence on damages and
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disputes (generating 6 opinions) .76 Two of the disputes resulting in damage awards were staff privileges cases, two were exclusive contracting
cases, and two were insurance cases (including one involving allegations
of a boycott and exclusionary conduct to block the market entry of an
HMO). Other remedies included a successful effort to remove an antitrust case out of a bankruptcy court, and a defendant successfully obtaining Rule 11 sanctions against a plaintiff bringing a frivolous antitrust
claim. 7 As discussed below, the DOJ and F-FC have had substantially
greater success than private plaintiffs, but even their remedies have been

granting defendant's motion for partial summary judgment), rev'd, 19 F.3d 1312, 1313
(9th Cir. 1994) (reversing partial summary judgment on damages and remanding for a
new trial); Reazin v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Kan., Inc., 663 F. Supp. 1360, 1421,
1429-30 (D. Kan. 1987) (upholdingjury verdict on Sherman Act § 1 and § 2 claims, state
tortious interference claim, and award of damages), aff'd, 899 F.2d 951, 983 (10th Cir.
1990).
76. Redwood Empire Life Support v. County of Sonoma, No. 91-16444, 1993 U.S.
App. LEXIS 1913, at *2 (9th Cir. Jan. 29, 1993) (affirming grant of preliminary injunction
to antitrust plaintiff as not being abuse of district court's discretion); Blue Cross & Blue
Shield United of Wis. v. Marshfield Clinic, 883 F. Supp. 1247, 1258-60, 1267 (W.D. Wis.
1995) (upholding jury's Sherman Act § I and § 2 verdicts and entering broad injunctive
relief in the form of a conduct remedy), affd in part and rev'd in part, 65 F.3d 1406,
1411-17 (7th Cir. 1995) (reversing finding of liability on price fixing and monopolization
claims, but affirming finding of liability on market allocation claim and remanding case for
new trial on damages resulting from illegal market allocation agreement and to
reformulate injunction), remanded by 980 F. Supp. 1298, 1301-02 (W.D. Wis. 1997)
(district court granting defendant's motion for partial summary judgment holding that
plaintiff failed to prove damages on market allocation claim and dissolving completely its
previous injunction), aff'd in part and vacated in part, 152 F.3d 588 (7th Cir. 1998)
(affirming grant of summary judgment due to absence of damages, but reversing on
question of plaintiffs entitlement to injunctive relief and some portion of fees and costs);
Wilk v. Am. Med. Assoc., 671 F. Supp. 1465, 1477-84, 1505 (N.D. Ill. 1987) (finding on
remand that AMA was liable for antitrust violations against plaintiff chiropractor and
issuing permanent injunction against specific illegal conduct), aff'd, 895 F.2d 352, 355 (7th
Cir. 1990); see also FTC v. Univ. Health, Inc., 938 F.2d 1206, 1225-26 (11th Cir. 1991)
(reversing district court's denial of FTC's request for preliminary injunction and issuing its
own injunction to block defendant hospital merger pending FTC adjudication); FTC v.
Tenet Healthcare Corp., 17 F. Supp. 2d 937, 939 (E.D. Mo. 1998) (issuing preliminary
injunction enjoining hospital merger pending full administrative review), rev'd, 186 F.3d
1045, 1055 (8th Cir. 1999); FTC v. Cardinal Health, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d 34, 68 (D.D.C.
1998) (granting FTC preliminary injunction preventing merger of wholesale prescription
drug distributors); United States v. Rockford Mem'l Corp., 717 F. Supp. 1251, 1292 (N.D.
Ill. 1989) (granting DOJ's motion for preliminary injunction preventing hospital merger),
aff'd, 898 F.2d 1278, 1286 (7th Cir. 1990).
77. See Lifemark Hosps. of La. v. Liljeberg Enters., Inc., 161 B.R. 21, 27 (Bankr. E.D.
La. 1993) (granting plaintiffs motion to remove antitrust issue from bankruptcy
proceeding); Colo. Chiropractic Council v. Porter Mem'l Hosp., 650 F. Supp. 231, 245 (D.
Col. 1986) (ordering Rule 11 sanctions against losing antitrust plaintiff for bringing
frivolous suit); see also United States v. N.D. Hosp. Ass'n, 640 F. Supp. 1028, 1044 (D.N.D.
1986) (granting DOJ's summary judgment motion on liability, but denying government's
request for injunction because there was no continuing violation).
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limited.7 8 For example, only one case in our sample involved criminal
79
penalties.
6. Antitrust Allegations and Violations. - The range of antitrust violations in the cases we examined can be divided into three categories: allegations under the Sherman or Clayton Act traditionally considered "per
se" violations of law (for example, price fixing), allegations under the
Sherman or Clayton Act usually subjected to more detailed rule-of-reason
analysis (for example, exclusive dealing), and allegations under other
statutes such as the Robinson-Patman Act or various state antitrust laws.
Most antitrust plaintiffs will allege as many violations as possible in their
complaints. For example, alleging conduct that is illegal per se is strategically valuable because it can reduce plaintiffs' discovery and expert witness costs (anticompetitive effects are presumed once a prima facie case
is established). We coded alleged violations only when the court rendering the opinion took the issue seriously enough to discuss its merits.
The most common allegations were unreasonable restraint of trade
(184 opinions; 36%), monopolization (184 opinions; 36%), attempted
monopolization (156 opinions; 31%), and boycott (146 opinions; 29%).
These allegations correspond to the fact patterns presented in staff privileges and exclusive contracting cases. Violations that would fall into
traditional per se illegal categories of antitrust law were alleged 237 times
in the 511 private opinions reviewed. Because of the prevalence of staff
privileges disputes, more than half (146) were boycott claims. Boycott
claims are useful because they may trigger a form of per se liability, although the pragmatic benefits of claiming per se illegal boycotts are less
significant after cases such as Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific
80
Stationary & PrintingCo.

Hard core per se violations-price fixing, geographic market allocation, and product market allocation-were alleged in a total of 63 opinions (12%). These allegations were raised more often in insurance cases
(24 opinions; 27%) exclusive contracting cases (18 opinions; 13%), and
78. See infra text accompanying notes 98-104.
79. United States v. Alston, 974 F.2d 1206, 1215 (9th Cir. 1992) (reversing acquittals
notwithstanding verdict against two dentists for illegal price fixing, but permitting district
court to consider ordering new trials). The absence of criminal prosecutions stands in
contrast with the Reagan and early Bush administrations' policies in other areas of
antitrust enforcement, which orchestrated a shift away from civil and towards criminal
cases. See GAO Report, supra note 17, at 3 (noting shift).
80. 472 U.S. 284, 298 (1985) (holding that conduct of joint purchasing cooperative
was not per se unlawful absent proof of market power). While the state of boycott law
remains confused after Northwest Wholesale Stationers, most courts require proof of some
level of market power on the part of the defendant before invoking the per se rule. A
similar "soft" per se rule now governs tying agreements as well. See Jefferson Parish Hosp.
Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 15-16 (1984) (adding market power requirement as part of
plaintiff's prima facie case before invoking per se rule against tying). But see NYNEX
Corp. v. Discon, Inc., 525 U.S. 128, 135 (1998), and FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers
Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411, 421-23 (1990), for cases suggesting that some aspects of a hard per se
rule may still exist for certain group boycotts.
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"other" business conduct cases (11 opinion; 14%) than in information
cases (4 opinions; 10%), staff privileges cases (8 opinions; 4%), and corporate combination cases (1 opinion; 3%). Illegal tying was alleged in 63
opinions (12%).
As might be expected from the low number of pro-plaintiff outcomes
detailed above, few actual violations of antitrust law were ascribed by federal courts in written judicial opinions. 8 1 Potentially per se illegal conduct (including boycotts) was identified in only 10 different opinions.
Price fixing violations were found in 2 opinions representing two separate
disputes.8 2 Per se illegal geographic market allocations were found in 4
opinions from the same underlying dispute, one of which also opined
that product markets had been unlawfully allocated.8 3 Concerted refusals to deal or group boycotts were found in 3 opinions representing three

disputes. 84 Allegations not suggesting per se illegality generated a total of
14 opinions finding actual violations of antitrust law. Six opinions representing four disputes found violations best classified as "unreasonable restraints of trade" under section 1 of the Sherman Act, although these
85
cases generally have undercurrents of price fixing and boycotts as well.

81. Recall that in our coding system we treat each opinion as a separate unit, and,
therefore, include violations found at the district court level that were subsequently
reversed on appeal, as well as violations in opinions that form only part of an overall
dispute.
82. See Blue Cross & Blue Shield United of Wis. v. Marshfield Clinic, 883 F. Supp.
1247, 1259 (W.D. Wis. 1995), rev'd in part and aff'd in part, 65 F.3d 1406, 1417 (7th Cir.
1995); Hahn v. Or. Physicians' Serv., No. 78-0887-MA, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16899,
*11-*12 (D. Or. Oct. 26, 1990). The court in Sandy River Nursing Care v. Aetna Cas., 985
F.2d 1138, 1147-48 (1st Cir. 1993), expressly found a per se illegal price fixing agreement,
but concluded that the conduct was immunized under the state action doctrine.
83. See Marshfield Clinic, 883 F. Supp. at 1259, affd, 65 F.3d 1406 (7th Cir. 1995).
84. See Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94, 105-06 (1988) (finding no state action
immunity and reinstating jury verdict of concerted refusal to deal); Hahn, 1990 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 16899, at *11-*12 (finding that physician boycott of podiatrists had effect of
unreasonably restricting trade); Wilk v. Am. Med. Ass'n, 671 F. Supp. 1465, 1477 (E.D. Ill.
1987) (finding AMA liable for concerted refusal to deal), aftd, 895 F.2d 352, 378 (7th Cir.
1990). Again, the court in Sandy River Nursing Care, 985 F.2d at 1147-48, found behavior
constituting a group boycott, but held such conduct immune.
85. See Boczar v. Manatee Hosps. & Health Sys., Inc., 993 F.2d 1514, 1519 (11th Cir.
1993) (reversing district courtJNOV and reinstating ajury verdict finding an unreasonable
restraint of trade); Key Enters. of Del., Inc. v. Venice Hosp., 919 F.2d 1550, 1560-62 (1lth
Cir. 1990) (reinstatingjury verdict for plaintiff in durable medical equipment case finding
reciprocal dealing), reh'g en banc granted, 979 F.2d 806 (lth Cir. 1992); Oltz v. St.
Peter's Cmty. Hosp., 656 F. Supp. 760, 763 (D. Mont. 1987) (upholdingjury verdict finding
unreasonable restraint of trade), aft'd, 861 F.2d 1440 (9th Cir. 1988); Reazin v. Blue Cross
& Blue Shield of Kan., Inc., 663 F. Supp. 1360, 1425 (D. Kan. 1987) (upholding jury
finding of an unreasonable restraint of trade), affd, 899 F.2d 951 (10th Cir. 1990); see also
United States v. N.D. Hosp. Ass'n, 640 F. Supp. 1028, 1036-41 (D.N.D. 1986) (granting
DOJ motion for summary judgment finding Sherman Act section 1 violation). In some of
these cases, one gets the impression that courts make a conscious effort not to frame the
claim as a boycott in order to avoid addressing a complicated and confusing area of law.

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 102:545

Three opinions, representing two disputes, found section 2 monopoliza86
tion violations.
It is interesting that price fixing and tying arrangements were alleged
more often in the Georgetown Antitrust Project, which surveyed general
antitrust litigation, than in our sample of health care cases.8 7 Fewer price
fixing allegations in health care may reflect the deterrent effect of high
profile public enforcement actions in the medical industry, as well as the
influence of the Supreme Court's 1982 decision in Maricopa confirming
the appropriateness of per se liability for medical professionals.8 8 It may
also reflect the intrinsic difficulties in concealing price fixing agreements
between health care providers for very long in a system predicated upon
third party payment. Similarly, the Supreme Court's 1984 decision in Jefferson ParishHospital District No. 2 v. Hyde rejecting tying liability for the
hospital's exclusive contract may have had a chilling effect on such claims
89
in the health care sector during our sample period.
The Georgetown Antitrust Project and NERA also both reported
high numbers of boycotts, concerted refusals to deal, and dealer termination cases, although the groupings and understandings of these claims
86. See Marshfield Clinic, 883 F. Supp. at 1255-59, 1265, rev'd in part and aff'd in part,
65 F.3d 1406 (7th Cir. 1995); Reazin, 663 F. Supp. at 1486-89 (upholding jury verdict on
section 2 monopolization claim), aff'd, 899 F.2d 951 (10th Cir. 1990).
87. According to the Georgetown Antitrust Project, traditional categories of per se
illegality dominate other antitrust allegations. Horizontal price fixing was alleged in 21.3%
of all cases, refusals to deal in 25.4% of cases, and tying or exclusive dealing in 21.1% of
cases (reporting results combining primary and secondary allegations). Salop & White,
supra note 15, at 6. The authors allowed as many codes as were relevant to be marked, so
that (as with many of our results) percentages usually do not sum to 100. Differences in
methodology may account for this disparity. The Georgetown Antitrust Project and NERA
report allegations made in the complaint. Our methodology was to count only allegations
substantively addressed by courts in their opinions.
88. Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 335-37, 357 (1982). On
the other hand, this result appears to be fairly sensitive to the manner in which the coding
takes place. For example, if one uses the NERA study to calculate alleged violations as a
percentage of the number of cases, horizontal price fixing and market allocations were
alleged in only 11.2% of all cases-roughly comparable to our finding of price fixing being
a seriously addressed violation in approximately 9% of the cases. See NERA, Antitrust
Report, supra note 16, at 28 (calculation based on Table 8). One must also consider the
extent to which differences reflect disparities in the time frames: 1973-1978 (NERA),
1973-1983 (Georgetown), and 1985-1999 (our sample). One should consider as well
differences in geographic location. All the NERA data comes from the Southern District of
New York (Manhattan), where one might expect garden variety price fixing to constitute a
lower percentage of the antitrust disputes than would be found elsewhere. For a brief
summary of the methodologies employed in these studies, see supra notes 15-18.
89. 466 U.S. 2, 28-29 (1984). Again, however, the lower number of tying allegations
in our sample reflects in part different groupings in the respective coding instruments.
Rather than grouping exclusive dealing cases with tying cases, we coded exclusive dealing
under the category of vertical nonprice restraints and coded tying cases separately. NERA
grouped tying cases with exclusive dealing cases and reported that, as a percentage of cases
rather than allegations, they arose in a surprising 43.9% of all disputes. See NERA,
Antitrust Report, supra note 16, at 28 (calculation based on Table 8).
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are likely to differ to some degree from ours. 90 These statistics suggest
that boycott and dealer termination claims in antitrust law generally may
play an analogous role to that of staff privileges cases in health care; i.e.,
plaintiffs often complaining about the intensity of competition rather
than its absence. Interestingly, allegations of unspecified restraints of
trade in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act and allegations of monopolization and attempted monopolization in violation of section 2
were less common in private antitrust litigation generally than in our
health care sample. 9 1 The greater role of monopolization and attempted
monopolization in our sample reflects, in part, the disproportionate presence of hospitals as defendants. To challenge the unitary acts of a hospital in either a staff privileges or exclusive contracting case, the complaint
must often be styled in terms of either monopolization or attempted monopolization. 92 The greater role of monopolization and attempted monopolization claims also reflects the higher levels of concentration characteristic of service markets.
7. Antitrust Analysis. - Befitting the predominance of cases that require plaintiffs to prove that defendants possess market power ("rule of
reason" cases under section 1 of the Sherman Act, all claims under section 2 of the Sherman Act, and merger cases), 176 opinions in private
antitrust disputes (34%) discussed market definition, and 144 opinions
(28%) discussed levels of market concentration. The fact that only 49
opinions (10%) evaluated barriers to market entry by new competitors
suggests that courts were able to shortcut their analysis in a substantial
number of cases after holding that the market was not sufficiently concentrated to support a finding of market power.
Defenses are extremely common in health care antitrust litigation,
existing in one form or another in almost all opinions. 93 By far the most
90. Georgetown's combined total was 34.3%. See Salop & White, supra note 15, at 6
(calculations based on Table 1.4). NERA's adjusted combined total was 45.6%. See NERA,
Antitrust Report, supra note 16, at 28 (calculation based on Table 8).
91. The Georgetown study found allegations of generic "restraints of trade" in only
10% of the complaints and allegations of monopoly or attempted monopolization in only
8.8% of complaints. See Salop & White, supra note 15, at 6. The NERA study did not even
break out monopolization concerns as an independent line on its tables.
92. Section 1 allegations typically run up against the Capperweld doctrine when a
hospital is accused of conspiring with its own medical staff. See, e.g., Oksanen v. Page
Mem'l Hosp., 945 F.2d 696, 703-04 (4th Cir. 1991) (holding no Sherman Act section 1
claim can be based upon the plaintiffs revocation of staff privileges because under
Copperweld a hospital cannot conspire with itself); Canady v. Providence Hosp., 903 F.
Supp. 125, 127 (D.D.C. 1995) (granting defendants' motion to dismiss by finding no
concerted action in light of the Copperweld doctrine); Purgess v. Sharrock, 806 F. Supp.
1102, 1109 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (identifying circuits in which hospitals have been found to be
incapable of conspiring with members of their medical staffs).
93. We use the term "defenses" very loosely. These "defenses" encompass a broad
range of considerations, not all of which fit tightly into understandings of affirmative
defenses or claims of immunity. Defenses here are intended to capture the wide range of
arguments defendants might employ in avoiding antitrust liability.
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common defenses were lack of standing to sue or the absence of antitrust
injury, which are related doctrines (243 opinions; 48%). Defenses involving legitimate business purposes, procompetitive effects, and efficiencies
were raised in 110 separate opinions (22%). Other commonly discussed
defenses included state action (Parker) immunity (88 opinions; 17%),
lack of a conspiracy because only one enterprise was involved (Copperweld) (77 opinions; 15%), peer review immunity under HCQIA (44
opinions; 8%), and political action (Noerr-Pennington)immunity (40 opinions; 8%).
Looking atjudicial analysis by time period, discussions of market definition, market concentration, and entry barrier analysis were less frequent in 1985-1989 than in recent periods when merger cases have become more common. Essential facility claims arose most often in
1990-1995, tracking the expansion of managed care into markets dominated by a single hospital or medical group. Oligopoly explicitly entered
courts' discussions only in 1995-1999. Defenses based on intraenterprise
conspiracy were less common in 1985-1989 than subsequently, but state
action and McCarran-Ferguson Act 9 4 defenses were more common earlier. Finally, per se analysis was performed less frequently by courts in
1985-1989 than in more recent periods. Although this undoubtedly reflects the changing case mix over time, it may also indicate lower courts'
growing comfort with the Supreme Court's 1982 refusal in Maricopa to
95
immunize professional activities from per se scrutiny.
Legal analysis correlated strongly with the type of parties involved
and the business conduct at issue. Regardless of whether hospitals, physicians, insurance organizations, pharmaceutical companies, or other parties were plaintiffs or defendants, courts assessed market definition and
concentration more or less equally across the board. Evaluation of barriers to entry, by contrast, was emphasized in cases with insurance plaintiffs
or defendants, with courts generally holding that such barrier are low in
insurance markets. Cases with physician plaintiffs and defendants indulged in fewer discussions of entry barriers, likely because claims were
disposed of before reaching that point in the analysis of market power.
Correspondingly, examining the case according to business conduct
reveals that entry barrier analysis is concentrated in corporate combination cases (for example, mergers) and insurance cases, and is conspicuously absent from staff privileges disputes. Interestingly, courts defined
markets most often in exclusive contracting cases, generally in order to
determine whether the defendant possessed sufficient power to render
94. 15 U.S.C. § 1011 (1994).
95. It will be interesting to see if this pattern reverses course in the future as lower
courts digest the Supreme Court's revival in CaliforniaDental of Goldfarb'sdictum regarding
professional activities and rule of reason analysis. See Cal. Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 526 U.S.
756, 771 n.10 (1999) (quoting Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 788 n.17 (1975)
(suggesting that the public service aspects of the professions might justify special antitrust
treatment)).
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an exclusive arrangement anticompetitive. The fact that exclusive contracting cases defined markets much more frequently than staff privileges
cases supports the inference that courts view these categories as analytically distinct rather than merely excusing all hospital defendants from
antitrust scrutiny.
Lack of antitrust injury or standing was the most common defense
analyzed in suits against hospitals and insurance companies as defendants, and was also invoked frequently by other types of defendants. Pharmaceutical companies most often invoked an efficiencies defense; that
approach was also common in cases with insurers as defendants. HCQIA
predictably was the principal defense for physicians, and applied
uniquely to them (much as McCarran-Ferguson Act defenses are available
only to insurance companies). State action immunity was employed liberally by physician and hospital defendants, but not by insurance or pharmaceutical companies. Political action immunity was much more commonly discussed in suits against pharmaceutical companies than in other
cases. Sorting according to categories of business conduct, efficiencies
defenses were least common in staff privileges cases (again distinguishing
those cases from exclusive contracting disputes). Discussions of state action immunity were clustered in staff privileges and exclusive contracting
cases, and political action immunity was addressed mainly in the residual
category of cases that includes pharmaceutical and other medical product litigation. As expected, HCQIA was strictly limited to staff privileges
disputes.
The prevalence and diversity of these defenses illustrate several facets of contemporary antitrust law. Courts' reliance upon structural economic analysis and the screening role played by the antitrust injury doctrine are striking. To prevail on an antitrust claim, the plaintiff must
establish an injury to competition. This typically requires the defendant
to be large enough to possess some level of market power and the conduct in question to be substantial enough to have an adverse impact on
the market. If these conditions are not satisfied, then the case can be
dismissed at a relatively early stage of the proceedings. Our data suggest
that this is happening in a large number of medical antitrust cases and
that staff privileges and exclusive contracting cases are particularly vulnerable to this type of attack.
Other defenses serve quite different functions. Unlike screening devices, consideration of economic efficiencies, procompetitive benefits,
and the presence of legitimate business justifications are indicative of
merits-based analysis likely to be associated with closer and more difficult
cases. The fact that this type of analysis takes place on a substantially less
frequent basis as compared with analysis of antitrust injury suggests that
cases where an actual assessment of the merits is necessary are the exception, not the rule.
A final category of defenses includes various types of statutory antitrust immunity. The immunity enjoyed by certain labor, insurance, and
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physician peer review practices represents a type of legal zoning, in which
Congress has declared certain conduct to be antitrust concerns and other
conduct not. These defenses also perform an implicit channeling function, taking classes of disputes out of the judicial arena and forcing batties over the nature of antitrust liability to be fought in the legislature.
The judicially crafted state action doctrine and, to a lesser extent, the
Noerr-Penningtondoctrine serve similar functions. Not surprisingly considering the strong regulatory tradition in health care, defenses serving
these zoning and channeling functions play a significant role in health
care antitrust litigation.
A few other correlations are worth noting. Some differences in legal
analysis over time were observed in the data. Invocation of state action
immunity declined from 1985-1989 to 1995-1999, while use of the Copperweld doctrine increased. Although HCQIA was enacted in 1986, its effect only became apparent in litigation after 1990. On the other hand,
size of geographic market did not correlate with market power analysis,
and only influenced analysis of legal defenses to the extent that medical
products cases involve large geographic markets. The number of cases
within each federal judicial circuit was too small to support strong statistical claims, but a curious finding was that cases in the Tenth Circuit analyzed barriers to entry much more often than cases elsewhere, while cases
in the Eighth Circuit hardly discussed barriers to entry at all.
Finally, monopsony was considered in only two opinions. 96 Considering that managed care has led to the proliferation of intermediary organizations that purchase health care services from providers and resell
them to end users under various insurance arrangements, it is striking
that concentrated purchasing power is so rarely attacked directly in antitrust litigation.) 7 Rather than seeing the concerted action of purchasers
96. The two opinions coded for discussing monopsony power were U.S. Healthcare,
Inc. v. Healthsource, Inc., 986 F.2d 589, 598 (1st Cir. 1993), and Ball Mem'l Hosp., Inc. v.
Mutual Hosp. Ins., Inc., 784 F.2d 1325, 1334 (7th Cir. 1986). In U.S. Healthcare,the First
Circuit rejected the argument that the defendant HMO possessed monopsony power in
large part because it rejected the existence of a distinct market for HMO services as
opposed to a market for health care services and financing more generally. 986 F.2d at
598. Similarly, in Ball Memorial, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of a requested
preliminary injunction seeking to prevent the plaintiff from offering a new preferred
provider organization (PPO) product. 784 F.2d at 1346. Defining the market broadly to
include all health care services and financing, the court held the plaintiff lacked market
power and therefore there could be no Sherman Act section 1 or section 2 violation. Id. at
1337.
97. One explanation is that antitrust law has always been relatively more tolerant of
buyer than of seller behavior. See Kartell v. Blue Shield, 749 F.2d 922, 930 (1st Cir. 1984)
(praising the aggressive actions of the health care insurer for producing low prices for its
subscribers). Part of the greater deference afforded buyers may result from the analytic
difficulty courts have understanding that the problems of monopsony power are symmetric
to the problems of monopoly power. See Hovenkamp, supra note 3, § 1.2b (outlining the
economic consequences of monopsony power). Another part may represent legitimate
recognition by courts that joint activity on the buyer side of the market can reduce the
transaction costs of purchasing in procompetitive ways. See, e.g., Northwest Wholesale
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as an antitrust problem, however, courts in 14 opinions (3%) considered
the defense that the conduct in question was by a buyer rather than a
seller and therefore should be treated more favorably.
B. Public Antitrust Enforcement
Of the 542 opinions in our sample, only 31 (representing 22 disputes) involved cases brought by the DOJ (10 disputes), the FTC (11 disputes), or state attorneys general (1 dispute). In addition, 52 administrative decisions and consent orders with private parties were entered by the
FTC during the period of our sample in 39 disputes, as were 22 consent
decrees between private parties and the DOJ (3 of them also involving
states) in 20 disputes, and 8 consent decrees between private parties and
state attorneys general. Public litigation remained uncommon from the
first five-year period studied to the most recent. By contrast, consent decrees and administrative actions by the DOJ and the FTC rose sharply in
later years of the study (see Figure 7).
FiCuRE 7:
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Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 295 (1985) (discussing
efficiencies ofjoint purchasing). Another set of explanations concerns whether and when
market power will exist on the buyer's side of health care markets. As acknowledged in
U.S. Healthcare and Ball Memorial, the markets for health care financing in which these
purchasers act as resellers are so large, both geographically and in product scope, that a
formal finding of market power is unlikely. See U.S. Healthcare, 986 F.2d at 598; Ball
Memorial, 784 F.2d at 1334-35; see also Blue Cross & Blue Shield United of Wis. v.
Marshfield Clinic, 65 F.3d 1406, 1413 (7th Cir. 1995) (rejecting the idea of a distinct HMO
market). Still, monopsony continues to generate academic interest. See, e.g., Mark V.
Pauly, Market Power, Monopsony, and Health Insurance Markets, 7 J. Health Econ. 111,
111 (1988); Mark V. Pauly, Monopsony Power in Health Insurance: Thinking Straight
While Standing on Your Head, 6J. Health Econ. 73, 74 (1987).
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Government plaintiffs were much more successful in court, carrying
42% of opinions that reached a significant disposition, than were private
plaintiffs, who carried 14% (see Figure 8). More than half of the government cases (18; 58%) involved allegedly anticompetitive mergers. Only

one case found an actual Clayton Act section 7 merger violation, although courts in another 4 disputes granted the government preliminary
injunctions in merger cases. 98 The remainder of the allegations split
nearly equally among boycotts, monopolization, and unreasonable restraints of trade. Two opinions in different disputes found violations of
section 5 of the FTC Act, based on unreasonable restraints of trade. 99
Only one fully litigated case each alleged price fixing, product market
allocation, or geographic market allocation, presumably because parties
caught in these acts tend to settle the charges against them rather than go
to court.
FIGURE 8: SUCCESS
100%

RATES IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT

0

90%_

c
.2

80%
70%
60%

0
-6

50%-

Z

40%

0)
C-

30%
20%--

1]

Indeterminate
0 For Defendant

3]

For Plaintiff

1

10%
0%
Public Litigation

Private Litigation

In 50 of the 82 settled cases in our sample (61%), enforcement action resulted in injunctive relief in favor of the DOJ or state attorneys
general, or the issuance of a cease and desist order by the FTC. The FTC
also required full or partial divestiture in 18 merger settlements (21%)
and compulsory licensing in 4 settlements (5%). Damages were sought as
98. See Hosp. Corp. of Am. v. FTC, 807 F.2d 1381, 1389 (7th Cir. 1986) (upholding
FrC determination that merger violated the Clayton Act). Given changes in the law which
permit the FTC to seek preliminary injunctions against mergers in district court, most cases
are now won or lost at the injunction stage. Disputes resulting in successful injunctive
relief are detailed supra note 76.
99. See FTC v. Ind. Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 466 (1986) (finding refusal to
supply x-rays violated section 1 of the Sherman Act and therefore constituted a violation of
section 5 of the FTC Act); Cal. Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 128 F.3d 720, 730 (9th Cir. 1997)
(upholding FTC finding of an unfair trade practice), rev'd, 526 U.S. 756 (1999), on
remand, 224 F.3d 942 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding insufficient evidence to establish a violation
under the rule of reason).
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part of the settlement of only two consent decrees, both of which were
brought by state attorneys general. In a handful of instances, defendants
subsequently prevailed before the FTC in efforts to modify or set aside
consent orders.
Combining litigated cases with consent decrees and settlements provides an overall picture of public enforcement that differs from private
litigation in several respects. Public enforcement was more likely than
private litigation to involve pharmaceutical companies (20% vs. 12% of
disputes) and professional or trade associations (15% vs. 6%) as defendants, and was less likely to target individual physicians (9% vs. 33%) and
hospitals (38% vs. 61%). However, hospitals were still common targets
for public enforcement, particularly with respect to merger activity amid
the waves of consolidation that have buffeted the hospital sector since the
early 1980s.
Compared to private litigation, public enforcement concentrated on
policing corporate combinations (48% of public disputes), and maintained a substantial presence in insurance (29%) and information (13%)
cases, while devoting few resources to exclusive contracting (10%) or staff
privileges (2%) disputes (see Figure 1). Not a single litigated staff privileges case involved a public plaintiff, and the only case of public litigation
involving hospital exclusive contracts was brought by a state attorney general, not the DOJ or FTC. This finding can be explained by one or more
of the following: adequacy of private enforcement activity in such instances, lack of a broad effect of conduct in these areas on public welfare,
unlikelihood of achieving a significant legal precedent, and the absence
of true anticompetitive behavior or antitrust injury. Two FTC consent
orders involved the conduct of hospital medical staffs denying or terminating staff privileges. The facts of these cases, however, differ substantially from those in most private suits. One case involved the categorical
denial of privileges for nurse midwives and was pursued under a theory of
preserving consumer choice. 100 The other case involved a collective refusal by physicians to participate in a new HMO entering the market,
combined with threats to terminate the privileges of any physician who
joined the HMO network.10 1
Somewhat surprisingly, overall public enforcement did not differ
from private litigation in terms of the geographic markets involved, although cases actually litigated by government enforcement agencies focused on relatively more isolated markets where concentration ratios are
likely to be higher, and on larger national or global markets where substantial public interests may be at stake. Although the numbers were too
small to assure statistical significance, more public than private cases
(41% vs. 29%) involved small cities or towns, and fewer (9% vs. 32%)
100. See In re Med. Staff of Mem. Med. Ctr., No. 851-0002, 1987 FTC LEXIS 9, *9
(Oct. 6, 1987) ("Consumers have been limited in their ability to choose among alternative
types of health care providers competing on the basis of price and service.").
101. See In re Addison, No. 871-0007, 1988 FTC LEXIS 69, at *5-*8 (Feb. 16, 1988).
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involved large cities and suburbs. Public plaintiffs were also more likely
than private plaintiffs to litigate cases involving regional or national markets (45% vs. 33%).
Finally, the federal enforcement agencies tend to specialize. The
DOJ monitored insurance companies and contracting intermediaries
more closely than did other public enforcers, while the FTC took action
more often against pharmaceutical and technology companies.' 0 2 The
FTC dominated merger enforcement, pursuing 29 such cases compared
to 9 for the DOJ. 10 3 In part because FTCjurisdiction over nonprofit organizations outside of the merger context was not expressly confirmed by
the Supreme Court until 1999,104 over two-thirds of the FTC's enforcement involved for-profit defendants, while the DOJ took action nearly
two-thirds of the time against nonprofit defendants.
C. JudicialAssessment of Quality
The preceding results, though valuable, merely frame the central
questions of our study: How do antitrust courts define and understand
quality in health care (if at all)? How do courts analyze the effects of
allegedly anticompetitive behavior on quality and similar considerations
other than price? What quality related arguments are made and in what
settings? To answer these questions, we reviewed the opinions in our
sample for a range of legal and factual interpretations relating to nonprice competition.
As a preliminary matter, we attempted to determine how frequently
courts explicitly articulate their assumptions about the effects of competition in health care markets. Unsurprisingly, relatively few opinions (101;
19%) contained general statements of belief or disbelief in the benefits of
health care competition. Of these, the majority expressed views consistent with prevailing economic analysis in the overall economy: 57 opinions stated that health care competition decreases prices, 15 that competition decreases costs, and 37 that competition increases quality. Despite
the prominence given in the literature to "maverick" cases, we found very
few opinions (11; 2%) in which courts ventured unorthodox beliefs that
health care competition increases prices (6 opinions), increases costs (7
102. Eighteen public enforcement actions in the sample involved pharmaceutical
companies; 16 of these were brought by the FTC.
103. Of the 38 consent decrees involving mergers, 9 were brought by the DOJ, 5 by
state attorneys general, and the remainder by the FTC. Only one DOJ merger consent
decree involved a hospital merger. See United States v. Morton Plant Health Sys., Inc., No.
94-748-CIV-T23E, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15352, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 29, 1994). The
remaining DOJ merger cases involved medical devices and equipment. Nearly half of the
FTC merger cases involved the pharmaceutical industry and typically resulted in partial
divestiture or compulsory license agreements. The FTC also assumed responsibility for
policing the merger activity of HCA/Columbia (producing 6 FTC consent decrees over a
series of different transactions).
104. Cal. Dental, 526 U.S. at 767-68 (holding that the activities of a nonprofit
professional association fall within the jurisdiction of the FTC Act).
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opinions), or decreases quality (3 opinions). Nor did many courts explicitly avail themselves of the leeway that Supreme Court precedent affords
them regarding the health care industry.1 0 5 Only 16 opinions (3%)
stated that courts hearing health care antitrust cases should pay special
attention to the professional issues involved, and only 11 courts (2%)
mentioned the social importance of health care as an analytic factor.
Opinions issued in 1985-1989 were more likely to cite professional values
than later opinions. Notably, 4 of the 13 opinions that expressed at least
or special considerations inone of these countercurrent assumptions
10 6
volved nonprofit hospital mergers.
Quality was discussed by courts as an attribute of competition in 436
passages, appearing in 194 different opinions (36%).107 The incidence
of quality discussions did not change from the beginning of our study
period to the end. Adapting conventions from health economics and the
105. See Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 788 n.17 (1975). In Goldfarb, the
court said:
The fact that a restraint operates upon a profession as distinguished from a
business is, of course, relevant in determining whether that particular restraint
violates the Sherman Act. It would be unrealistic to view the practice of
professions as interchangeable with other business activities, and automatically to
apply to the professions antitrust concepts which originated in other areas. The
public service aspect, and other features of the professions, may require that a
particular practice, which could properly be viewed as a violation of the Sherman
Act in another context, be treated differently.
Id. It is possible that more courts will use the leeway afforded by Goldfarb following the
Supreme Court's 1999 decision in CaliforniaDental, 526 U.S. at 771 n.10 (reviving Goldfarb's
footnote 17). See infra text accompanying note 187.
106. See HTI Health Servs., Inc. v. Quorum Health Group, Inc., 960 F. Supp. 1104
(S.D. Miss. 1997); FTC v. Butterworth Health Corp., 946 F. Supp. 1285 (W.D. Mich. 1996);
FTC v. Freeman Hosp., 911 F. Supp. 1213 (W.D. Mo. 1995); United States v. Carilion
Health Sys., 707 F. Supp. 840 (W.D. Va. 1989). Significantly, two of the other cases
involved judicial deference to legislative determinations about the possible adverse effects
of health care competition. See Martin v. Mem'l Hosp., 86 F.3d 1391, 1399-1400 (5th Cir.
1996) (finding that suppression of competition in provision of end stage renal dialysis was
beneficial and foreseeable result of state regulation under state action doctrine); Huron
Valley Hosp., Inc. v. City of Pontiac, 650 F. Supp. 1325, 1337-39 (E.D. Mich. 1986)
(granting defendants' motion for summary judgment and holding that defendants'
conduct in attempting to deny plaintiff a "certificate of need" for new hospital was
consistent with the planning mandate of governing legislation).
107. One of the most difficult aspects of case coding was to separate references to
quality as a byproduct of competition from references to quality as a professional or
technical issue. For example, cases involving denial of staff privileges often discuss the skill
of the physicians in question because evidence of poor quality tends to explain the denial
as other than anticompetitive. Few of these cases, however, assert that the hospital or the
physicians associated with it will be more effective competitors by having protected the
quality of the medical staff. In contrast, other courts expressly discuss how professional
standards and qualifications are mediated through the marketplace. See, e.g., Koefoot v.
Am. Coll. of Surgeons, 652 F. Supp. 882, 900-04 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (discussing how
professional society rules can enhance the market reputation of society members). This
issue is addressed further in the discussion section. See infra text accompanying notes
183-187.
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health services research literature, we divided our inquiries regarding
quality characteristics within health care firms into three groups: clinical
structure, clinical processes (including clinical outcomes), and administration.10 8 In addition, we examined the opinions that mentioned quality
to determine whether quality attributes were discussed in market or system terms, and whether those discussions focused on consumer choice or
on other characteristics. Our results are shown in Figure 9.
FIGURE

9:

TYPES OF QUALITY DISCUSSED IN JUDICIAL OPINIONS
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Although the difference was not statistically significant, slightly more
opinions (134) mentioned quality as a market or system consideration as
opposed to a firm-level consideration (122). Whether or not discussed in
connection with a given firm, quality was frequently invoked as a general
consideration (74 opinions) instead of being linked to specific manifestations of quality such as staffing, facilities, or technology. 09 ° Outcome statistics, the gold standard for quality measurement in health services research," 10 were mentioned only once."' By contrast, malpractice claims
108. Cf. I Donabedian, supra note 32, at 79-85.
109. We coded a discussion of quality as "general" or "unspecified" even if another,
unrelated part of the opinion contained a more specific discussion of quality, which was
coded separately. Fifty-three separate opinions were coded as containing at least one or
more abstract coding categories (section 5-3-7, 5-6-1, 5-7-8 or 5-7-9). See infra Appendix.
110. See generally Institute of Medicine, Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health
System for the 21st Century 145-63 (2001).
111. See Angelico v. Lehigh Valley Hosp., Inc., 984 F. Supp. 308, 313-14 (E.D. Pa.
1997), rev'd by 184 F.3d 268 (3d Cir. 1999). Plaintiff alleged an antitrust conspiracy that
coerced him to resign from defendant hospital and blacklisted him elsewhere. In assessing
whether plaintiffs removal resulted in a reduction in quality and hence an antitrust injury
under Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977), the plaintiffs
expert examined "raw data on mortality and ASG (admission severity group) supplied to
him from the Pennsylvania Health Care Cost Containment Council" and found that "Dr.
Angelico had equal or better mortality results in the aggregation of either of the other
providers" at defendant hospitals. 984 F. Supp. at 313-14. The district court rejected
these claims and other evidence regarding trends in mortality rates, ultimately finding that
plaintiff had not established direct evidence of an anticompetitive effect and therefore
lacked standing to pursue the claim. Id. at 314. The Third Circuit reversed, holding that
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against physicians, a notoriously poor indicator of quality but one with
salience to courts (especially in staff privileges cases), were mentioned in
1
25 opinions.' 2
Paralleling their focus on markets and systems, courts discussed "horizontal" conceptions of quality-freedom of choice, range of products
and services, geographic scope, and informed choice-in 96 opinions
(18%). These discussions were more common than ones involving "vertical" quality characteristics such as advanced facilities, skilled personnel,
or reduced mortality." 3 Static rather than dynamic views of quality dominated the opinions that contained quality related analysis: Only 6 opinions mentioned the potential for future quality improvement among
firms, and only 7 opinions mentioned market or system-wide innovation
and research.
Comparing cases that generated discussions of quality with those that
did not reveals a few differences. First, opinions issues in connection with
public litigation were much more likely to discuss quality than opinions
issues in cases involving private plaintiffs (71% vs. 34%). Possible explanations are that public enforcement focuses on more systematic threats to
competition, and/or that the DOJ and the FTC are better prepared to
make quality arguments. Second, opinions in cases with hospitals or physicians as plaintiffs were more likely to discuss quality than opinions in
cases with pharmaceutical companies or insurance companies as plaintiffs. Sorting the data according to the identity of the defendants, the
same trends were apparent but only hospital related cases achieved statistical significance, which suggests that plaintiffs have primary control over
framing quality issues for courts. Third, the only detectable general influence of business conduct on quality related judicial analysis was that qualthe district court failed to inquire into the existence of market power, which might support
an inference of anticompetitive effect. 184 F.3d at 275-76.
112. Particularly in staff privileges cases, however, courts are often unclear as to
whether denying privileges to a physician with a poor malpractice history should be
regarded as beneficial to the hospital's competitive position, or merely supports the
medical staffs contention that its decision was based on patient care rather than
competitive concerns. See, e.g., Smith v. Ricks, 31 F.3d 1478, 1482 (9th Cir. 1994)
(affirming dismissal of antitrust case with the court focusing on HCQIA and evidence of
plaintiff's lack of medical competence as support for reasonableness of hospital's peer
review action).
113. There may be some overlap here, however. An HMO or medical group practice
that includes all potentially useful specialties can be both horizontally diverse and vertically
superior. Cf. Blue Cross & Blue Shield United of Wis. v. Marshfield Clinic, 65 F.3d 1406,
1412 (7th Cir. 1995). The court in Marshfield Clinic observed:
If an entire county has only 12 physicians, one can hardly expect or want them to
set up in competition with each other. We live in the age of technology and
specialization in medical services. Physicians practice in groups, in alliances, in
networks, utilizing expensive equipment and support. Twelve physicians
competing in a county would be competing to provide horse-and-buggy
medicine. Only as part of a large and sophisticated medical enterprise such as
the Marshfield Clinic can they practice modern medicine in rural Wisconsin.
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ity discussions occurred more often in corporate combination cases, and
less often in the residual category that included pharmaceutical and
other medical products cases. The latter finding raises the possibility that
courts are failing to consider innovation as a quality concern in health
antitrust litigation.
Turning to specific quality dimensions, opinions in staff privileges
disputes were most likely to mention provider qualifications (an expected
finding), and nearly all discussions of malpractice history as a quality concern arose in the context of staff privileges. Interestingly, staff privileges
cases almost never discussed general firm reputation for quality or service, suggesting that, unlike exclusive contracting cases, courts approach
these disputes as involving decisions by physician-competitors rather than
14
the hospitals themselves.'
Different factors were associated with courts discussing choice as a
quality attribute, although these discussions were again more common in
public than in private litigation. Cases involving hospitals as plaintiffs or
insurance companies as defendants, many of which related to selective
contracting, were most likely to discuss choice. Cases with physicians as
defendants, or pharmaceutical companies as plaintiffs or defendants,
were least likely to discuss choice. Sorting by business conduct, discussions of choice were common in merger cases (loss of a competitor), exclusive contracting cases, and insurance cases (selective contracting), but
were uncommon in staff privileges and "other" (medical products) cases.
Settlements by public enforcement agencies tend to offer less detailed analyses than most judicial opinions. Typically, all that is available
is a copy of the complaint, a fairly terse competitive impact statement,
and the actual consent decree or order which proscribes certain forms of
conduct. In addition, these documents reflect the position of the enforcement agencies alone, whereas judicial opinions reflect the competing views of both sides to the dispute as filtered by a supposedly neutral
arbiter. Nevertheless, discussions of quality occurred in 43 settlements
114. This finding is in some tension with the tendency of courts to invoke the
intraenterprise conspiracy doctrine, which assumes a unity of interest between the hospital
and its medical staff. Some of the tension is dispelled when the pragmatic function that
the intraenterprise conspiracy doctrine plays is acknowledged. The intraenterprise
conspiracy doctrine largely serves a screening function. Judges are highly skeptical of the
antitrust merits of most staff privileges cases. The history of staff privileges case law is, in
part, a study of the many strategies lawyers and judges have concocted to dismiss these
cases early in the litigation process. At one point, it was fashionable to dismiss staff
privileges cases on jurisdictional grounds, claiming an insufficient impact in interstate
commerce. This tactic was ultimately rejected by the Supreme Court in Summit Health v.
Pinhas, 500 U.S. 322, 330 (1991). A different strategy was to leverage various state
mandates encouraging peer review into immunity under the state action doctrine. This
tactic was rejected by the Court in Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94, 105 (1988), which
required some level of active state supervision before immunity could be invoked. Today,
the screening function is served through a combination of the antitrust injury
requirement, the intraenterprise conspiracy doctrine, and federal protection afforded
tinder HCQIA.
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(52%), a higher frequency than in private litigation (172 opinions; 34%).
For both the DOJ and the FTC, quality discussions tended to relate to
1 5
markets (46 coded entries) rather than to firms (13 coded entries).
Choice was discussed in 20 settlements (24%), again more often than in
private litigation (84 opinions; 16%). Surprisingly, more discussions of
innovation as a dimension of quality were found in this small group of
public settlements (9 entries) than in the much larger sample ofjudicial
116
opinions that we reviewed (7 entries).
III.

DISCUSSION or LEGAL AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

The empirical research described in this Article was motivated by a
desire to test three assumptions we held about the role of antitrust law in
health care. We initially posited (1) that antitrust litigation plays a useful
role by promoting price competition in medical markets, (2) that medical antitrust law is substantially influenced by the actions and policies of
the federal enforcement agencies, and (3) that medical antitrust law does
not adequately address quality and nonprice concerns."17 Our results
115. Of the 7 state attorney general consent decrees in our sample, admittedly a very
small number, only two mentioned a specific attribute of quality, both focusing on
provision of charity care. See Wisconsin v. Kenosha Hosp., 1997-1 Trade Cas. (CCH)
71,669, at 71,669 (E.D. Wis. Dec. 31, 1996) (permitting hospital merger but committing
the hospitals to establish an indigent care fund); Pennsylvania v. Capital Health Sys. Servs.,
1995-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 71,205, at 71,205 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 15, 1995) (premising approval
of merger on commitment that some portion of the efficiencies attributed to the merger
go to provide services to the underserved).
116. The results pertaining to innovation are driven, in part, by pharmaceutical cases.
Five of the six FTC codes for considerations of technological or organizational innovation
come from consent decrees with drug companies. It is not surprising that innovation is a
particularly important concern in this setting, where research and development is essential
and where the core concern of intellectual property is the creation of incentives to
encourage innovation. Significantly, the enforcement agencies' concern for innovation is
not limited to this line of cases. Innovation is invoked as a concern in nonpharmaceutical
cases and with respect to factors that go beyond technology to encompass organizational
form; for example, the transition to various forms of managed care is a type of
organizational innovation.
117. These assumptions derived in part from our familiarity with "leading cases" in
health care antitrust as presented in the health law casebooks. Comparing such cases to
the full litigation landscape is a useful exercise. As previously noted, we applied our
coding instrument to the antitrust cases reported in the major health law casebooks to
confirm the instrument's utility before embarking on the much larger endeavor of coding
all published opinions. Although there is no reason to believe that the sample of casebook
cases should mirror the larger universe of medical antitrust cases, it is interesting to note
how the view of the world and the law reflected in the leading casebooks compares to our
findings generally.
The casebook sample consisted of 26 cases, some of which are not in our larger
sample because they were decided before 1985. The casebook sample suggests that
government suits are four to five times more common than they in fact are, that antitrust
disputes with managed care defendants account for a third of all cases, and that litigation
against professional and trade associations accounts for nearly 30% of health care antitrust
disputes. Staff privileges and exclusive contracting cases are well represented, but account
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support the third hypothesis, but cast doubt on the first and second. Our
data reveal that federal medical antitrust cases resulting in judicial opinions are mostly private, not public. Despite the rise of managed care,
judicial dockets remain dominated by litigation between physicians and
hospitals. This antitrust litigation disproportionately involves the denial
of staff privileges and the legality of exclusive contracts to deliver clinical
services. Moreover, very few private suits succeed. These findings raise
questions about the social utility of private medical antitrust litigation, the
manner in which public enforcement functions to influence behavior in
health care markets if not through the federal courts, and the importance of antitrust law to markets dominated by managed care, which are
also the markets in which quality is most vulnerable to the competitive
process. In this Part, we discuss the connections between our empirical
results and these broader legal and policy questions, both generally and
with specific attention to the issue of quality competition.
A. Is Medical Antitrust Litigation Socially Useful?
The American system of antitrust law is premised upon an overlapping system of public and private enforcement. Not only may private citizens sue for violations of federal antitrust law, but they are given added
incentives to do so in the form of treble damages and compensation for
their attorneys' fees if they are successful. Because government's enforcement resources are limited, it should not be surprising that the vast majority (94%) of health care antitrust disputes that resulted in judicial
for one-fifth rather than two-thirds of the cases. As with most casebook collections, one
gets the impression that district courts do not exist (88% of the cases are appellate level
decisions). More significantly, one gets the impression that plaintiffs and defendants are
more evenly matched than they in fact are. While twice as many appeals are by plaintiffs
rather than defendants-suggesting more rulings adverse to plaintiffs at the district court
level-plaintiffs enjoyed favorable outcomes in 30% of the casebook sample, while
defendants enjoyed favorable outcomes in 40% of cases.
There are important similarities as well. The casebook sample gives a fair
representation of the types of legal analyses courts perform, including a strong tendency
towards structural economic analysis, a sensitivity to alleged efficiencies and
procompetitive effects, and a significant role for defenses such as state action and the
intraenterprise conspiracy doctrine. The casebook sample understates the role of the
antitrust injury doctrine, but this is not surprising because largely meritless cases screened
out by that doctrine do not make good teaching material. Interestingly, possibly as a
byproduct of the overrepresentation of professional and trade association cases, the
casebook sample substantially overstates the significance of Goldfarb-era concerns.
The casebook sample fairly represents judicial treatment of quality concerns. As in
the larger sample, there is a nearly even split between firm-specific and market-level quality
discussions. Concerns dominant in the health services research literature are found in
neither sample. The quality related factors that arise in the casebooks resonate more
broadly with courts: the qualifications of health care providers, malpractice, and the
seemingly ubiquitous "unspecified quality of patient care concerns." On the market level,
the casebook cases accurately suggest the importance of information and choice in courts'
antitrust analysis, but these cases credit courts with a sensitivity to technological and
organizational innovation somewhat greater than occurs in the world at large.
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opinions between 1985 and 1999 were brought by private parties. Previous studies of general antitrust litigation find similar splits between private and public plaintiffs. The Georgetown Antitrust Project reports that
from the mid-1960s to the late 1970s only 5% of antitrust cases filed in
federal court were brought by the FTC or the DOJ. 1 18 In the 1980s,
largely due to overall reductions in the number of private suits rather
than increased public enforcement, 10% of all cases were brought by the
two federal agencies.1 1 9
1. Private Litigation. - What motivates private parties to bring these
suits? If we assume plaintiffs are rational economic actors, a private suit
will be brought only if the expected gains in damages and/or injunctive
relief exceed the expected costs of litigation. 120 Antitrust law skews these
118. Salop & White, supra note 15, at 3.
119. Id. Similar numbers are reported elsewhere, though none of those studies focus
as we do on health care litigation. A GAO Report on changes in federal antitrust
enforcement found that between 1980 and 1989, private cases constituted 91% of all
antitrust cases filed in district courts. See GAO Report, supra note 17, at 14; see also
NERA, Antitrust Report, supra note 16, at 1 (finding that in 1970-1978 between 93% and
96% of cases filed in district court were brought by private plaintiffs). Historic public/
private trends can be found in Posner, supra note 18, at 373. Between 1890 and 1940, the
number of public and private cases filed were comparable. Id. Beginning in the 1940s and
continuing to 1969, private antitrust filings began to substantially outpace public filings,
which remained roughly constant. Id. Some caution should be exercised in comparing
these sets of numbers with the results of our survey. Our survey examined medical
antitrust cases, not antitrust litigation generally. Our survey was limited to cases that
resulted in judicial opinions and thus did not include all district court filings. Our survey
included cases brought by state attorneys general, an aspect of public enforcement not
specifically included in the earlier studies. Finally, the exact percentage of public versus
private suits in our study is sensitive to the inclusion or exclusion of public consent
decrees. If both DOJ and FTC consent decrees are added to the mix, the percentage of
public cases rises to 19% of the total sample in our study.
120. In economic models of litigation, the decision to sue, the decision to settle, and
decisions concerning the amount of resources to devote to litigation are premised upon a
series of interconnected cost benefit calculations. A number of models have been
developed with the specific aim of studying antitrust settlement practices. See Baxter,
supra note 18, at 11-26; Jeffrey M. Perloff & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Settlements in Private
Antitrust Litigation, in Private Antitrust Litigation, supra note 15, at 149, 150-61; Salop &
White, supra note 15, at 16-24; see also John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff's
Attorney: The Implications of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through
Class and Derivative Actions, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 669, 698-701 (1986) (finding that trials
occur only when one party is overly optimistic and thus prevents agreement on litigation
odds); Theodore Eisenberg, Litigation Models and Trial Outcomes in Civil Rights and
Prisoner Cases, 77 Geo. L.J. 1567, 1570-72 (1989) (stating that expectation theory predicts
that "objectively strong and weak cases do not reach trial"); Priest & Klein, supra note 45,
at 6-17 (using selection effect to show that parties' estimates of success drive litigation and
differences in estimates cause nonsettlement). The basic insight from these economic
models is fairly straightforward. Plaintiffs initiate suits when they believe that the expected
value of their damage award will be greater than the expected costs of litigation. Within
these models, cases will normally settle if plaintiffs and defendants have sufficiently
convergent estimates of the value of the case (amount of damages), the legal principles
governing the dispute, and the probability of success. Litigation is typically a sign of
divergent expectations between the parties. However, where either party has incentives
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calculations in favor of suing by increasing the potential payoff and decreasing the expected costs of litigation by its fee shifting provision.
Moreover, in addition to treble damages and attorney's fees, antitrust law
empowers courts to provide extensive equitable relief (with more liberal
standing and antitrust injury requirements than are required in damage
actions). Any anticipated benefits of litigation, however, must be discounted by the expected probability of a successful outcome, which in
our sample is quite low even using an expansive definition of success.
The private parties in our study gained successful court outcomes only
14% of the time. 12 ' Courts very rarely awarded damages and infrequently
granted equitable relief. If one looks specifically at staff privileges cases,
plaintiff success rates are particularly dismal. Plaintiffs receive favorable
outcomes in staff privileges cases only 7% of the time. Our data on appellate opinions confirm our finding that plaintiffs are unsuccessful at the
lower court level. Plaintiffs brought 168 appeals, whereas defendants appealed from adverse trial rulings on 39 occasions. Appellate opinions sustained trial rulings adverse to defendants only 5 times in private suits.
Our findings mirror recent work by Jacobson, Selvin, and Pomfret, who
conducted an empirical assessment of the relationship between health
care litigation generally and health policy. 122 In their much smaller sample of 47 medical antitrust opinions, courts ruled for plaintiffs in 24%
and for defendants in 67%, with 9% representing "partial" rulings-results roughly comparable to our own. 1 2 3 The low rate of plaintiff victories
that go beyond the context of the dispute in question, such as a concern about how
settlement of the present case might affect future litigation, it can produce different
outcomes.
121. In drawing conclusions from these data, it is important to keep in mind the
limitations of our methodology. First, as discussed earlier, we have no means of comparing
our results from written opinions with the category of cases that settle. Second, even with
respect to litigated cases, we only examine cases that generated ajudicial opinion. There is
no necessary reason that a plaintiff's (or defendant's) jury verdict will be included in our
sample. The question, therefore, is whether the win-loss ratios derived from examining
opinions accurately reflect the win-loss ratios in the universe of all litigated medical
antitrust cases. Verdicts will be reported in opinions primarily if challenged by post-trial
motions or if appealed. If plaintiffs and defendants have identical incentives to bring posttrial motions and appeals, then the trial outcomes reported in opinions should not be
subject to any systematic selection bias. If the defendant's stakes in an adverse ruling are
higher than the plaintiffis, then opinions would disproportionately report plaintiff trial
victories. If antitrust plaintiffs as a class have fewer resources relative to antitrust
defendants, and resources are positively correlated with the decision to seek review, then
one would expect relatively fewer plaintiff challenges to adverse outcomes. Under either
of these scenarios, we believe that if a selection bias does exist in our focus on judicial
opinions, it would suggest that the low rates of plaintiff victories we report may actually
represent an upper bound.
122. Jacobson et al., supra note 40, at 3-4. The Jacobson study also evaluated
litigation involving ERISA, medical necessity, utilization review, and technology
assessment.
123. Id. at 15, 29-30.
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found in our sample is also generally consistent with earlier studies of
12 4
non-health care antitrust litigation.
What explains the large number of private suits despite very low
probabilities of success, and what do possible explanations imply about
the social utility of private antitrust litigation in health care? First, assuming that our results are not simply the artifacts of a publication or settlement bias, these findings are consistent with the incentive effects of potentially high antitrust payoffs. The promise of treble damages, attorney's
fees, and injunctive remedies may attract plaintiffs at the margin with
weaker cases than would be the case if the payoffs were reduced. A possible analogy is medical malpractice litigation. According to one study,
plaintiffs in medical malpractice suits were significantly less likely to prevail than other personal injury plaintiffs sustaining similar injuries, but
t 25
damage awards in successful cases were approximately twice as high.
In our study, however, so few cases generated damages or equitable relief
with clear commercial value that we hesitate to endorse this hypothesis
with respect to medical antitrust litigation. Publicity from early staff privileges cases with large damage awards, such as Patrick v. Burget,126 may
have misled plaintiffs into overestimating their likely gains from litigation. However, such an effect would be short-lived, and our data show
that the frequency of such cases remained fairly high throughout the
study period. On the other hand, private staff privileges cases did decline
from 51 (39%) in 1985-1989 to 34 (28%) in 1995-1999 (see Figure 2).
The reduction in the later periods may have been caused by persistently
124. The Georgetown Antitrust Project found that 73.3% of all cases filed in their
sample settled or were dismissed, and only 2.8% resulted in a judgment for some or all
plaintiffs. Salop & White, supra note 15, at 10. In contrast, 7% of all filed cases resulted in
a judgment for one or all defendants. Id. Considering only cases in the Georgetown
sample that went to judgment, plaintiffs prevailed in 28% of all cases (reduced to 11% if
the dismissal of the case is considered to be a defendant victory, a characterization more
consistent with our methodology). Id. at 16. The NERA study found that plaintiffs won
only 2% of all filed cases, where a victory reflected either a trial verdict in their favor or a
defendant's default. NERA, Antitrust Report, supra note 16, at 44. Defendants received
judgments in 14% of all filed cases, including summary judgment motions, motions to
dismiss, and victories at trial. Id. If one looks only at cases proceeding to judgment,
plaintiffs prevailed in 12% of cases in the NERA sample. Id. In comparing our results to
those of the Georgetown Antitrust Project and the NERA study, the difference in our
definition of a "plaintiff victory" must be kept in mind. Other studies of antitrust litigation
define a plaintiff victory in terms of an actual judgment, such as a trial verdict or a default
judgment. Our definition of a plaintiff victory is much broader. For both plaintiffs and
defendants, we define a victory to include not simply judgments, but also prevailing in
other respects, such as winning or losing a motion for summary judgment or a motion to
dismiss. Perhaps most significantly, we treat the denial of a defendant's motion for
summary judgment as a plaintiff's victory. The net effect of our approach would be to
over-report the degree of plaintiff success rates as compared with earlier studies.
125. Randall R. Bovbjerg et al., Juries and Justice: Are Malpractice and Other
Personal Injuries Created Equal?, 54 Law & Contemp. Probs. 5, 16-21 (1991).
126. 486 U.S. 94, 98-99 (1988) (upholding ajury verdict awarding plaintiff nearly two
million dollars in treble damages).
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low success rates or the Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986,127
which granted peer review bodies limited antitrust immunity and provided for recovery of attorney's fees by prevailing defendants.
It is possible that prevailing plaintiffs earn rewards outside of court
or in collateral proceedings that increase the potential payoff from litigation in ways that are not reflected in our data. Strong cases may be the
very cases that settle, thereby skewing our results. It would be useful to
know whether the mere fact of filing suit pressured hospitals to admit or
reinstate a complaining physician to the medical staff, even though one
would expect the negotiating value of such an action to be slight if the
defendant is aware of how unsuccessful these antitrust claims are. We see
no particularly strong strike value to these claims. The cost of trying a
staff privileges case should not be inordinately high for the hospital, particularly given the availability of screening devices such as the antitrust
injury doctrine to dispose of weak cases early in the process. Alternatively, the antitrust claim may simply be one of many legal theories being
pursued against the hospital, with others consisting mainly of state tort
and contract claims. From this perspective, a federal antitrust claim may
be part of a larger mix, with the Sherman Act claims serving as a means to
128
anchor the dispute in federal rather than state court.
127. 42 U.S.C. §§ 11,101-11,152 (1994).
128. Many staff privileges cases combine state tort and contract claims with a federal
antitrust claim. On rare occasions, the plaintiff succeeds on all fronts. In Brown v.
PresbyterianHealthcare Services, for example, a physician sued a hospital after revocation of
staff privileges on antitrust and state tort theories. 101 F.3d 1324, 1327-28 (10th Cir. 1996).
The jury found in favor of the plaintiff on both theories. Id. at 1328. In other cases, the
plaintiff may win the state common law claim, but lose the federal antitrust claim. In
Johnson v. Hospital Corp. of America, practitioners of environmental medicine sued on state
tort and federal antitrust grounds for revocation of their staff privileges and the
subsequent closure of the Environmental Medicine Unit. 95 F.3d 383, 386-87 (5th Cir.
1996). The district court found a violation of state tort law and awarded compensatory and
punitive damages, but found no antitrust violation. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the finding
of no antitrust liability but reversed a portion of the damage award on the state tort theory.
Id. at 393, 395-96; see also Robles v. Humana Hosp., 785 F. Supp. 989, 999, 1002-03 (N.D.
Ga. 1992) (granting defendants summary judgment as to antitrust claims but denying
summary judgment on state tort and contract theories in staff privileges case). In the
majority of instances, however, the federal antitrust claim is dismissed and the court
declines to exercise jurisdiction over the state causes of action. See, e.g., Alba v. Marietta
Mem'l Hosp., 184 F.R.D. 280, 290 (S.D. Ohio 1998) (granting summary judgment on the
antitrust claim and declining to exercise pendant jurisdiction over state law claims in staff
privileges case), affd, 202 F.3d 267 (6th Cir. 2000); Mathews v. Lancaster Gen. Hosp., 883
F. Supp. 1016, 1047 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (granting defendants summary judgment on antitrust
claims and declining to exercise jurisdiction over state law claims in dispute between
orthopedic surgeon and hospital peer review board), affd, 87 F.3d 624 (3d Cir. 1996);
Willman v. Heartland Hosp. East, 34 F.3d 605, 612-613 (8th Cir. 1994) (affirming district
court's grant of summary judgment for defendants on antitrust claims and finding that
district court did not abuse discretion in declining to hear state law claims); Flegel v.
Christian Hosp. Northeast-Northwest, 804 F. Supp. 1165, 1175-76 (E.D. Mo. 1992)
(granting defendants summary judgment on antitrust claim and declining to exercise
jurisdiction over state law claims in case involving changes in hospital bylaws that would
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A second possible explanation involves the asymmetry of payoffs
rather than their absolute level. One of the more interesting predictions
of the Priest-Klein settlement model is that the outcomes of litigated cases
should favor each party about half the time. 129 The fact that the win/loss
ratio for private antitrust plaintiffs diverges substantially from this prediction is well known and has been widely noted. 13 0 The most commonly
suggested explanation for the historically low rate of plaintiff victories is
that the stakes in most antitrust cases are highly asymmetric. Defendants
often have more to lose in antitrust litigation than the plaintiffs stand to
gain, a fact that violates one of the basic assumptions of the Priest-Klein
model. Defendants may be worried about reputational effects of litigation and the effect that an adverse ruling or onerous injunctive relief
could have on a wide range of their business practices. 3 1 When the defendant has more to lose than the plaintiff has to gain, the model
predicts both a higher rate of settlement and a lower rate of plaintiff
victories, because defendants will only go to trial on those cases where
32
they are fairly confident of victory.1
Asymmetric stakes are likely present in some of our health care antitrust cases as well. As in other industries, the broad equitable powers of
antitrust courts expose defendants to the risk of costly injunctive relief.
Defendants may also care more about reputational effects, both generally
and in connection with provoking additional lawsuits. Still, at least in the
setting of staff privileges and exclusive contacting cases, it is unlikely that
a single hospital will be a repeat defendant in the same manner as a national manufacturer facing a steady stream of dealer termination cases.
Similarly, the stakes for the discharged physician in terms of professional
reputation and economic livelihood can be quite substantial as well.

result in categorical exclusion of osteopaths), affd, 4 F.3d 682 (8th Cir. 1993). Similar
patterns can be observed in exclusive contracting cases. See, e.g., Diaz v. Farley, 15 F.
Supp. 2d 1138, 1150 (D. Utah 1998) (granting defendants summary judgment and
declining to exercise jurisdiction over the state law claims in dispute between groups of
anesthesiologists), aftd, 215 F.3d 1175 (10th Cir. 2000).
129. Priest & Klein, supra note 45, at 17-20. In predicting an even win/loss ratio in
litigated cases, the model assumes that litigation is more costly than settlement, id. at 13,
that the parties will make comparable types of errors in estimating outcomes, id. at 19, and
that the parties' stakes in the litigation are symmetrical, meaning that the damage award
the plaintiff stands to win represents the full and complete anticipated loss to the
defendant. Id. at 12.
130. See, e.g., Baxter, supra note 18, at 16-20 (discussing how historic plaintiff win/
loss ratios in private antitrust litigation violate an analogous 50-50 hypothesis suggested by
Baxter's own settlement model); Coffee, supra note 120, at 698-701 (noting the paradox
of historically low plaintiff win rates in antitrust cases in the context of the Priest-Klein
model); Eisenberg, supra note 120, at 1579-80 (same); Priest & Klein, supra note 45, at
52-54 (discussing the unusually low rate of plaintiff victories in private antitrust cases in
the context of their selection model); Salop & White, supra note 15, at 25-26 (same).
131. Perloff & Rubinfeld, supra note 120, at 156.
132. Priest & Klein, supra note 45, at 25-26.
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While certainly germane, the asymmetric stakes explanation alone
does not seem to fully explain either the steady volume or the incredibly
low rate of success in these cases. 1 33 The standard Priest-Klein model
predicts that the volume of litigated cases will decline as increased certainty about the legal rule leads to a greater convergence in the parties'
expectations and an increase in settlement. Given the ongoing structural
transformation of the health care sector, however, it is easy to imagine
that there are sufficient new sources of uncertainty to outweigh any uncertainty reducing effect of previously litigated cases.
A third set of possible explanations involves relaxing the rational actor assumption as applied to physicians, or at least building into the physician's utility function elements not normally associated with engaging in
litigation. This might be thought of as the "big ego/big wallet" or "big
fish/little pond" explanation.' 34 Under this view, staff privileges cases
and perhaps other cases are brought because they affect deeply personal
and important aspects of the physician's reputation or competence and
the physician has the financial resources to subsidize the litigation. 13 5 Especially in small communities, antitrust litigation frequently has as much
133. Some might claim that asymmetric information rather than asymmetric stakes
explains the persistently low plaintiff win/loss ratios. In the presence of asymmetric
information, almost any win/loss ratio can be generated in the Priest-Klein settlement
model. Steven Shavell, Any Frequency of Plaintiff Victory at Trial is Possible, 25 J. Legal.
Stud. 493, 500-01 (1996). It is doubtful that the existence of information asymmetries has
much explanatory power in our sample beyond the issues of rationality and representation
discussed below. Aside from the wide range of cases where equally sophisticated parties
are on both sides of the litigation-hospital versus hospital, insurance company versus
insurance company, pharmaceutical company versus pharmaceutical company, or even
hospital versus insurance company-the asymmetric information explanation is largely
unpersuasive even for the more limited context of staff privileges cases (physicians versus
hospitals). As already noted, typical hospital defendants are unlikely to be very
experienced in antitrust litigation. Neither do physicians resemble indigent plaintiffs or
plaintiffs in medical malpractice suits. Each side in the physician-hospital dispute has
economic resources and each side can purchase expertise in the market. The relevant
information is itself a ready commodity-professional legal services. Outside counsel
retained by hospitals may be better trained than lawyers representing individual physicians.
However, these are not particularly difficult cases from an antitrust perspective and not an
area where there would be substantial question as to the appropriate legal advice.
134. Some plaintiffs truly seem to have wandered through the looking glass. In one
case, a surgeon in rural Idaho sued two hospitals for allegedly agreeing not to recruit
additional surgeons into the community because reduced competition among surgeons
forced him to work too hard. Patton v. E. Idaho Reg'I Med. Ctr., No. 92-36805, 1994 U.S.
App. LEXIS 3192, at *2 (9th Cir. Feb. 18, 1994). The court commented: "Although it may
have been foreseeable that the alleged conspiracy would result in Dr. Patton's overwork
and stress, this . . . is not a cognizable antitrust injury." Id. at *7.
135. This pattern extends beyond antitrust litigation to other legal claims. Because of
the strong personalities, high moral tone, and large financial stakes in health care,
internecine feuds among physicians often spill over into the courts. The first part time job
that one of the authors had in law school involved reviewing medical records in
malpractice litigation based on data on poor cardiac surgery outcomes that the medical
cardiologists at a major academic center in California, who were in the midst of a bitter
turf battle with the surgeons, had leaked to the press.
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to do with personal animosity as economic injury. 1 3 6 Furthermore, physicians in solo or small-group practice may feel that being denied access to
their preferred hospital in a new town (staff privileges cases) or being
shut out of the hospital in which they are accustomed to practicing (exclusive contracting cases) is tantamount to costing them their livelihood,
and may be willing to go to substantial lengths to prevent it. Exclusive
contracting cases may have additional symbolic importance to physicians.
While staff privileges disputes are typically triggered by fellow physicians'
efforts to remove a colleague who is incompetent and/or incorrigible,
exclusive contracting cases reflect a fundamental restructuring of the
marketplace that shifts economic power and decisionmaking authority
1 37
from physicians to hospitals.
A last set of possible explanations involves agency failure in the legal
profession. Are the lawyers who agree to represent these physicians, and
who presumably know the slim odds they face, failing in their counseling
role, or are their clients simply too stubborn to listen to good advice? It
would be enlightening to know more about the fee structures used by
plaintiffs' attorneys in medical antitrust cases. One might speculate that
the pro-plaintiff fee shifting provisions of the federal antitrust laws tempt
lawyers into misleading the physicians paying their hourly rates that the
fees will ultimately be covered by defendants. One also wonders how
many of these cases would be brought if the plaintiffs' attorneys had to
undertake the claim on a contingency fee basis. In any event, the lack of
attorney self discipline suggested by our data makes us doubt that sound
client counseling regarding antitrust obligations and liabilities is taking
place, or that the public ends of antitrust law are necessarily being furthered by the actions of the private bar.1 38
On the positive side, our survey suggests that courts recognize the
weaknesses of most medical antitrust claims and are fairly effective in

136. The histrionics portrayed by the parties in Wright v. Southern Mono HospitalDistrict
are perhaps extreme, but far from unique: "[Dr.] Stehlik [was] accused of severely
breaching good interprofessional conduct and physically threatening Dr. Paulson, his wife,
and unborn child.... [And] Dr. David Matthews ... and Dr. Stehlik engaged in a fist fight
behind closed doors in the radiology suite at Mammoth Hospital." 631 F. Supp. 1294,1298
(E.D. Cal. 1986), affd sub nom. Stehlik v. S. Mono Hosp. Dist., 924 F.2d 1063 (9th Cir.
1991). For additional pathos, the court goes on to note that "[a]t the present time, there
Dr. Matthews was killed
are no witnesses to the altercation, independent or otherwise ....
Dr. Stehlik committed suicide." Id. at 1299 n.3.
in a single aircraft collision ....
137. This was particularly true for cases that arose during the 1990s, when hospital
finances were strained and competition intense. Some of the earlier cases involved battles
between rival physician groups for control of hospital departments, with the hospital
caught in the crossfire, rather than placing the hospital in a position of economic and
clinical authority.
138. See Coffee, supra note 120, at 684-90 (discussing how methods of attorney
compensation can undermine the public integrity of various private attorney general
provisions).
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weeding them out. 139 According to the GAO, the total number of private

antitrust cases (in all industries) filed in federal district courts fell over
50% (from 1,292 to 638) between 1981 and 1989.140 Many attribute this
dramatic decline to increasing reliance by courts on structural economic
analysis (the express examination of market definition and assessments of
market power) and the use of standing limitations and screening devices
such as the antitrust injury doctrine. While our research does not document a decline in the number of medical antitrust cases being brought
over the fifteen-year period we studied, it does document judicial use of
various doctrinal devices to screen out weak cases, to frame the legal issues in contested cases, and to distinguish disputes raising concerns germane to antitrust law from disputes that are better addressed in legislative
or administrative fora, or as a matter of state common law. The antitrust
injury doctrine stands out in our data as the most effective such
heuristic. 141

Although social resources are arguably wasted in the process of litigating these cases, medical antitrust disputes are not necessarily generating bad outcomes, or systematically curious results.' 4 2 The exclusive contracting cases, for example, reflect a move away from a "physician
workshop" model of hospitals and toward an integrated vertical relationship between hospitals and suppliers of certain physician services, such as
radiology, anesthesiology, pathology, and emergency medicine. As noted
above, courts have readily acknowledged the efficiencies and improved
quality of services often associated with such contracts. 143 From this perspective, suits challenging exclusive contracting can be understood as efforts to use the antitrust laws to preserve traditional power relations and
streams of economic benefits in health care. Such a tactic is neither
unique to health care nor necessarily improper. In rejecting most of
these claims, courts have projected onto the health care sector the same
economic assumptions they make about the efficiency of vertical relations
and nonprice restraints elsewhere in the economy. 144 Arguably, this has
helped facilitate further, socially appropriate market restructuring.
139. This claim has some obvious normative overtones. It is based upon our
interpretation of the survey results in conjunction with our systematic review of the cases.
In reviewing the cases, one obtains a fairly strong instinct for what constitutes a strong or a
weak claim. One also gains a fair amount of respect for how courts have used structural
economic analysis, a sensitivity to efficiency claims in appropriate settings, and the full
range of immunities and defenses available in antitrust law, admittedly blunt instruments
in and of themselves, to screen cases lacking in substantive merit and to identify those cases
most likely to present a threat to competition.
140. GAO Report, supra note 17, at 4.
141. Antitrust injury or standing was addressed in 45% of the opinions we studied.
See supra text accompanying notes 93-95.
142. The same type of caveats we make in footnote 139 about the normative nature of
this claim apply here as well.
143. See infra text accompanying notes 174-175.
144. In non-health care settings, vertical nonprice restraints are evaluated under the
rule of reason as a matter of course, see Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433
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Still, it would be a stretch to conclude that private health care antitrust litigation between 1985 and 1999 produced substantial social benefits. Such litigation was common, and comprised a large and growing
proportion of antitrust lawsuits as a whole. Most cases were losers and
were dismissed at early stages of review. It remains possible that buried in
our data are a handful of cases with real impact, but relatively few private
cases in our sample pose "big questions" about the optimal structure of
the health care industry. Rather, most of the antitrust litigation we observed was mired in a thicket of physician-hospital relations. The subset
of cases involving pharmaceuticals and other medical products seems
more analytically interesting than the larger universe of physician and
hospital disputes, 14 5 perhaps presaging a series of decisions in the future
as large insurers and other managed care companies have their day in
U.S. 36, 36-37 (1977), with a strong presumption that such restraints are efficient. See
Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 726 (1988). This same template is
now being applied in many hospital exclusive contracting cases. See, e.g., Coffey v.
Healthtrust, Inc., 955 F.2d 1388, 1392-93 (10th Cir. 1992) (characterizing the relationship
between the defendant hospital and its physicians as vertical in nature and therefore
subject to rule of reason analysis).
145. An important trend in pharmaceutical litigation involves challenges to systems
for pricing and distributing prescription drugs. See, e.g., In re Brand Name Prescription
Drugs Antitrust Litig., 123 F.3d 599, 603, 616 (7th Cir. 1997) (blocking effort by small
retail pharmacies to challenge the pricing structure created by large purchasers and
managed care plans negotiating special deals for prescription drugs); Barton & Pittinos,
Inc. v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 118 F.3d 178, 179 (3d Cir. 1997) (affirming summary
judgment against plaintiff in antitrust litigation over the wholesale distribution of hepatitisB vaccine to nursing homes); Burlington Drug Co. v. VHA, Inc., No. 2:95-CV-15, 1998 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 17787, at *2-*3 (D. Vt. Sept. 3, 1998) (granting plaintiff drug company's
motion for defendant health care organization to supplement discovery in antitrust
litigation over wholesale distribution of pharmaceuticals and jointly negotiated price
discounts); Merck-Medco Managed Care, Inc. v. Rite Aid Corp., 22 F. Supp. 2d 447, 450
(D. Md. 1998) (alleging conspiratorial boycott by defendant pharmacies to undermine
plaintiff's efforts to build pharmacy network), af'd, 201 F.3d 436 (4th Cir. 1999); FTC v.
Cardinal Health, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d 34, 36-37 (D.D.C. 1998) (enjoining a proposed
merger between two large wholesale drug distributors); Rudner v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 664
F. Supp. 1100, 1101 (N.D. Ohio 1987) (involving Robinson-Patman Act price
discrimination claim against pharmaceutical manufacturer).
A second important trend involves disputes between the manufacturers of brand
name and generic drugs. Some of this litigation implicates conduct before the FDA at the
market/regulatory interface. See Cheminor Drugs, Ltd. v. Ethyl Corp., 168 F.3d 119, 120
(3d Cir. 1999) (finding that alleged misrepresentations by defendant did not vitiate NoerrPennington immunity for petitioning the government to protect it against imports of bulk
ibuprofen by plaintiffs); Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Akzo, N.V., 770 F. Supp. 1053, 1058 (D. Md.
1991) (alleging improprieties in securing FDA approval of generic drugs). Other cases
challenge marketing tactics. See, e.g., Nat'l Ass'n of Pharm. Mfrs., Inc. v. Ayerst Labs., 850
F.2d 904, 906 (2d Cir. 1988) (seeking review of dismissal of antitrust and Lanham Act
claims by generic drug manufacturer against brand name drug manufacturer for
circulation of letter to pharmacies discussing possible dangers of generic drug
substitution). Occasional cases pit competing prospective manufacturers of generics
against each other. See Invamed, Inc. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 22 F. Supp. 2d 210, 214-15
(S.D.N.Y. 1998) (alleging anticompetitive behavior by affiliated entities in suit between
rival prospective generic drug producers of warfarin sodium).
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court. Nonetheless, our results strongly suggest that we must look beyond the private litigation of the past fifteen years to find antitrust analysis that is robust enough to accomplish our policy goal of incorporating
both quality and price considerations into health care competition.
2. Public Enforcement. - To a degree, the conclusion of the preceding Section is unsurprising. There is no reason to believe that the self
interest of private parties who can claim standing under the antitrust laws
will necessarily coincide with public objectives.1 46 Although there is a
long tradition of private antitrust suits following on public investigations
and litigation-cases in which one might assume a degree of correspondence between public aims and private actions-very little contemporary
private litigation falls into this category. 14 7 Similarly, there is little evidence of follow-on litigation in our sample. The common types of private
health care antitrust suits being brought (staff privileges and exclusive
contracting) and the sectors in which they concentrate (physician-hospital relations) often fail to implicate important competitive or health policy concerns.
One would expect, however, the activities of the federal enforcement
agencies (the DOJ and FTC) to serve the general welfare, at least as it is
understood by the presidential administration in power.148 If medical antitrust law fails to exert beneficial effects on competition through private
litigation, then does it do so through public enforcement? Public en146. Antitrust injury and standing doctrines are fluid, and courts have been flexible in
their application to permit plaintiffs to bring suits that might raise legitimate claims. See,
e.g., In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., 123 F.3d at 604-06 (invoking an
exception to Illinois Brick's indirect purchaser bar where intermediate purchasers,
wholesale middlemen, were also alleged conspirators); Rozema v. Marshfield Clinic, 977 F.
Supp. 1362, 1375 (W.D. Wis. 1997) (rejecting defendant's argument that "HMO
subscribers [were] indirect purchasers of physician services" that were being "resold"
through the HMO). Still, there have always been substantial difficulties empowering
consumers who are in theory the preferred private antitrust plaintiffs. See, e.g., Askew v.
DCH Reg'l Health Care Auth., 995 F.2d 1033, 1037-41 (l1th Cir. 1993) (holding that
defendant was a political subdivision and was immune under state action doctrine in light
of Alabama statutes); Advocacy Org. for Patients & Providers v. Mercy Health Servs., 987 F.
Supp. 967, 970 (E.D. Mich. 1997) (denying plaintiffs' request for TRO to block
defendants' hospital merger, finding little likelihood of plaintiffs' success on the merits).
147. Thomas E. Kauper & Edward A. Snyder, Private Antitrust Cases That Follow on
Government Cases, in Private Antitrust Litigation, supra note 15, at 329, 332 (reporting
that less than 9% of the private cases in the Georgetown sample represented follow-on
forms of private litigation). The 9% follow-on cases in the Georgetown sample contrasts
with reports that nearly 75% of all private cases in the first half of the last century came in
the wake of government prosecutions. Robert W. Stedman, Comment, Consent Decrees
and the Private Action: An Antitrust Dilemma, 53 Cal. L. Rev. 627, 628 n.7 (1965).
148. In this Article, we adopt a relatively uncritical public interest theory of
government enforcement. At this stage of our study, we are primarily interested in using
the government cases as a foil against which to compare and contrast private enforcement
efforts. The extent to which public antitrust enforcement actually furthers the public
interest is an important and difficult question. In a subsequent phase of our study, we
intend to focus more closely on government enforcement efforts and to examine more
critically the social value of public antitrust activity in this area.
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forcement (including by state attorneys general) accounted for merely
6% of all litigated disputes in our survey-a small portion of the medical
antitrust cases decided in federal courts. Nonetheless, these cases may
have importance disproportionate to their numbers by halting especially
harmful conduct, deterring misbehavior by other similarly situated parties, or aiding the productive evolution of the underlying substantive law.
In addition, litigated cases represent only a fraction of the potentially anticompetitive activity investigated and addressed by the DOJ and the FTC
using other enforcement tools. 149 Settlements, advisory opinions, policy

statements and the like may be more powerful influences on industry
conduct than litigated cases. We must therefore explore two questions
using our empirical findings. First, what is the impact of public enforcement actions on the federal courts? Second, how do litigated cases relate
to other work performed by the enforcement agencies?
The small number of cases brought by the DOJ and the FTC does
not necessarily indicate that antitrust law cannot promote competition in
medical markets. Antitrust law can serve as an effective deterrent even
without many prosecutions. For example, the Supreme Court's 1982 decision in Maricopa put the health care industry on notice that it was subject to the Sherman Act's per se rule against price fixing. The fact that
DOJ and FTC consent orders involve price fixing and other per se conduct more often than do litigated cases provides support for this hypothesis.1 50 Furthermore, even though the DOJ has not pursued many crimi-

149. The 22 litigated disputes are the tip of a public enforcement iceberg,
constituting 24% of the combined total of 89 agency enforcement actions during the study
period. The 39 disputes resolved by FTC consent orders and administrative decisions and
the 20 disputes resolved by DOJ consent degrees represent another layer of effort.
Beneath both of these layers is the bulk of the agencies' work: cases investigated but not
pursued, responses to business review letters and advisory opinions, as well as speeches by
enforcement agency personnel to industry groups, comments on proposed legislation, and
the production of industry specific guidelines. Between 1985 and 1999, the DOJ issued 60
business review letters in health care matters, and the FTC issued 73 advisory opinions.
150. Our data shed some light on the question of which public cases settle and which
are litigated. As stated earlier, there are historic estimates that place the settlement rate
for government antitrust enforcement efforts generally at 80% from 1955-1973 and at
92% from 1973-1981. McDavid et al., supra note 51, at 883. In our health care specific
survey, 67% of DOJ cases and 78% of FTC cases settled. Assuming that the older numbers
retain some contemporary significance, the rate of settlement in health care cases appears
to be lower than in other antitrust cases. The hospital merger cases, which we argue
elsewhere as being aberrational, drive some of these results. Defendant hospitals with
concentration ratios that would be considered presumptively unlawful (and treated as
such) in any other sector of the economy proceed to trial and have obtained a remarkable
level of success in the district courts. The data further support the contention that
government cases alleging per se illegal conduct are more likely to settle. None of the
litigated cases involve cases against contracting intermediaries, such as IPAs and PPOs
(likely facilitators of price fixing agreements), while 9 consent decrees (13%) name such
entities as defendants. Only 2 litigated cases involve conduct classified as joint contract
negotiations (9%), while such conduct is at issue in 17 consent decrees (25%). Finally,
price fixing was alleged in only one publicly litigated case (the criminal prosecutions in
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nal cases in health care-and even though the verdicts obtained in United
States v. Alston were not upheld by the Ninth Circuit-the few prosecutions that have occurred received substantial publicity. While one must
ask whether these signals are lost or muted because of the noise generated by substantially larger numbers of often meridess private lawsuits,
the volume of private suits may actually exert a sentinel effect, furthering
the general deterrent message in per se cases by keeping potential defendants vigilant regarding potential antitrust liability.
Still, our data suggest an unsettled relationship between courts and
the enforcement agencies with respect to medical antitrust law, limiting
the potential impact of public enforcement decisions on competition.
Courts take cases brought by the DOJ and the FTC seriously and frequently side with those agencies against private parties.' 51 Occasionally,
however (more than occasionally where hospital mergers are concerned),
the courts disagree with public enforcement, which inevitably affects the
power of the agencies to negotiate private settlements in similar situations
as well as their decisions to litigate future cases. 1 52 At one level, this accords well with the notion, familiar from recent antitrust literature, that
the FTC and the DOJ may be more effective as regulators than as prose15 3
cutors, particularly in highly specialized industries such as health care.
Under this theory, courts would play a backstop role, using judicial accountability to keep the agencies honest in their regulatory role. Other
health care regulation is conducted similarly; for example, efforts by the
Office of Inspector General (OIG) of the Department of Health and
Human Services to root out fraud and abuse affecting the Medicare and
Medicaid programs.' 54 This pattern is typical of the administrative law
United States v. Alston), whereas price fixing was alleged in 18 (27%) of the cases producing
consent decrees. A similar pattern exists for boycott claims.
151. While the government's approximately 50% win ratio in health care cases looks
good in comparison with the extremely low rate of private plaintiff victories, it compares
unfavorably with historic government antitrust win/loss ratios. See Priest & Klein, supra
note 45, at 53 (reporting that historically DOJ and FTC won 81% of antitrust cases
litigated) (calculation based on tables compiled by Posner, supra note 18, at 381 tbl.11).
Antitrust is a relative newcomer to the professions in general and to health care in
particular. The novelty of many of the claims may explain part of the lower rates of victory.
Part of the explanation must also lie with the government's abysmal success rate in the
hospital merger cases. Hospital mergers account for 9 of the 11 health care outcomes
classified as defendant victories.
152. One would expect this effect to be more pronounced for the DOJ, which has no
formal enforcement authority apart from judicial process, than for the FTC, which can
bring cases through administrative adjudicatory mechanisms, subject to appellate level
judicial review.
153. See Spencer Weber Waller, Prosecution by Regulation: The Changing Nature of
Antitrust Enforcement, 77 Or. L. Rev. 1383, 1417-35 (1998). These arguments generally
lead to the conclusion that a regulatory approach requires a less confrontational style and
a greater expectation of a continuing relationship with the subject of one's investigation
than is common among prosecutors.
154. A growing proportion of antifraud enforcement activity is conducted through
settlements, "corporate integrity agreements," and other forms of self policing. When
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model of the post New Deal state, which views courts primarily as trustees
of congressional intent, restraining agencies from misinterpreting or
overstepping their mandates, rather than as lawmakers in their own right.
Indeed, the FTC and DOJ have behaved like regulators in recent
years, sometimes following explicit congressional instructions but often
acting on their own. In 1993, 1994, and 1996, the two agencies issued
joint Policy Statements Regarding Antitrust Enforcement in the Health
Care Industry.155 It is generally accepted that the 1993 policy statements
were released in order to demonstrate the agencies' willingness to engage
in dialogue with the health care industry, which was in the first throes of
consolidation in response to managed care, and thereby to forestall legislative action as part of national health reform that might extend antitrust
immunity to various constituencies and activities. 156 Because they focus
on a single industry, the policy statements are unique among guidance
documents published by the federal enforcement agencies. 157 In addinegotiations falter and OIG or DOJ must initiate formal judicial enforcement processes,
the rules of the game change dramatically because courts often respond differently to the
underlying facts and law. See generally Timothy Stoltzfus Jost & Sharon L. Davies, The
Empire Strikes Back: A Critique of the Backlash Against Fraud and Abuse Enforcement,
51 Ala. L. Rev. 239, 305-07 (1999) (discussing the settlement process for medical fraud
claims and high risk borne by providers who elect to go to trial).
155. See Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission Statements of
Antitrust Enforcement Policy in Health Care, 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 1 13,153, at 20,799
(Aug. 5, 1996); Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission Statements of
Enforcement Policy and Analytical Principles Relating to Health Care and Antitrust, 4
13,152, at 20,769 (Sept. 30, 1994); Department of Justice and
Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)
FTC Antitrust Enforcement Policy Statements in the Health Care Area, 4 Trade Reg. Rep.
(CCH)
13,151, at 20,755 (Sept. 15, 1993).
156. For this reason, the 1993 policy statements did not break new ground, but
basically restated existing law in reader friendly prose, with examples. The 1994 and 1996
policy statements, by contrast, attempted in truer regulatory fashion to address cutting
edge practices that had not yet been resolved by the courts. Agency "good citizenship"
under threat of legislative curtailment of enforcement authority persists to this day.
Former Representative Campbell continually introduced legislation into the House that
would have granted independent physicians the same right to collectively bargain that is
enjoyed by labor unions. See, e.g., H.R. 1304, 106th Cong. (1999); H.R. 4277, 105th Cong.
(1998). In 2000, the Campbell bill was passed by the House of Representatives but not
brought to a Senate vote.
157. The enforcement agencies have issued guidelines on a number of different
topics. Perhaps best known are the Horizontal Merger Guidelines, Department of Justice
and Federal Trade Commission Horizontal Merger Guidelines, reprinted in 4 Trade Reg.
13,104, at 20,569 (issued Apr. 2, 1992, revised Apr. 8, 1997), but the
Rep. (CCH)
agencies have also issued guidelines in the areas of intellectual property, Department of
Justice and the Federal Trade Commission Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of
13,132, at 20,733 (Apr. 6,
Intellectual Property, reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)
1995), and international undertakings, Department of Justice and the Federal Trade
Commission Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations, 4 Trade Reg.
Rep. (CCH)
13,107, at 20,589 (Apr. 5, 1995). State attorneys general have also
promulgated antitrust enforcement guidelines. See Vertical Restraints Guidelines, 49
Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1243, at 996 (Dec. 4, 1985); Horizontal Merger
Guidelines, 52 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1306, at S-1 (Mar. 12, 1987).
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tion to explaining the agencies' analytic approach to common fact patterns, the statements identify "safety zones" that will not attract scrutiny,
and pledge the agencies to rapid turnaround of requests for pretransaction review. All of these features are more familiar to regulators than to
prosecutors.' 5 8 Similarly, one can observe patterns of enforcement agencies using their authority to discourage specific practices they deem to be
a threat to competition, such as "most favored nation" (MFN) clauses in
15 9
certain insurance reimbursement contracts.
However, there are two problems with a regulatory approach to antitrust enforcement. First, the federal antitrust laws, unlike the fraud laws,
do not contain a detailed statutory scheme that can guide judicial interpretation. Instead, the Sherman Act's broad "restraint of trade" language
envisions a strong role for the courts as developers of law.' 60 Second,
because courts are preoccupied with often groundless private litigation,
most health care antitrust decisions in our sample did not refine or advance the law, weakening the case for the courts guiding the public enforcement agencies. Again, the exception is the hospital merger cases,
but it remains to be seen whether the defeats suffered by the FTC and the
DOJ will help them refine their enforcement approach, rather than being
regarded merely as 'judicial nullification." Nonetheless, our data
158. In fraud enforcement, a good example is the issuance of advisory opinions
regarding potential kickbacks, a practice long resisted by the DOJ as incompatible with
prosecution of crime because it required the agency to divine the presence or absence of
criminal intent. Only in the intense political climate of the mid-1990s did Congress finally
require the Secretary of HHS to issue advisory opinions. See Health Insurance Portability
and Accountability Act of 1996, 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7d (Supp. 1999).
159. All five entries under "unilateral imposition of contracts provisions" in the
consent decree subset involved challenges by the DOJ to MFN provisions. See United
States v. Med. Mut., 1999-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 72,465, at 84,264 (N.D. Ohio 1999)
(nullifying Most Favored Rate requirement instituted by insurer in attempt to secure lowest
rate that a hospital gave to any third party); United States v. Delta Dental of R.I., 1997-2
Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 71,860, at 80,045 (D.R.I. 1997) (nullifying similar scheme instituted by
dental insurer); United States v. Vision Serv. Plan, 1996-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 71,404, at
77,037 (D.D.C. 1996) (nullifying similar scheme instituted by vision insurer); United States
v. Or. Dental Serv., 1995-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 71,062, at 75,045 (N.D. Cal. 1995)
(nullifying similar scheme instituted by dental insurer); United States v. Delta Dental Plan
of Az., 1995-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 71,048, at 74,962 (D. Az. 1995) (same).
160. Section 1 of the Sherman Act broadly prohibits contracts, combinations, and
conspiracies in restraints of trade, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994), while section 2 prohibits
monopolization and attempted monopolization. Id. § 2. Judges have interpreted this
language as extending to courts an organic mandate to develop a federal common law of
antitrust. See Peter J. Hammer, Antitrust Beyond Competition: Market Failures, Total
Welfare, and the Challenge of Intramarket Second-Best Tradeoffs, 98 Mich. L. Rev. 849,
906 n.151 (2000). Even the FTC Act, which is a mandate to an administrative agency
rather than the courts, speaks at a high level of generality. Section 5 of the FTC Act
broadly prohibits "[ujnfair methods of competition." 15 U.S.C. § 45(a). To be fair, some
health care fraud laws are also vague and overbroad. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)
(2001) (prohibiting "remuneration" in exchange for referring Medicare or Medicaid
patients); see also William M. Sage, Fraud and Abuse Law, 282 JAMA 1179, 1180 (1999)
(describing large gray areas in federal fraud law).
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strongly suggest that meaningful oversight of competition in health care
will depend in large part on evolving a more theoretically coherent relationship between the public enforcement agencies and the courts.
B. How Do Antitrust Courts Approach Quality and Nonprice Competition?
Turning to the centerpiece of our empirical investigation-nonprice
competition in health care-we begin by restating our initial hypothesis:
Antitrust courts are unlikely to examine quality concerns often and are
not likely to address them very well. This is essentially a negative hypothesis and, as such, one that is difficult to establish persuasively. What evidence would tend to disprove our assertion? If we were to conclude that
courts were adequately addressing quality concerns, we would expect to
find evidence that courts first acknowledged the existence of quality related problems in medical antitrust cases, and then brought to bear appropriate theoretical and empirical understandings to help resolve those
issues. We found little evidence of courts acknowledging quality concerns. We found almost no evidence of courts taking advantage of existing theoretical or empirical understandings of quality that might be
drawn from fields such as the health services research literature. Finally,
we found little evidence of courts devising useful heuristics to guide their
analysis that could substitute for more formal models of nonprice competition. From these observations we conclude with a fair level of confiexisting doctrine are not adequately
dence that current courts applying
16 1
addressing quality concerns.
No dominant pattern of judicial treatment of quality concerns
emerges from the diverse collection of cases we reviewed, precluding any
attempt to articulate a unified theory of health care quality under federal
antitrust law. The lack of a unitary approach to health care quality competition is not surprising. As already noted, quality is a slippery concept.
Even within medical science and health services research, quality is notoriously difficult to define, assess, or operationalize. Economics fares little
better. Economic theories and models to predict the implications of market structure and competition for quality and other nonprice concerns
are often indeterminate. This is true not only for health care quality, but
for nonprice competition throughout the economy.' 62 Unless and until
economists and health services researchers can produce simple predictive
161. The desire to prove a negative helps explain our commitment to
comprehensively examining medical antitrust cases with a highly detailed coding
instrument. After casting a fine-gauged net, trolling the entire sea of opinions over the
past 15 years, and coming up largely empty, we believe we have demonstrated that not
much quality related activity is taking place.
162. For a discussion of the lack of a cohesive economic approach to nonprice
competition generally, not merely for health care, see supra note 25; see also Sage &
Hammer, Competition Policy, supra note 13, at 1078-88 (asserting that price does not
constitute an accurate proxy for quality).
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models of the impact of competition on objectively verifiable dimensions
of health care quality, courts will largely be feeling their way in the dark.
Significantly, in the absence of a cohesive theoretical framework,
courts have not tried to impose their own views on quality as a matter of
judicial fiat.1 63 Many quality concerns simply do not fit well within the
frames of reference that antitrust disputes provide for the private litigants
who contest the lion's share of cases, regardless of whether courts might
be receptive to such arguments. On the plaintiffs side, harm to quality
or restrictions on available price-quality combinations create fewer incentives to litigate, are less salient for triers of fact, and present much more
speculative evidence of antitrust injury and damages, than issues of price
and cost.' 64 Certainly, the few winning cases in our sample did not argue
163. Might sometimes makes right in law as elsewhere, but the voice of the highest
U.S. court has seldom been heard directly where quality is concerned. Of the four
Supreme Court opinions in our sample, two were staff privileges cases, one was a concerted
refusal to provide documentation to insurers, and one involved self-regulatory restrictions
on professional advertising. The last two cases did raise issues of quality, but the Court's
opinions take opposite approaches to the problem. In 1TC v. IndianaFederation ofDentists,
a case decided in 1986, the Court basically assumed that markets would function well and
produce appropriate price/quality tradeoffs. 476 U.S. 447, 459-62 (1986). Indiana
Federation of Dentists can also be seen as a product of its time. The case involved
professional resistance to early utilization review by third party payors. The Court sent a
clear signal that provider efforts to resist the growth of managed care would not be treated
kindly under antitrust law. In CaliforniaDental Ass'n v. FTC, decided in 1999, the Court
adopted a much more skeptical view of markets and their ability to safeguard quality in
health care. 526 U.S. 756, 772 (1999). CaliforniaDental Ass'n can be seen as a bellwether of
the growing backlash against managed care. This opinion, however, comes at the
chronological end of our sample, so its full effects on lower courts remain to be seen. Still,
neither opinion stakes out a clear position on the nature of quality in health care or the
relationship between quality and price.
Chronology is also significant as it bears on the relative importance of price and
nonprice competition in health care. We chose as a starting date for our empirical sample
the year 1985, when private employers and the insurers who served them were beginning
to experiment with care management techniques in order to control persistent double
digit increases in annual premiums, and shortly after Medicare had converted to a
prospective payment policy for hospitals with the explicit goal of cost containment. Clark
Havighurst has argued that the Goldfarb case broke down the most intractable obstacle to
price competition in health care-professional immunity from antitrust enforcementand allowed managed care to flourish. Clark C. Havighurst, Health Care as a (Big)
Business: The Antitrust Response, 26J. Health Pol., Pol'y & L. 905, 906-09 (2001). As
described above, see supra note 11 and accompanying text, our focus in this Article on
quality competition derives in part from our concern regarding price-quality tradeoffs after
managed care unleashed vigorous price competition. Yet our sample, even in the later
years, contains few managed care cases. Rather, it remains dominated by disputes over
medical staff privileges and hospitals' exclusive contracting practices. Nor does our sample
encompass many disputes involving pharmaceuticals, medical devices, or biotechnology,
even though the cost of medical innovation has in recent years risen to the top of both
public and private health reform agendas.
164. Quality claims are difficult to establish both as a conceptual and an evidentiary
matter. In United States v. Mercy Health Services, 902 F. Supp. 968, 986-87 (N.D. Iowa
1995), vacated by 107 F.3d 632 (8th Cir. 1997), the government argued that the hospital
merger would substantially reduce the level of quality and nonprice competition in the
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subtleties such as effects on quality, but offered clear proof of classic per
165
On
se illegal, anticompetitive, monopolistic, or exclusionary behavior.

the defense side, articulating a rough quality rationale for challenged
conduct may be useful in order to secure antitrust immunity under
HCQIA, but it is far more difficult to establish quality affirmatively as a
competitive parameter that can be measured and used to refute allegations of harm to consumers.
Even though no unified theory of quality competition emerges from
the cases, one can identify distinct pockets of judicial activity regarding
quality that document a number of interesting tendencies and beliefs.
The remainder of this Section is devoted to exploring these themes.
1. The Unquestioned Orthodoxy: The Virtues of Competition. - How do
courts view the relationship between competition and quality in health
care? In the absence of affirmative theories about health care quality and
its relation to competition, orthodox economic assumptions about the
virtues of competition win substantially by default. What is interesting is
not that unorthodox arguments are rejected, but that such arguments are
seldom raised. The theoretical effects of competition on quality in health
care markets are largely uncontested. This is surprising. Lack of price
market. The district court, either disingenuously or through a true misunderstanding of
the nature of the claim, caricatured the government's position as a failure of the hospitals
to remodel private rooms or to give away free child car seats to maternity patients. Id. at
987. The court proceeded to reject the government's arguments, citing the absence of
hard evidence on likely adverse impacts on price or quality. Id.
From this perspective, it is interesting to note what has constituted acceptable
evidence of quality in other cases. In FTC v. Butterworth Health Corp., 946 F. Supp. 1285,
1301 (W.D. Mich. 1996), the court relied upon its own impressions obtained from a
personal tour of the defendant hospital facilities. While not providing much specific
analysis, the judge was confident that he knew quality when he saw it. In HTI Health
Services, Inc. v. Quorum Health Group, 960 F. Supp. 1104, 1140 (S.D. Miss. 1997), the
court relied heavily on aspirational statements by physicians associated with the defendant
hospitals that post-merger recruitment of specialists would decrease morbidity and
mortality rates. "The Court was most impressed by the highly credible testimony of the
physician witnesses who expressed a sincere intent that this merger provide a means for
improving medical services and saving patients' lives." Id. at 1140. The Eleventh Circuit
panel that reinstated the plaintiffs jury verdict in Key Enterprises of Delaware, Inc. v.
Venice Hospital, 919 F.2d 1550, 1555, 1560 (11th Cir. 1990), reh'g en banc granted, 979
F.2d 806 (11th Cir. 1992), was persuaded by evidence that plaintiff lost substantial market
share after defendant hospital's entry into the DME market, even though other evidence
suggested that plaintiff's services were of a consistently higher quality than the defendant's.
Other litigants have not fared as well. In Flegel v. Christian Hospital, 4 F.3d 682, 688
(8th Cir. 1993), plaintiff submitted affidavits by osteopathic physicians (DOs) in general
practice that the plaintiff, a DO urologist, provided higher quality care than did the
competing MD urologists on staff at the defendant hospital. The court regarded these as
insufficient to excuse the need to provide direct evidence of market power on the part of
the defendant. In Kaczanowski v. Medical Ctr. Hospital, 612 F. Supp. 688, 695 (D. Vt.
1985), the court granted summary judgment to the defendant based upon its own
conclusory assertions that sensitive medical equipment should not be entrusted to those
"who fail to meet a high level of advanced medical training."
165. See supra notes 80-92 and accompanying text.
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competition in health care markets can both produce monopoly rents
and channel competitive forces into supplying products with more nonprice characteristics. 166 However, economists scrupulously abstain from
opining whether higher quality at a higher price is better or worse than
lower quality at a lower price. Rather, they postulate that unfettered competition will yield the range of price-quality combinations that consumers
want, and will therefore be "efficient" absent identifiable market failures. 1 67 By contrast, there has always been much agonizing in health policy circles and among medical professionals about the degree to which
health care is simply different from other products and services. This
wringing of hands is often accompanied by loud laments over the "sacrifice" of quality to the bottom line (that is, price). Related protests are
based on the supposedly adverse effects of competition on "professionalism," which encompasses values such as charity, compassion, and social
68
harmony, as well as quality.'
Our data indicate that in most health care antitrust litigation, such
"meta concerns" are rarely on the judicial radar screen. 169 Of the opinions that expressed general beliefs about the role of competition, the vast
majority adhered to traditional economic assumptions. Competition in
health care markets is presumed to lower health care prices, reduce
health care costs, and improve health care quality. 1 70 Only a small number of courts articulated sentiments critical of, or inconsistent with, this
orthodoxy. Discussions about whether health care markets are different
in ways that should be accommodated within antitrust doctrine also were
relatively rare, even though the Supreme Court's decision in Goldfarb v.
166. See Sage & Hammer, Competition Policy, supra note 13, at 1072-73.
167. IndianaFederation ofDentists, 476 U.S. at 459-62, is probably the best citation for
this position, although other courts have asserted the same proposition with varying
degrees of enthusiasm. See, e.g., Ambroze v. Aetna Health Plans, No. 95 CIV. 6631 (DLC),
1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7274, at *21-*22 (S.D.N.Y. May 28, 1996), remanded by No. 967778, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 1048 (2d Cir. Jan. 24, 1997) (expressing faith in market's
ability to strike appropriate price-quality tradeoffs); Koefoot v. Am. Coll. of Surgeons, 652
F. Supp. 882, 904 (N.D. Ill. 1986) ("[T]he 'best' product or service will be selected by
consumers when their choice is made in an open market free of restraints.").
168. See, e.g., Jerome P. Kassirer, Managing Care-Should We Adopt a New Ethic?,
339 New Eng. J. Med. 397, 397-98 (1998) (arguing against corporatized medicine); Rice,
supra note 10, at 383, 387-96 (describing failures of market theory in health care system);
Steffie Woolhandler & David U. Himmelstein, Extreme Risk-The New Corporate
Proposition for Physicians, 333 New Eng.J. Med. 1706, 1706-08 (1995) (criticizing market
medicine); see also, e.g., Sherry Glied, Chronic Condition: Why Health Reform Fails
26-33 (1997) (describing "medicalist" opposition to market models).
169. See supra notes 105-106 and accompanying text.
170. See, e.g., Swarthmore Radiation Oncology, Inc., v. Lapes, No. 92-3055, 1993 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 17035, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 15, 1993) ("If, as the plaintiffs allege, the
defendants conspired to drive the Swarthmore center out of business, not only were the
plaintiffs harmed, but so also were the health care consumers of the Delaware Valley. They
were deprived of the benefits of competition-lower prices, higher quality, and greater
choice.").
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Virginia State Bar provides a ready framework for such a debate. 171 Goldfarb-era concerns that markets dominated by professionals might deserve
172
special antitrust deference barely register in the published opinions.
Courts are sometimes willing to acknowledge the issue, but are usually
content to point to their mandate to apply the law as written and to advise
1 73
dissatisfied litigants to take their arguments to the legislature.
This is not to suggest that courts are incapable of incorporating quality concerns into a competitive framework. Quality can be thought of in
competitive terms. The clearest examples come from the exclusive contracting cases, which constituted the second largest group of disputes in
our sample. In the typical exclusive contracting case, a hospital that previously allowed any physician granted privileges by the hospital's self-governing medical staff to work in one of the hospital's departments decides
to limit that department to a smaller group of physicians that enter into a
contractual relationship with the hospital itself. 1 74 Most often, these
171. 421 U.S. 773, 780-92 (1975).
172. An independent LEXIS search for cases meeting our final selection criteria that
specifically cited footnote 17 of the Goldfarb opinion revealed only 10 such instances. This
result tends to confirm our instrument's finding that Goldfarb-era concerns about the
special nature of the professions have not substantially influenced contemporary health
care antitrust analysis.
173. See, e.g., Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94, 105 (1988). There the Court said:
[W]e are not unmindful of the policy argument that respondents and their amici
have advanced for reaching the opposite conclusion. They contend that effective
peer review is essential to the provision of quality medical care and that any threat
of antitrust liability will prevent physicians from participating openly and actively
in peer-review proceedings. This argument, however, essentially challenges the
wisdom of applying the antitrust laws to the sphere of medical care, and as such is
properly directed to the legislative branch.
Id. This is not to say that Goldfarb plays no role in antitrust cases. Goldfarb is sometimes
cited to justify application of the rule of reason rather than a per se standard of review for
the conduct in question. See, e.g., Sherman Coll. of Straight Chiropractic v. Am.
Chiropractic Ass'n, 654 F. Supp. 716, 722 (N.D. Ga. 1986) (declining to apply per se rule in
part because "[p] rofessions are different in certain respects from commercial businesses").
This is somewhat ironic because other developments in the law of boycotts and vertical
restraints probably allow the same result to be achieved without invoking deference to the
learned professions.
174. In this process, the question of who chooses a particular physician and when
such a choice is made is substantially altered. In traditional settings, patients selected their
primary care physician, and that physician would select the hospital and often the provider
of ancillary physician services, such as radiology or anesthesiology. Today, many patients
select hospitals (or health plans) and the hospital (or plan) arranges additional services via
exclusive contracts. Some physicians have challenged these practices under the antitrust
laws, often for threatening the quality of care. These doctors maintain that patients
benefit from having an expanded number of choices and that competition between
individual physicians at the point of service improves quality.
Collins v. Associated Pathologists provides a useful illustration. 676 F. Supp. 1388,
1394-95 (C.D. Il. 1987), afl'd, 844 F.2d 473 (7th Cir. 1988). Plaintiff pathologist
challenged the hospitals' exclusive contract on the following theory:
[T] he exclusive agreements prevented patients at St. John's Hospital from having
their pathology work done by anyone other than an APL [Associated Pathologists,
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cases involve physicians whose specialties, such as radiology, anesthesiology, pathology, emergency medicine, and invasive cardiology, are practiced in hospitals rather than private offices. In these instances, where
the existence of the contract clearly signals a business transaction, courts
have been receptive to the argument that the hospital is interested in
improving its competitive position vis-As-vis other hospitals based on the
quality of its affiliated physicians as well as the cost of supporting their
practices. As the court in White v. Rockingham Radiologists, Ltd. observed:
Rockingham Memorial believes that by making one group responsible and accountable to it, rather than having fragmented
responsibility and accountability, it minimizes its malpractice exposure, can better monitor operations and quality control, helps
to insure that a qualified physician is nearby and available if
needed, and promotes efficiency in scheduling and promptness
175
in reading.
The net effect of these benefits will be to increase the competitiveness of
the hospital, and hence the level of quality in the market.
2. Challengingthe Orthodoxy: HospitalMergers. - An important exception to the economic orthodoxy can be found in the hospital merger
cases. In these cases, antitrust courts occasionally veer toward heresy, exLtd.] doctor, and they prevented pathologists who were not APL members from
offering his or her services to a patient at St. John's. The Plaintiff contends that
the exclusive agreements had an adverse effect upon competition in the area of
pathological services, because competition among pathologists would result in
lower prices and/or increased quality of pathological work done for St. John's
patients.
Id. The court rejected this argument, reasoning that the exclusive contract does not
destroy competition:
In the present case, even though patients in St. John's Hospital do not have the
choice of having doctors other than those from APL perform pathological work,
they do have a choice prior to entering the hospital about which hospital they will
enter, based upon factors such as price, quality, the type of services, and the staff
members (including pathologists) of the hospitals in the relevant geographic
market.
Id. at 1404-05. Other courts have argued that intensified physician competition over the
exclusive contract itself improves quality and benefits patients. Balaklaw v. Lovell, 14 F.3d
793, 799 (2d Cir. 1994). The rationale is that hospitals have better information and direct
financial incentives to be efficient, and will make better choices than would individual
patients selecting physicians ad hoc at the point of service.
175. 820 F.2d 98, 105 (4th Cir. 1987); see also Martin v. Mem'l Hosp., 130 F.3d 1143,
1150 (5th Cir. 1997) (finding that exclusivity provides for standardization, uniformity, and
quality control); Balaklaw, 14 F.3d at 799 (finding that competition for exclusive contracts
increases quality); Todorov v. DCH Healthcare Auth., 921 F.2d 1438, 1457 (11 th Cir. 1991)
(finding that exclusivity permits centralization, increasing ability to monitor and control
quality); Beard v. Parkview Hosp., 912 F.2d 138, 145 (6th Cir. 1990) (finding that exclusive
contracting increases efficiency and quality); Steuer v. Nat'l Med. Enter., 672 F. Supp.
1489, 1518 (D.S.C. 1987) (finding that exclusive contracting increases quality and
monitoring), aff'd, 846 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1988); Mosby v. Am. Med. Int'l, Inc., 656 F. Supp.
601, 606, 609 (S.D. Tex. 1987) (finding that exclusive contracting is procompetitive). The
stamp of Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in Jefferson Parish is clear in these cases.
See supra note 89.
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plicitly questioning the desirability of competition as a vehicle for determining the cost and quality of medical services. Expressing a willingness
to trust the good intentions of the merging hospitals, these courts have
blessed unions that would remain unconsummated in other industries.
In FTC v. Butterwrth Health Corp., for example, a federal district court
denied a preliminary injunction and allowed the two largest hospitals in
Grand Rapids, Michigan to merge based on their "white-hat" reputation,
the support of community leaders, and their largely unenforceable
promises (captured in a highly regulatory sounding judicial order) to act
as benign monopolists. 176 In the same opinion, the court did little to
hide its disdain for and distrust of the managed care organizations who
77
lined up in opposition to the mergeri
An irony of the hospital merger cases is that judges have credited
defendants' reputations for quality as support for allowing them to combine, thereby using arguments about quality to achieve the lessening of
competition rather than its enhancement. For example, hospitals often
successfully argue that premerger competition has resulted in a "medical
arms race" with "unnecessary duplication" of services that has raised costs
and prices for patients, and count the savings associated with consolidating services as an efficiency gain without offering any evidence that quality and access will not suffer. 178 Litigation strategy partly explains the
176. 946 F. Supp. 1285, 1296 (W.D. Mich. 1996). In that case the court observed:
Defendants argue the above findings demonstrate that nonprofit hospitals do not
operate in the same manner as profit maximizing businesses. This is especially
true, defendants contend, where as here, the boards of the merging hospitals are
comprised of community business leaders who have a direct stake in maintaining
high quality, low cost hospital services.
Id. Butterworth is not an isolated incident in this respect. A number of state attorneys
general have approved hospital mergers after negotiating consent decrees similar to the
one in Grand Rapids. See e.g., Wisconsin v. Kenosha Hosp., No. 96-C-1459, 1996 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 20215, at *5-*9 (E.D. Wis. Dec. 31, 1996) (consent decree permitting hospital
merger on the belief that the merger would generate efficiencies, but requiring that
portions of the cost savings be passed on to the community in the form of increased charity
care or lower prices); Pennsylvania v. Capital Health Sys. Servs., No. 4:CV-95-2096, 1995
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20268, at *6-*8 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 13, 1995) (state attorney general
permitting merger conditioned, among other things, on the merged hospitals providing
charity care); Pennsylvania v. Providence Health Sys., No. 4:CV-94-772, 1994 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 19849, at *6-*9 (M.D. Pa. May 24, 1994) (same).
177. Butterworth, 946 F. Supp. at 1302 ("In the real world, hospitals are in the business
of saving lives, and managed care organizations are in the business of saving dollars.").
178. See, e.g., FTC v. Freeman Hosp., 911 F. Supp. 1213, 1224 (W.D. Mo. 1995)
("After the consolidation, the new entity will be closer in size to St. John's, clearly the
Joplin market leader, and will have equivalent resources and assets allowing it to offer
comparable services."); United States v. Carilion Health Sys., 707 F. Supp. 840, 845 (W.D.
Va. 1989) ("Roanoke Memorial needs more space in which to offer its obstetrics services
and for various other clinical and administrative functions. On the other hand,
Community's occupancy has declined faster than that of Roanoke's other hospitals.
Community has extra space and needs more patients."). We do not want to overstate the
case. A number of courts in the sample adopt more traditional views about the benefits of
competition. These cases suggest that competition creates appropriate incentives to
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lack of attention to quality data. Not only are cost savings easier to estimate and more salient to courts, but most of the investment that merger
defendants make in expert economic testimony tends to be directed to
challenging the government's proposed product and geographic markets, upon which the determination of market power ultimately depends.
This task is best accomplished by showing the existence of "noise" in the
government's data, not by constructing precise models of the clinical services involved and their cost and quality implications. At the same time,
courts have not been receptive to arguments by the federal enforcement
agencies that merging hospitals may be able to exercise market power
because their high quality puts them in a separate economic market for
179
antitrust purposes.

The hospital merger cases are provocative and present some of the
most serious and successful challenges to traditional economic presumptions that can be found anywhere in contemporary antitrust law.18 0 Nevertheless, a related and somewhat surprising finding of our study helps
put the merger cases into perspective. As suggested above, the skeptical
views courts express about the desirability or effectiveness of competition
in hospital merger cases have not spread to other areas of medical antitrust litigation. Instead, these views remain largely contained in the
merger domain.' 8 ' One explanation for the cabining of these sentiments
acquire and maintain state of the art technology. See, e.g., Howerton v. Grace Hosp., No.
4:90CV]87, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21123, at *22 (W.D.N.C. July 7, 1995) ("Since Blue
Ridge Radiology opened its clinic in 1990, Grace Hospital . .. finally purchased an up-todate ultrasound machine and made improvements in their mammographic images. These
improvements at Grace Hospital were prompted mainly as a direct effect of competition
from Blue Ridge's outpatient clinic."); see also, e.g., United States v. Rockford Mem'l
Corp., 717 F. Supp. 1251, 1283 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (discussing beneficial effects of increased
hospital competition), affd, 898 F.2d 1278 (7th Cir. 1990).
179. See United States v. Long Island Jewish Med. Ctr., 983 F. Supp. 121, 137-40
(E.D.N.Y. 1997) (rejecting government's "anchor hospital theory" that linked defendants'
superior reputations and scope of services to local purchasing needs of managed care
organizations, despite existence of other institutions within same geographic market).
180. See generally PeterJ. Hammer, Questioning Traditional Antitrust Presumptions:
Price and Nonprice Competition in Hospital Markets, 32 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 727, 729
(1999). There one of us said:
The economics of hospital mergers directly challenge core antitrust beliefs: the
belief that competition will effectively allocate resources along price and
nonprice dimensions, and the belief that competition will lower prices. The
resolution of these issues will have implications for antitrust law that extend far
beyond the health care field.
Id.
181. Judicial assessment of exclusive contracting cases, for example, stands in sharp
contrast to the hospital merger disputes. When we presented preliminary results of this
study to a brown bag lunch of the DOJ/FTCJoint Health Care Taskforce, it was suggested
by one official that there may be no tension at all between the merger cases and the
exclusive contracting cases-the hospitals always win. This claim has descriptive merit.
Nevertheless, the types of reasoning used and basic assumptions employed by the courts
are quite different. The exclusive contracting cases sit comfortably within established
doctrines of vertical nonprice restraints. The hospital is empowered to establish and
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is that, even within the health care system, only the hospital sector remains dominated by nonprofit institutions.1 8 2 Furthermore, charitable
hospitals are usually protected by powerful political forces as a result of
their long history, place in the community psyche, and status as large
employers, often of unionized workers. The small, elite club of individuals from which hospitals draw their boards of trustees shares much with
the privileged pool from which most federal district courtjudges emerge.
Hospital merger cases may give some local judges the pleasure of telling a
bunch of Washington based lawyers and bureaucrats spouting general
theories of consumer protection how little they know about the institutions they are attacking. For whatever reason, the hospital merger cases
are both significant in and of themselves and, paradoxically, largely
aberrational.
3. Quality as "a Part of' or "Apartfrom" Competition. - Our findings of
general beliefs consistent with economic orthodoxy and specific efforts to
successfully incorporate quality concerns into a competitive analysis in
the exclusive contract cases provide only weak support for the claim that
quality improvements are understood by courts as a desirable outcome of
health care competition. Certainly, some courts grasp the competitive
dimensions of hospital quality standards such as physician qualifica-

enforce what it believes to be appropriate intra-firm price/quality standards, and inter-firm
competition is trusted to yield appropriate market level price/quality tradeoffs. In
contrast, the hospital merger cases fundamentally question the virtues of inter-firm
competition in medical markets.
182. If one looks at antitrust law generally, one finds many nonprofit antitrust
defendants on the losing end. See, e.g., NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 120 (1984)
(holding that NCAA restrictions on number and price of games member colleges could
televise constituted illegal restraint of trade in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act);
Nat'l Soc'y of Prof'l Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978) (holding that professional
society's ban on competitive bidding was a violation of Sherman Act). Moreover, black
letter antitrust law states that nonprofit institutions can be just as guilty of an antitrust
violation as for profit entities. See NCAA, 468 U.S. at 100 n.22 ("There is no doubt that the
sweeping language of § 1 applies to nonprofit entities, and in the past we have imposed
antitrust liability on nonprofit entities which have engaged in anticompetitive conduct."
(citations omitted)).
Even in the domain of hospital mergers, there have been dissenting voices refusing to
afford nonprofit hospitals any particular deference. In one case, the Eleventh Circuit
rejected a variety of alleged charity benefits attributable to the merger under review,
holding that antitrust law compels the conclusion that the public interest is best served
through competition. FTC v. Univ. Health, Inc., 938 F.2d 1206, 1225 (11th Cir. 1991). In
Mercy Health Services, a court otherwise predisposed to view hospital mergers favorably
rejected the hospitals' charity claim, reasoning that nothing within the board's structure
ensured that the benefits would be realized. United States v. Mercy Health Servs., 902 F.
Supp. 968, 989 (N.D. Iowa 1995), vacated by 107 F.3d 632 (8th Cir. 1997) (pointing out
that, notwithstanding the good intentions of current board members, if there is potential
for future board members to engage in illegal activity, then "there is nothing inherent in
the structure of the corporate board or the non-profit status of the hospitals which would
operate to stop any anticompetitive behavior").
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tions.1 8 3 There is a strong sentiment in the case law that hospitals should
have the authority to impose and enforce quality related standards, and
184
that such standards will enhance competition in the market generally.
Our data also suggest, however, that other courts segregate quality from
their competitive analysis in antitrust disputes, addressing it as a separate
matter. In fact, one of the most difficult challenges in applying the coding instrument to the cases was to distinguish judicial discussions of quality as a professional concern from discussions of quality as a competitive dimension.' 85 The coders' difficulties in discerning such distinctions in largely
183. Courts that understand the competitive dimensions of hospital standards
consider selectivity a virtue, and are solicitous of hospital efforts to adopt and enforce strict
physician qualifications. "Hospitals are not public utilities, required to grant staff
privileges to anyone with a medical license. The Marshfield Clinic's reputation for high
quality implies selectivity in the granting of staff privileges at hospitals affiliated with the
Clinic." Blue Cross & Blue Shield United of Wis. v. Marshfield Clinic, 65 F.3d 1406, 1413
(7th Cir. 1995). To this end, hospital quality controls and staff privileges decisions are
viewed as procompetitive practices. "[H]ospitals must make choices about the types of
qualifications a practitioner must have to apply for staff privileges in various fields of
practice ....
These restrictions help it provide more efficient, higher quality services in
order to compete against other hospitals." Flegel v. Christian Hosp., Northeast-Northwest,
4 F.3d 682, 687 (8th Cir. 1993); see also Matthews v. Lancaster Gen. Hosp., 87 F.3d 624,
640 (3d Cir. 1996) ("Moreover, we believe peer review actions, when properly conducted,
generally enhance competition and improve the quality of medical care."); Potters Med.
Ctr. v. City Hosp. Ass'n, 800 F.2d 568, 576 (6th Cir. 1986) ("[T]he court held that a nonmonopolist hospital's policy of restricting staff appointments to very highly qualified
applicants did not impose an unreasonable restraint on trade, because by building a high
quality staff the hospital would improve its competitive posture, thereby increasing
competition in the relevant market.").
184. See Bhan v. NME Hosps., Inc., 929 F.2d 1404, 1412 (9th Cir. 1991) (finding that
hospitals need to be able to establish quality standards and qualifications and that these
standards will ordinarily improve the hospital's efficiency and competitiveness); Nanavati v.
Burdette Tomlin Mem'l Hosp., 857 F.2d 96, 121 n.24 (3d Cir. 1988) (finding that hospitals
have legitimate rights under a rule of reason analysis to control the quality of their medical
staffs); Flegel v. Christian Hosp. Northeast-Northwest, 804 F. Supp. 1165, 1172 (E.D. Mo.
1992) (noting that an assumption under rule of reason analysis is that restricting staff
privileges to physicians with predetermined levels of competence will enhance a hospital's
reputation and the quality of medical care it delivers), aff'd, 4 F.3d 682 (8th Cir. 1993);
Husain v. Helene Fuld Med. Ctr., No. 89-2107 (AET), 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14738, at *10
(D.N.J. Dec. 8, 1989) (noting that hospitals have wide latitude to exclude physicians for
their "lack of professional competence or their unprofessional conduct"); Kaczanowski v.
Med. Ctr. Hosp. of Vt., 612 F. Supp. 688, 696 (D. Vt. 1985) (noting that hospitals are not
passive providers of facilities, but rather play an integral part in the arrangement and
provisions of medical services).
185. Blindness to the possible connection between medical quality and competitive
processes runs deep in the law, and is not limited to antitrust cases. Some of it can be
ascribed to the belief that quality is the exclusive province of individual health
professionals, and is not a concern of corporate entities such as insurance companies. In
Potvin v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., for example, the California Supreme Court ruled
that a managed care organization acted improperly by terminating an obstetrician from its
provider network without due process. 95 Cal. Rptr. 2d 496, 499, 506 (2000). Curiously,
the purported reason for termination, that the physician had previously incurred
malpractice claims against him, was viewed even by the dissentingjustices as legitimate only
to the extent that the defendant insurer might lower its costs because its physicians paid
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undifferentiated judicial assessments of quality underscore how much antitrust courts need to learn in order to appreciate the dimensions of quality and how they interact within a competitive system.
This problem is seen most clearly in the staff privileges cases, the
largest pool of disputes in our sample. In a typical staff privileges case, a
physician who desires to admit patients to a particular hospital or to perform specific medical procedures must demonstrate her legitimacy and
competence by documenting matters such as her education, training,
passage of relevant examinations, licensure, malpractice history, and experience at other institutions. Decisions regarding privileges are not
made by the hospital itself, but by the hospital's self governing medical
staff, a historically well established but conceptually obscure body consisting of the physicians currently allowed to practice at the hospital (virtually all of whom are independent economic entities), acting through
their elected chief of staff and various committees. Courts struggle with
quality in staff privileges cases for understandable reasons. First, most
physicians comprising the medical staff conduct their business primarily
in their offices or at other institutions, and have no clear economic interest
in assuring the quality of physicians being considered for staff privileges.
To the contrary, the economic interest of these physicians seemingly lies
in excluding particularly high quality physicians, because they represent
greater competitive threats.1 8 6 Second, and relatedly, HCQIA immunizes
medical staff decisions from antitrust scrutiny to the extent that the decisions appear to be based exclusively and legitimately on quality, which
reinforces courts' tendency to partition discussions of quality from discussions of competition when these disputes occur.
Overall then, our data show that courts can appreciate quality as a
competitive concern, but not infrequently stray from that approach for
reasons of either judicial temperament or historical path dependence.
These tendencies and the resulting ambiguities they produce are nicely
illustrated by the Supreme Court's 1999 decision in CaliforniaDentalAss'n
v. FTC, where the Court held that the competitive effects of a professional association's prohibitions on publicized price discounts and quality
advertising must be evaluated using full blown rule of reason analysis, a
decision that led the appellate court on remand to uphold those prohibitions. 1 87 California Dental comes after two decades of Supreme Court
less for malpractice coverage. Id. at 513 (Brown, J., dissenting). Not only does this reflect
ignorance of the market for professional liability insurance (physician policies are not
experience rated), but the obvious point that a doctor who had been sued frequently
might not be attractive to the insurer's customers completely eluded the court.
186. See, e.g., Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94, 95-97 (1988) (considering case of a new
surgeon in town who had acquired a sufficiently good reputation to practice in
competition with established group accused of poor care and investigated in an attempt to
revoke his hospital privileges).
187. 224 F.3d 942, 943 (9th Cir. 2000). One should be cautious of inferring too much
from the Ninth Circuit's reversal of the FTC decision. On remand, the FTC was hamstrung
by a record that was intentionally short on expert testimony and direct economic evidence
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opinions in medical antitrust cases that consistently marginalized Goldfarb-type concerns. By reviving Goldfarb's provocative dictum in footnote
17, the case arguably signals a renewed willingness of courts to fashion a
unique set of antitrust rules tailored to medical markets, and might even
presage a new era of judicial skepticism about the effects of competition
in health care. On the other hand, the Court framed the conduct at issue
in economic, not professional terms. The Court's reasoning was clearly
predicated upon the existence of market failure (specifically, imperfect
information) and the Court remanded the case for consideration of the
"not implausible" procompetitive effects of the advertising restrictions at
issue. From this perspective, CaliforniaDental can be reconciled with our
finding that courts apply a traditional economic framework to health care
disputes, and can even be read as an instruction to lower courts that quality in health care should be evaluated within, not apart from, the competitive paradigm.

4. Quality as a Component of Individual Firms or as an Attribute of Systems. - Our coding instrument was designed to detect a broad range of
approaches antitrust courts might adopt when presented with disputes
involving health care quality. As described above, we tried to envision
how different disciplines might conceive of quality and give each view fair
representation in the instrument."' We divided these perspectives into
"firm-level" and "system- or market-level" characteristics. The firm-level
characteristics, consisting of twenty-five categories such as considerations
of clinical and administrative structure and clinical process, tended to
track the health services research literature. The market-level characteristics, consisting of ten categories such as freedom of choice, level of product differentiation, and the potential for technological or organizational
innovation, tended to track the concerns of economists and antitrust
lawyers.
The absolute number of codes in each category are roughly comparable. The total number of codes for firm-level characteristics (231)
slightly exceeds the number of codes for market-level characteristics
(212).189 If one looks at the total number of opinions coding at least one
quality characteristic, however, one gets a slightly different result (134
separate opinions containing at least one market-level characteristic versus 122 opinions containing at least one firm-level quality characteristic).
Similarly, if one focuses upon specific and not general coded characteris-

of anticompetitive effects because the case was designed to test the boundaries of quicklook rule of reason analysis. Id. at 959. How the FTC would fare on a record intended for
full rule of reason review remains to be seen, although the additional administrative
burden facing the enforcement agencies, courts, and private plaintiffs if such review is
universally required will be great.
188. See supra text accompanying notes 25-37.
189. This was the case notwithstanding the fact that a much larger number of codes
were available for firm-specific entries (25) than for market-level characteristics (10).
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tics, codes for specific market-level characteristics come out ahead with
172 codes versus 164 codes for specific firm-level entries.
What is to be made of this? Our impression from reviewing the text
of these cases is that it is easier for courts to view the competitive dimensions
of quality as a market-level, rather than as a firm-level, characteristic. On
the one hand, a relative bias in favor of market-level characteristics may
simply be reflective of a broader tendency in antitrust law and economics
to treat the firm as a "black box." Apart from "transaction cost economics" and focused work by Coase and others on the theory of the firm,
mainstream microeconomics and even most theories of industrial organization tend to treat the firm as an undifferentiated entity, or simply as a
production function.' 90 Perhaps it is easier for courts to make analytic
connections between quality and competition when they are already contemplating the market as the appropriate metric for analysis. On the
other hand, courts may conceptualize health care as "systematized" for
reasons having nothing to do with market economics. As Jim Blumstein
has observed, the term "health care system" is unique, the "system" modifier seldom being applied to goods or services in other industries (for
example, a "supermarket system" or an "automobile system"). 1 9 1
These readings have opposite implications for the strength of antitrust law in overseeing health care competition. Courts that focus on the
overall competitive landscape rather than the business prospects of specific litigants may be better equipped to impose doctrinal requirements
such as antitrust injury, which requires cognizable harm to competition
(not merely to individual competitors). However, courts that expect
health care to function as a "system" in the Blumstein sense may be more
tolerant of collusive professional activities and more dependent on anticompetitive restrictions to achieve redistributive goals than would be the
case for other industries.
5. Quality as an Abstract Notion or as a Specific Characteristic.- Our
results further indicate that judicial discussions of quality often occur at
an abstract rather than a specific level. General or wastebasket categories
190. See, e.g., Joseph E. Stiglitz, Symposium on Organizations and Economics, 5 J.
Econ. Persp. 15, 15 (1991) ("Many economists argued that there was no need to look
carefully into the black box called the firm: ... if managers didn't [maximize profits], they
would be replaced; and firms that didn't maximize value wouldn't survive.").
191. James F. Blumstein, The Application of Antitrust Doctrine to the Healthcare
Industry: The Interweaving of Empirical and Normative Issues, 31 Ind. L. Rev. 91, 94-95
(1998). Blumstein writes:
Application of the antitrust laws to the healthcare arena makes it clear
that . . . healthcare is an "industry" to be policed ... as are other economic
sectors ....
Cooperation and coordination were seen as socially appropriate tools for
rationalizing a "system

. . . . From an antitrust perspective,

however, such

conduct between or among competitors is far from the wholesome activity
envisioned by its health planning proponents.
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such as "Unspecified process/outcome quality concerns," "General reputation for quality," and "Unspecified quality of patient care" accounted
for 25% of the quality related entries. A similar picture is revealed by
looking at opinions instead of coded entries. Recalling that there were a
total of 194 opinions containing quality codes, a total of 74 opinions
(38% of all opinions with quality codes) contained one or more of the
"general" quality codes. In 22 opinions (11%), general quality codes
were the only codes to register.
Part of this tendency may be attributed to lack of precision in the
coding instrument, but we believe that it also reflects a deeper reality
about the dearth of meaningful ways to frame quality in antitrust litigation. First, as noted, there is little clear theory about quality and nonprice concerns in the economic and antitrust literature. It is therefore
not surprising that courts tend to address quality concerns, if at all, in a
fairly abstract manner. 19 2 Second, courts often insist on quantitative economic evidence in antitrust litigation, such as sales volume, customer
flows, market concentration, price, costs, revenues, and the like. 193 By
contrast, quality seems, well, qualitative, and courts tend to deal with it
accordingly. Even relatively well established metrics for health care quality, such as HEDIS scores and other comparative "report card" tools designed specifically for consumer use, did not register with courts in our
sample. 194
Our results support a hypothesis advanced by Tom Kauper that the
only dimensions of health care "quality" likely to find their way into antitrust litigation would be those that could be cast in a manner that directly
indicates their economic significance. 95 Kauper proposed two candidates: first, quality as it relates to malpractice liability exposure, and second, quality as it relates to the building of a provider's reputation and
goodwill. 1 96 Among firm-specific characteristics, "malpractice history"
and the question of liability exposure registered 25 entries, while discussions of "general reputation for quality" registered 24 entries. These
combined numbers reflect 11% of the total quality discussions and 22%
of the firm-specific quality discussions. These aspects of health care qual192. E.g., United States v. Carilion Health Sys., 707 F. Supp. 840, 846 (W.D. Va. 1989)
(speculating on quality gains from hospital merger); Cooper v. Forsyth County Hosp.
Auth., 604 F. Supp. 685, 687 (M.D.N.C. 1985) (considering quality in connection with
limitation of staff privileges to physicians).
193. E.g., United States v. Mercy Health Servs., 902 F. Supp. 968, 987 (N.D. Iowa
1995) (rejecting government's claim of reduced nonprice competition and demanding
quantitative evidence of postmerger prices).
194. See supra text accompanying notes 32-34. Because HEDIS scores did not come
into routine use until after 1995, one must qualify this statement to take into account the
years we studied and the inevitable delays that occur in litigation. It will be interesting to
see whether future antitrust opinions make more liberal use of these "quantitative" quality
measurement tools.
195. Kauper, supra note 25, at 292-96.
196. Id. at 302-06.
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ity are relatively easy to advance and assess within antitrust law's dominant
19 7
economic orientation.
While our data suggest that economic, market-level conceptualizations of quality dominate the understandings of quality common in the
health services research literature, courts that utilize firm-specific criteria
take clinical structure into account far more often than clinical process or
outcomes. Rankings in quality surveys, outcome statistics, preventative
services, product defects, and the potential for clinical innovation or improvement fail to register using our coding instrument. To address the
possibility that these issues are, in fact, the subject of motion practice or
trial testimony, but do not make their way into published opinions, we
presented our initial findings at a health care antitrust conference attended by leading members of the private bar. 198 Several lawyers indicated that these issues are simply not being litigated.
Health services research concerns pertaining to aspects of clinical
structure, on the other hand, do register in our data. On a firm-specific
level, courts discussed the effects of competition on individual physician
qualifications (29 entries), the adequacy of nonphysician staffing (11 entries), continuity of care (11 entries), the adequacy of physical facilities
(10 entries), private accreditation (9 entries), the adoption and dissemination of advanced technology (8 entries), and government certification
or licensing (3 entries). The bias in favor of structural concerns is not
surprising because such characteristics are easier to detect and verify.
This again highlights the importance of developing objective, reliable
measures of quality as well as simple, predictive theories about the relationship between such characteristics and observable dimensions of competition if courts are effectively to address firm-specific quality in health
care.
6. Choice and Information as Dimensions of Quality. - Courts consistently consider the degree of choice available in the market as an important aspect of quality that antitrust laws are designed to protect. In our
sample, 95 opinions (18%) discussed consumer choice, accounting for
approximately half of all the market-level quality entries. Choice is a consideration that is easy for economists and antitrust lawyers to understand.
197. Closer textual examination of these cases reveals some of the problems discussed
earlier. See supra text accompanying notes 183-187. While a number of cases clearly
discuss medical malpractice as a competitive factor, many other courts tend to speak of
malpractice issues more as a professional, rather than a competitive, concern. These
courts do not make the economic translation suggested by Kauper. Other factors may also
explain the high number of codes in these categories. For example, the finding may
reflect the fact that antitrust courts remain more familiar with physicians and hospitals
than they are with insurance organizations, and have not yet evolved a sophisticated
understanding of purchasing decisions in the employment based health care system that
prevails in the United States.
198. William M. Sage and Peter J. Hammer, Antitrust, Quality and the Courts,
Presented at the Sixth Annual Health Care Antitrust Forum (Nov. 2000) (on file with the
Columbia Law Review).
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Because free, rational (and informed) consumer choice is the engine that
drives the competitive market, antitrust courts have been quick to condemn professional practices that seek to deny or interfere with individual
health care choices.
Well functioning markets respond to different consumer preferences
by providing a range of tailored products or services. Actions by entrenched market participants that artificially restrict the range of market
alternatives available are inherently suspect from an antitrust perspective. 199 A similar choice-related heuristic is that market entry of a new
provider will be viewed as procompetitive. 200 Consumer choice in antitrust law functions at a market, not an individual, level. 20 1 Consequently,
courts are skeptical of plaintiff efforts to prove a limitation on consumer
choice, and hence a cognizable antitrust injury, as a result of their own
personal exclusion from the market. 20 2 However, courts may condemn
the exclusion of an individual provider who lays claim to a different man199. See, e.g., Reazin v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Kan., Inc., 899 F.2d 951, 966
(10th Cir. 1990) (affirming jury finding based on expert testimony that Blue Cross'
activities "would, in the long run, harm consumers because they would slow down or
inhibit the development of alternative delivery systems, thereby reducing the options
available to consumers"); Swarthmore Radiation Oncology, Inc. v. Lapes, No. 92-3055,
1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17035, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 15, 1993) (deciding that, if true,
plaintiffs allegations show defendants conspired to lessen competition, depriving
consumers of lower prices, higher quality, and greater choice); Sweeney v. Athens Reg'l
Med. Ctr., 709 F. Supp. 1563, 1573-74 (M.D. Ga. 1989) (upholding claim of nurse midwife
who owned her own home birthing business, on the grounds that home birth was a
valuable option to consumers, against hospital and Ob/Gyn physicians for refusal to allow
her access to patients).
200. See, e.g., Bio-Med Applications Mgmt. Co. v. Dallas Nephrology Assocs., No.
4:94cv37, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20179, at *17 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 7, 1995) (noting that
defendant's opening of new dialysis clinics increased competition and provided more
choice for patients); Advanced Health-Care Servs. v. Giles Mem'l Hosp., 846 F. Supp. 488,
496 (W.D. Va. 1994) (concluding that defendant hospital's entry into the durable medical
equipment market increased competition and provided greater choice for customers);
Howerton v. Grace Hosp., Inc., No. 4:90cv187, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21042, at *61-*62
(W.D.N.C. Sept. 13, 1993) (granting defendant hospital summary judgment as plaintiffs
"presented no plausible evidence that competition in this outpatient market has been
adversely affected" by exclusive contract, which provides an alternative supplier of
outpatient services to the market).
201. HTI Health Servs. v. Quorum Health Group, Inc., 960 F. Supp. 1104, 1135 (S.D.
Miss. 1997) (reasoning that because antitrust law does not assume perfect choices for each
consumer, plaintiff hospital's harm alone should not be the proper plane of analysis and
that "the proper focus must be on proof of harm to the market as a whole").
202. See Betkerur v. Aultman Hosp. Ass'n, 78 F.3d 1079, 1091 (6th Cir. 1996)
(rejecting plaintiff's argument that defendant's boycott deprived patients' choice of a
preferred supplier of neonatal care); Korshin v. Benedictine Hosp., 34 F. Supp. 2d 133,
138 (N.D.N.Y. 1999) (concluding that removal of individual provider from hospital did not
broadly affect market choice but merely reshuffled competitors); Addis v. Holy Cross
Health Sys. Corp., No. 3:94 cv 118 AS, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21838, at *25-*26 (N.D. Ind.
July 6, 1995) (holding that plaintiff physician was not driven from market and that new
surgeons provided consumers with "more choice and more competition"); Robles v.
Humana Hosp. Cartersville, 785 F. Supp. 989, 998 (N.D. Ga. 1992) (denying standing in
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ner of practice, or who provides an option that may not otherwise exist in
20 3
the market.
Antitrust courts are also sensitive to informational market failures,
arguably because notions of "free choice" are hard to reconcile with the
dependence and asymmetric information inherent in the physician-patient relationship. 20 4 Our survey revealed 17 instances in which courts
discussed helping consumers make more informed choices. With notable exceptions such as California Dental, courts tend to strike down restraints that artificially restrict the availability of information in the market. 20 5 Courts also tend to encourage mechanisms that supply consumers
of an
with additional information, even if such information is the 2product
06
agreement between actors who are otherwise competitors.
Consumer choice is also a central theme in cases brought (and won)
by the federal antitrust enforcement agencies, as well as in the consent
part because number of Ob/Gyns in county had increased, providing consumers more
choice and competition).
203. In Allen v. Washington Hosp., No. 96-1950, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14606, at *17,
*24 (W.D. Pa. May 30, 1997), plaintiffs alleged that defendants' conduct harmed patients
by denying them access to emergency or weekend cardiology care, high quality care,
diagnostic procedures, and second opinions, and the district court denied defendants'
12(b) (6) motion to dismiss as premature. See also Boczar v. Manatee Hosps. & Health
Sys., Inc., 993 F.2d 1514, 1517, 1519 (1lth Cir. 1993) (reversing and reinstatingjury verdict
for plaintiff in staff privileges case based on evidence that she provided different style of
medicine than her competitors, consisting of lower-cost services and fewer caesarean
sections); Loiterman v. Antani, No. 90 C 0983, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8530, *11-*12 (N.D.
June 23, 1991) (denying defendants' motion for summary judgment in staff privileges
I11.
case where plaintiff argued that his termination prevented patients from obtaining less
invasive, less costly surgical procedures and alternative methods of treatment). Not all
plaintiffs making claims of alternative practice styles are successful. See Addis, 1995 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 21838, at *27 (granting summary judgment for defendant and rejecting
argument that plaintiffs creative use of laser surgery drew patients away from other
physicians and was the motivation for conspiracy against him).
204. California Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 771-78 (1999), provides a recent,
high profile discussion of information market failure. Lower courts are also sensitive to
these concerns. See, e.g., Born v. lannacone, No. 97-5607, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15497,
*14 (E.D. Pa. Sep. 28, 1998) (acknowledging existence of market failures in health care
and particularly the effects of imperfect information on consumer decisionmaking). The
difficulty that hospitalized patients face selecting suppliers of medical products is
paradigmatic. See Key Enters. of Del., Inc. v. Venice Hosp., 919 F.2d 1550, 1557 (11th Cir.
1990), reh'g en banc granted, 979 F.2d 806, 807 (11th Cir. 1992) (noting that choice of
durable medical equipment provider is very easy to manipulate because hospital patients
are captive and uninformed audience and are vulnerable to suggestions of hospital
personnel).
205. See, e.g., FTC v. Ind. Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 457, 460-62 (1986)
(holding that withholding information or making its acquisition more expensive has
inherently anticompetitive effects, obviating the need to prove market power, or even that
the information was in fact useful to consumers).
206. See, e.g., Machovec v. Council for the Nat'l Register of Health Serv. Providers in
Psychology, Inc., 616 F. Supp. 258, 272 (E.D. Va. 1985) (granting summary judgment in
case involving psychologist who refused listing on national register on grounds that the
registry provided the market with information and therefore had procompetitive benefits).
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decrees they enter into. In particular, the FTC's Bureau of Competition
has concentrated its efforts in this area, perhaps because it accords well
with other aspects of the agency's mission, such as the work of the Bureau
of Consumer Protection. CaliforniaDentalwas a critical test of these theories, involving as it did both the FTC as plaintiff and professional restrictions on advertising as the subject matter. Standing alone, the Supreme
Court's opinion upholding these restrictions may be taken either as renewed deference to professional self-regulation or merely as demanding
more rigorous economic analysis of informational market failures. Considering the case in the context of our finding that lower federal courts
tend to adopt an economic framework for assessing information, we are
guardedly optimistic that the latter interpretation will prevail.
These patterns ofjudicial interpretation have important implications
for the relationship between choice and other forms of quality competition. First, the exclusive dealing cases hammer a final nail into the coffin
of "guild free-choice,"207 organized medicine's longstanding claim that
all restrictions on patients' ability to consult physicians of their choosing-whether imposed by private insurers or by government-impair
quality. Courts do not treat medical choice as any more sacred than
choice in other industries, and they generally presume that adequate
choice can exist even when customers are precluded from choosing the
plaintiff. Second, courts have become sufficiently sensitive to choicebased arguments that physicians and hospitals may find them receptive to
such claims in markets dominated by a small number of insurers with
highly restrictive provider panels. However, what is sauce for the goose is
also sauce for the gander, allowing managed care organizations to argue
in opposition that consumers require choice among types of health care
financing as well as among physicians or hospitals. Third, courts' greater
familiarity with choice than with vertical metrics of quality may increase
their skepticism regarding physicians' attempts to discourage service provision by supposedly "lower quality" professionals such as nurse practitioners, and may ultimately lead regulators to relax licensing and reim2 08
bursement standards limiting scope of practice for those groups.
7. Innovation and Quality. - In large part because the discovery and
dissemination of new drugs, medical devices, and diagnostic and therapeutic technologies determine future national health expenditures, the
causes, costs, and benefits of innovation are becoming dominant issues in
health policy circles.20 9 While choice plays a significant role in antitrust
207. See Charles D. Weller, "Free Choice" as a Restraint of Trade in American Health
Care Delivery and Insurance, 69 Iowa L. Rev. 1351, 1367-72 (1984) (identifying
anticompetitive effects of AMA's "ethical" condemnation of limitations on choice of
physician).
208. See generally William M. Sage & Linda H. Aiken, Regulating Interdisciplinary
Practice, in Regulation of the Healthcare Professions 71, 71 (Timothy S. Jost ed., 1997)
(describing legal and extralegal barriers to nonphysician practice).
209. See generally The Value of Innovation, Health Aff., Sept./Oct. 2001, at 10-60
(special section of issue devoted to innovation).
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analysis, courts have been less successful in incorporating innovation concerns into their evaluations. Innovation sits at the intersection of antitrust law and patent law. 210 More often than not, courts have viewed the
impact of antitrust doctrine simplistically, as apart from and opposed to
the influence of patent law. 2 11 Few courts have considered innovation as
by
a factor in competitive analysis, although recent scholarship spawned 212
direction.
this
in
headway
make
to
started
has
the Microsoft litigation
Our survey confirms that health care disputes follow the conventional wisdom. In what can be seen as an important negative finding, few
medical antitrust courts address technological or organizational innovation as independent factors in their legal analysis. In the set of 542judicial opinions we studied, there were only 7 coded entries for technological or organizational innovation as a system wide or market-level concern
and only 6 coded entries for the potential for clinical innovation as a
firm-specific consideration. Significantly, however, concern about innovation appears to influence the DOJ and FTC enforcement activities to a
much greater degree. Technological or organizational innovation was

210. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, The Patent-Antitrust Intersection: A Reappraisal, 97
Harv. L. Rev. 1815, 1823-29 (1984) (noting inherent conflict between patent and antitrust
law and arguing that longer patent life encourages innovation at expense of "monopoly
loss" incurred by society); Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex
Economics of Patent Scope, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 839, 891-93 (1990) (noting that patents too
broad in scope will diminish incentives for others to compete and will therefore hinder
technological progress).
211. The court's reasoning in Boston Scientific Corp. v. Schneider (Eur.) AG is typical:
"Indeed, the intersection of antitrust law and patent law is inherently complex because the
two areas of law seek contradictory ends. 'The patent is itself a government grant of a
monopoly and is therefore an exception to usual antitrust rules."' 983 F. Supp. 245, 269
704-07, at
(D. Mass. 1997) (quoting 3 Philip Areeda & Donald Turner, Antitrust Law
117-45 (1978)). There is a corresponding fear that strict antitrust enforcement could chill
future innovation. See, e.g., C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc., 157 F.3d 1340, 1372 (Fed. Cir.
1998) ("As a sister circuit recently stated, 'Antitrust scholars have long recognized the
undesirability of having courts oversee product design, and any dampening of
technological innovation would be at cross-purposes with antitrust law.'" (quoting United
States v. Microsoft Corp., 147 F.3d 935, 948 (D.C. Cir. 1998))).
212. See, e.g., David McGowan, Innovation, Uncertainty, and Stability in Antitrust
Law, 16 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 729, 776-811 (2001) (outlining recommendations for
incorporating innovation into antitrust law); Maureen A. O'Rourke, Striking a Delicate
Balance: Intellectual Property, Antitrust, Contract, and Standardization in the Computer
Industry, 12 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 1, 25-40 (1998) (proposing a research agenda to
coordinate antitrust law with innovation); Arti K Rai, Fostering Cumulative Innovation in
the Biopharmaceutical Industry: The Role of Patents and Antitrust, 16 Berkeley Tech. L.J.
813, 844-53 (2001) (discussing improvements in antitrust law that would make it
compatible with biomedical innovation); David S. Evans & Richard Schmalensee, Some
Economic Aspects of Antitrust Analysis in Dynamically Competitive Industries, 18-37
(Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8268, May 2001) (discussing
challenges that dynamically competitive markets pose for market definition and theories of
predation).
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mentioned in 10 of the 82 settlements and administrative actions we
21
coded involving the federal enforcement agencies. 3
If one examines cases where pharmaceutical or medical device companies appear either as plaintiffs or defendants, what can be said about
judicial treatment of innovation? As suggested above, innovation is seldom recognized as an independent antitrust issue even in this subset of
cases (only 2 of the 7 coded entries were in opinions involving pharmaceutical companies). This does not mean that innovation concerns were
not raised in these disputes. Rather, the tradeoffs between "competition"
and "innovation" appear to be resolved by defining the domain of antitrust law to exclude disputes classified as patent or regulatory. The clearest examples of this phenomenon are disputes between competitors over
patent and intellectual property rights, 214 disputes between pharmaceutical manufacturers (often including generic drug manufacturers) over
conduct pertaining to the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 (the Hatch-Waxman Act), 2 15 and cases challenging
proceedings before the International Trade Commission (ITC) as fur21 6
thering anticompetitive purposes.
213. Moreover, our sample does not capture chronologically recent enforcement
agency activity in the area of generic drug approval. The FTC has challenged the legality
of patent settlements between brand name and potential generic manufacturers of specific
drugs on antitrust grounds for allegedly delaying the entry of generics into the market.
These investigations have resulted in two consent orders. See In re Hoechst Marion
Roussel, Inc., No. 9293, 2001 FTC LEXIS 56 (2001); In re Abbott Laboratories, No. C-3945,
2000 FTC LEXIS 65 (2000). The FTC has also embarked on a broader study to assess the
competitive effects of the Hatch-Waxman Act on the approval and marketing of generic
drugs. See Agency Information Collection Activities; Proposed Collection; Comment
Request, 65 Fed. Reg. 61,334-36 (Oct. 17, 2000).
214. See, e.g., CR. Bard, Inc., 157 F.3d at 1369 (raising claim of antitrust violation in
patent dispute over a needle biopsy gun); Cygnus Therapeutics Sys. v. Alza Corp., 92 F.3d
1153, 1160-62 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (raising antitrust issues in patent dispute between
producers of transdermal delivery devices); Mitek Surgical Prods., Inc. v. Arthrex, Inc., 21
F. Supp. 2d 1309, 1317 (D. Utah 1998) (raising antitrust issues in patent dispute between
manufacturers of suture anchors); Boston Scientific Corp., 983 F. Supp. at 267-73 (raising
antitrust issues in patent dispute between manufacturers of medical devices to treat
clogged coronary arteries); Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc., 930 F. Supp.
1241, 1250-54 (N.D. I11. 1996) (raising antitrust issues in patent dispute between
manufacturers of dental implants).
215. Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585, 1585-1605 (1984). For a discussion of the
effects of the statute and the complex interrelations between patent law and drug
regulation, see Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Shifting Functional Balance of Patent and Drug
Regulation, Health Aft. Sept./Oct. 2001, at 119, 123-29; see also, e.g., In re Warfarin
Sodium Antitrust Litig., No. MDL 98-1232-SLR, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19555, at *6-*16 (D.
Del. Dec. 7, 1998) (involving suit by generic manufacturer of warfarin sodium against
brand name manufacturer of Coumadin on antitrust grounds for, inter alia, attempting to
influence the FDA to delay introduction of a generic alternative); Mylan Labs., Inc. v.
Akzo, N.V., 770 F. Supp. 1053, 1053-54 (D. Md. 1991) (involving suit by brand name
manufacturer of prescription drugs against various manufacturers of generic alternatives
for antitrust violations alleging inappropriate conduct before the FDA).
216. See, e.g., Cheminor Drugs, LTD. v. Ethyl Corp., 168 F.3d 119, 119, 123-27 (3d
Cir. 1999) (involving antitrust suit by bulk producer of ibuprofen against defendant for
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In this respect, recent changes in the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine appear to be having some potentially unforeseen consequences. In highly regulated industries such as
health care, government processes can be manipulated to impede competition even if the underlying regulatory claims are not wholly without
merit. Nonetheless, in Professional Real Estate Investors, the Court announced new, more restrictive parameters for the "sham" exception to
political action immunity from antitrust scrutiny, holding that conduct
'21 7
would not be considered a sham unless it were "objectively baseless.
Applying this standard, courts in our sample have immunized a wide
range of competitively questionable conduct involving pharmaceutical
patents, FDA regulation, and ITC proceedings. 2 18 These are settings in
bringing allegedly baseless antidumping claims against it before the ITC); Bio-Tech. Gen.
Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 886 F. Supp. 377, 377 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (concerning foreign
producer of human growth hormone with FDA approval to import into United States who
sued defendant for antitrust violations in instigating allegedly baseless patent infringement
proceedings before the ITC); Novo Nordisk of N. Am. Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 885 F. Supp.
522, 522-26 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (involving antitrust suit by producer of genetically engineered
pharmaceutical products against defendant for bringing allegedly baseless patent
infringement proceedings before the ITC and for seeking enforcement of patents
allegedly procured by fraud before the patent office).
217. ProfI Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 508 U.S. 49, 60-61
(1993) [hereinafter PRE]. The Court said:
We now outline a two-part definition of "sham" litigation. First, the lawsuit must
be objectively baseless in the sense that no reasonable litigant could realistically
expect success on the merits. If an objective litigant could conclude that the suit
is reasonably calculated to elicit a favorable outcome, the suit is immunized under
Noerr, and an antitrust claim premised on the sham exception must fail. Only if
challenged litigation is objectively meritless may a court examine the litigant's
subjective motivation. Under this second part of our definition of sham, the
court should focus on whether the baseless lawsuit conceals "an attempt to
interfere directly with the business relationships of a competitor," through the "use
[of] the governmental process-as opposed to the outcome of that process-as an
anticompetitive weapon."
Id. (footnote and citations omitted).
218. For patent disputes, see CR. Bard, 157 F.3d at 1369 (reversing trial verdict and
holding that patent suit was not objectively baseless and therefore could not constitute
sham litigation); Mitek, 21 F. Supp. 2d at 1318 (granting plaintiff's motion for summary
judgment on defendant's counterclaim and holding that patent infringement suit was not
objectively baseless); Boston Scientific Corp., 983 F. Supp. at 272-73 (finding underlying
patent litigation suits were immune from antitrust challenge because they were not
objectively baseless). For immunized proceedings before the FDA, see In re Warfain, 1998
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19555, at *24-*27 (holding defendant's petition to stay plaintiff
submitting an abbreviated new drug application ("ANDA") to the FDA until the adoption
of stricter bioequivalence standards was immunized under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine
because it was not objectively baseless). Cf. Mylan Labs., 770 F. Supp. at 1064 (holding, in a
decision antedating PRE, that defendant's efforts to gain FDA approval for its generic
drugs using an ANDA constituted Noerr-protected conduct). For cases finding immunized
conduct before the ITC, see Cheminor Drugs, 168 F.3d at 128 (finding independent
objective basis existed for ITC suit and therefore conduct was immunized); Bio-Tech. Gen.
Corp., 886 F. Supp. at 382 (holding ITC proceedings were not objectively baseless and were
therefore Noerr-protected).
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which rights conferred by law and regulation can determine the identity
of market participants and the very scope and nature of the market.
When the economic stakes are so high, expansive Noerr immunity invites
strategic manipulation by competitors. Moreover, abdication of oversight
responsibility by antitrust courts does not imply corresponding acceptance by patent officials, FDA regulators, or the ITC of a duty to police the
potentially anticompetitive conduct of those who appear before them. 219
Courts are also insufficiently attentive to problems of organizational
innovation (as opposed to technological innovation). A recurring problem noted in our sample is that strict limitation of standing to traditional
customers and competitors in an industry undergoing organizational
transformation will inappropriately favor the status quo. In Barton & Pittinos, Inc. v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., for example, the plaintiff, a pharmaceutical marketing company, was developing a new system for marketing
and distributing a hepatitis-B vaccine to nursing homes using a single
wholesale pharmacy distributor. 22 0 Local pharmacies, who would have
been cut out of this line of business, allegedly flooded the vaccine's manufacturer, SmithKline Beecham, with complaints and the new system was
quickly terminated. 221 The Third Circuit affirmed summary judgment
for the defendant on standing grounds, reasoning that the plaintiff was
neither a consumer nor a competitor of the defendant. 2 22 This was not
the only possible outcome. The law of standing could have accommodated concerns about organizational innovation, but those considera22 3
tions were not appreciated by the court.
219. Ironically, liability for attempting to enforce a fraudulently obtained patent,
established in Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Machinery & Chemical Corp., 382 U.S.
172 (1965), may constitute one of the few sham type theories that survives the sweep of
PRE. See, e.g., Nobelpharma AB, 930 F. Supp. at 1253, 1257 (holding that PRE does not
extend immunity to defendant who initiated litigation defending a patent obtained
through knowing fraud); Novo Nordisk, 885 F. Supp. at 526-27 (dismissing plaintiff's
antitrust claim brought on "objectively baseless" sham litigation theory, but allowing claim
alleging fraudulent procurement of a patent on a Walker Process theory). The Court in PRE
expressly left open the question of the relationship between its "objectively baseless"
standard and the scope of Walker Process liability. See PRE, 508 U.S. at 61-62 n.6. But see
CheminorDrugs, 168 F.3d at 123 (holding that nonmaterial misrepresentations would not
deprive an antitrust defendant of Noerr immunity).
220. 118 F.3d 178, 179 (3d Cir. 1997).
221. Id. at 180.
222. Id. at 184.
223. See Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc., v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters,
459 U.S. 519, 536-37 (1983) (articulating flexible test analogous to common law definition
of probable cause). Similar concerns are raised by Practice Perfect, Inc. v. Hamilton
County Pharm. Ass'n, 732 F. Supp. 798 (S.D. Ohio 1989). The plaintiffs were starting a
prescription repackaging business in which the plaintiffs would prepare appropriate labels
and dosages for drugs and sell them to physicians who would sell the drugs directly to
patients. Id. at 799. Defendant pharmacists and pharmacy association allegedly engaged
in conduct that deterred wholesale pharmacy distributors from doing business with the
plaintiffs, and that also deterred the participation of local physicians. Id. at 800-01. The
court dismissed the complaint, reasoning that the plaintiffs' business was too speculative to
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On the other hand, some courts seem capable of addressing innovation concerns within traditional antitrust doctrines. For example, the
court in Reazin v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Kansas, Inc. was appropriately
alert to the danger that Blue Cross & Blue Shield's boycott of a new HMO
224
might slow the structural transformation of the health care industry.
Similarly, DM Research, Inc. v. College of American Pathologists involved
changes in professional standards (and new technologies) permitting
clinical laboratories to produce reagent water on site.2 25 The plaintiff, a
seller of reagent water whose business was harmed by on site production,
alleged that the defendant's new standards violated antitrust laws. 226 The
First Circuit dismissed the suit, acknowledging the benefits of both technological and organizational innovation. 2 27 The opinion in Ortho Diagnostic Systems, Inc. v. Abbott Laboratories, Inc. reflects a similar attention to
innovation, this time by factoring the comparative efficiency of market
actors into an examination of a plaintiffs predatory pricing claim.2 28
The case involved an antitrust challenge to Abbott Laboratories' use of
"bundled pricing" for blood screening tests. 2 2 9 Even though the defendant possessed substantial market power, the court excused its conduct
out of respect for maintaining incentives for innovation.
8. Managed Care, Antitrust, and Quality. - As discussed above, the
growth of managed care has prompted concern that competitive forces
are concentrated on the price front and are incompletely deployed with
respect to quality. There is little evidence in our sample of cases directly
addressing this concern. Despite the fundamental restructuring of health
care markets over the past two decades and the contemporary dominance
of managed care in a large number of markets, antitrust litigation directly
concerning managed care represents only a small percentage of total
medical antitrust cases resulting in opinions. Only 16% of the disputes
we studied involved the insurance sector, and one-fourth of these involved provider sponsored contracting entities such as IPAs.
Why isn't antitrust litigation involving managed care companies and
managed care issues more common? Given the relative novelty of managed care, and the time lag between unlawful conduct, the filing of a
claim, and the issuance of a judicial opinion, it is possible that a number
of cases are still in the pipeline. However, there are other possible reasons why managed care has not yielded as much antitrust litigation as
other aspects of the health care sector.
grant them antitrust standing. Id. at 803-04. Unfortunately, strict standing doctrines
coupled with insufficient attention to organizational innovation can lead courts to deny
relief to parties that may well be market innovators.
224. 899 F.2d 951, 970-71 (10th Cir. 1990).
225. 170 F.3d 53, 54 (1st Cir. 1999).
226. Id. at 55.
227. Id. at 57.
228. 920 F. Supp. 455, 469-70 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
229. Id. at 458.
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First, managed care plans are more likely to prosper in larger metropolitan markets, where it is difficult for a single plan to accumulate market shares that would subject its conduct to heightened antitrust scrutiny.
Second, the relationship between managed care plans and health care
providers is easier for courts to conceive as being predominately vertical
and arm's length in nature. Whereas hospital defendants in staff privileges cases (and some exclusive contracting cases) are often accused of
abetting exclusionary conduct by physicians, managed care defendants
are powerful economic actors in their own right, and are more likely to
be sued as monopolists or oligopolists than as cartel managers. In their
dealings with physicians, managed care plans therefore enjoy the
favorable antitrust treatment traditionally associated with vertical restraints on trade. Third, managed care plans offer a combination of
health care financing (insurance) and medical services. To the extent
that courts have focused on the financing aspect of managed care, they
have tended to define the relevant product and geographic markets very
broadly and to assume relatively low barriers to entry for new market participants. 2 0 Fourth, at least in the initial stages of managed care, antitrust courts tended to view insurance company activism as aggressive but
nonetheless appropriate purchasing, allowing them to invoke antitrust
law's relative leniency toward the buyer's side of the market.23 ' Finally,
managed care plans can be structured in ways that can decrease antitrust
liability or that reduce the incentives that likely plaintiffs have to sue.
Tightly integrated forms of managed care, such as staff model HMOs, can
claim the shelter that Copperweld affords against challenges to intraenterprise conspiracies. 232 The less tightly integrated forms of managed care
providers that dominated the industry in the mid and late 1990s are also
unlikely to present antitrust issues, but for different reasons. These networks are largely nonexclusive, allowing them to comply with the safety
23
zones contained in the DOJ/FTC Policy Statements.
Regardless of the small number of cases we identified, however, it is
indisputable that antitrust law has helped clear the space necessary for
the development of managed care. For example, several early cases in
our sample involve public plaintiffs, insurance companies, or managed
care plans using the antitrust laws to challenge provider resistance, often
on quality related grounds, to utilization review and other forms of third

230. See, e.g., Blue Cross & Blue Shield United of Wis. v. Marshfield Clinic, 65 F.3d
1406, 1411 (7th Cir. 1995) (rejecting notion of a separate HMO market); Ball Mem'l
Hosp., Inc. v. Mutual Hosp. Ins., Inc., 784 F.2d 1325, 1334-35 (7th Cir. 1986) (crediting
district court finding that there are no barriers to entry in medical insurance field).
231. See, e.g., Kartell v. Blue Shield, Inc., 749 F.2d 922, 927-29 (1st Cir. 1984)
(upholding fixed prices for physician services by the state's largest insurer as "rational
purchasing").
232. See supra note 92.
233. See supra notes 155-156 and accompanying text.
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party oversight of professional practice. 234 Even later cases, such as Blue
Cross & Blue Shield United of Wisconsin v. Marshfield Clinic, pursue similar
themes. 23 5 In Marshfield, a potential managed care competitor sued the
largest physician group practice in northeastern Wisconsin and its captive
HMO, accusing the group practice of various types of exclusionary
conduct.

236

More recently, courts have rejected a number of antitrust claims
brought against managed care plans that would have impaired the ability
of those plans to achieve their cost containment and management objectives. Many of these cases represent creative efforts on the part of physicians to attack other contemporary insurance practices by reinventing a
number of the arguments previously employed to justify professional resistance to utilization review. Within our sample, the most common
plaintiff/defendant pairing relating to managed care consisted of physicians suing insurers or HMOs (20 disputes), usually over access to "preferred provider" networks or restrictive provisions in provider
237
contracts.
234. See, e.g., FTC v. Ind. Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 455, 465-66 (1986)
(finding concerted refusal by defendant dentists to deny third party payors the x-rays they
needed to engage in utilization review to be an antitrust violation); Reazin v. Blue Cross &
Blue Shield of Kan., Inc., 635 F. Supp. 1287, 1333 (D. Kan. 1986) (finding genuine issue of
material fact on antitrust claim that defendant terminated hospital that contracted with
plaintiff HMO in order to deter other hospitals from dealing with plaintiff). These
challenges were not always successful, reflecting the persistence of judicial deference to
professional judgment. See Pa. Dental Ass'n v. Med. Serv. Ass'n of Pa., 632 F. Supp. 653,
661, 676, 679 (M.D. Pa. 1986), rev'd, 815 F.2d 270 (3d Cir. 1987). Pennsylvania had sued
the state's dental society and subsequently settled its claims. Id. at 656. Blue Cross & Blue
Shield, who had been impleaded as a third party defendant, filed a third party
counterclaim against the defendant dentists for illegal boycott of the its dental plan and
for interference with its cost containment initiatives. Id. at 656-57. The district court
granted the dentists' motion for summary judgment, accepting their argument that the
need to ensure quality of care through professional self regulation justified their
opposition to the insurer's utilization review measures. Id. at 679. The circuit court,
however, found this rationale unconvincing on appeal. Pa. Dental Ass'n, 815 F.2d at 277
("[Plaintiffs] contend that they have associational interests in advancing the standards of
professional care which motivated their actions in this case. Those interests are not so
great, however, as to afford a shield to professional conduct which forecloses
competition.").
235. 65 F.3d at 1408. In Marshfield, however, the defendant medical clinic prevailed.
236. Id.
237. See, e.g., Doctor's Hosp. ofJefferson, Inc. v. Southeast Med. Alliance, Inc., 123
F.3d 301, 304 (5th Cir. 1997) (concerning hospital terminated from preferred provider
organization (PPO) which alleged anticompetitive effects based on the fact that PPO
subscribers would be denied the choice of using its services); Levine v. Cent. Fla. Med.
Affiliates, Inc., 72 F.3d 1538, 1541 (l1th Cir. 1996) (involving suit by physician against
hospital over revocation of staff privileges and against PPO over denial of his application to
join its network); Cont'l Orthopedic Appliances, Inc. v. Health Ins. Plan of Greater N.Y.,
956 F. Supp. 367, 369 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (involving suit by supplier of orthotic and prosthetic
equipment against HMO that entered into an exclusive contract with its rival); Fogel v.
Metro. Life Ins. Co., 871 F. Supp. 571, 573 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (concerning suit by supplier of
medical devices against insurance company when the defendant failed to include plaintiff
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Managed care cases have also helped refine antitrust analysis of consumer choice in health care. Even though courts in other contexts appropriately view restrictions on choice as potentially anticompetitive, judicial opinions in our sample usually have appreciated the fact that some
level of exclusivity in provider networks is an essential component of
managed care, 23 8 and have allowed consumers to select price-quality
combinations that would not otherwise be available in the marketplace.2 39 It is also worth noting that many of the hospital exclusive contracting cases in our sample resulted, at least indirectly, from the cost
pressures on hospitals prompted by managed care. As described above,
these cases have produced the clearest judicial understanding of the rela240
tionships among price, choice, and quality of care.
In Ambroze v. Aetna Health Plans, for example, several anesthesiologists sued a group of managed care plans alleging that they were conspiring with local hospitals to coerce physicians to sign provider contracts

in a list of preferred suppliers); Capital Imaging Assocs. v. Mohawk Valley Med. Assocs.,
725 F. Supp. 669, 672-73, 675 (N.D.N.Y. 1989) (involving radiology practice which argued
that lack of access to defendant health plan would deprive it of the resources necessary to

support and maintain its sophisticated diagnostic equipment, and that its exclusion
deprived physicians of the opportunity to select a radiologist based on quality); Hassan v.
Indep. Practice Assocs., 698 F. Supp. 679, 681 (E.D. Mich. 1988) (concerning suit by
allergy specialist against HMO that refused to readmit him following his resignation, which
had resulted from his complaints about utilization review and cost containment).
238. See Levine, 72 F.3d at 1553 (finding that many dimensions of choice remain in
managed care, such as choice of plan at enrollment and ability to switch plans if
dissatisfied); Marshfield, 65 F.3d at 1409 (noting that the essential nature of any HMO is to
limit consumer choice to in-network options); Doctor's Hosp. of Jefferson v. Southeast
Med. Alliance, 897 F. Supp. 290, 294 (E.D. La. 1995) (rejecting plaintiffs theory that
consumers are denied choice as a result of PPO's exclusion of one hospital); Hassan,698 F.
Supp. at 696 (asserting that failure to include plaintiffs in HMO network does not limit
consumer choice because plaintiffs are still in the market and HMO members have range
of other allergists to choose from); Reazin, 635 F. Supp. at 1299 (indicating managed care
options necessarily restrict patient's choice of provider).
239. E.g., Smilecare Dental Group v. Delta Dental Plan of Cal., 858 F. Supp. 1035,
1038 (C.D. Cal. 1994), aff'd, 88 F.3d 780 (9th Cir. 1996). Plaintiff Smilecare, a company
offering supplemental dental insurance, sued Delta Dental, a large dental insurer, on
various antitrust grounds. Id. at 1036-37. The district court dismissed the complaint,
concluding that it was important that Delta Dental be allowed to make providers honor its
mandatory copayment provisions, which permits the marketing of a wider range of
insurance products and ultimately ensures a wider range of consumer choice. Id. at 1038;
see also U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Healthsource, Inc., 986 F.2d 589, 591 (1st Cir. 1993)
(affirming grant of summary judgment to HMO sued by competitor over its exclusive
contracts with primary care physicians); Barry v. Blue Cross of Cal., 805 F.2d 866, 867, 872
(9th Cir. 1986) (affirming summaryjudgment in favor of insurer sued by physician alleging
that its PPO plan constituted a price fixing agreement and boycott, and reasoning that
lower premiums, utilization review, and quality assurance associated with a PPO offered
consumers a new market option).
240. See supra notes 174-175 and accompanying text.
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that compromised the physicians' professional judgment. 241 Plaintiffs argued that the defendants' strong arm tactics undermined physicians' abil24 2
ity to provide high quality care consistent with professional standards.
Citing language from the First Circuit's opinion in Kartell, the court rejected the plaintiffs' claims, arguing that the plaintiffs were second guessing the working of the market and were trying to impose arbitrary constraints on market outcomes. The court expressed its confidence in the
the combination
market's ability to function well and provide consumers
24 3
of price and nonprice attributes that they desire.
There are reasons to suspect that antitrust past will not be antitrust
prologue with respect to managed care, and that the number of litigated
cases will increase. Most importantly, the managed care industry has undergone waves of consolidation and is reaching levels of horizontal concentration that will subject a wider range of its practices to more intense
antitrust scrutiny. If economic conditions continue to worsen, managed
care may once again adopt exclusive provider networks, prompting
heightened antitrust scrutiny even at relatively low levels of economic
concentration. Moreover, as managed care expands into smaller communities, the more concentrated nature of these markets may expose insurers and their contracting partners to greater antitrust liability.
The growing unpopularity of managed care is also likely to influence
antitrust litigation. Among other things, public backlash is almost certain
to disabuse courts of the notion that insurers are acting solely as consumer surrogates. In fact, one case in our sample suggests that courts
may be willing to hear complaints directly from patients about provider
network exclusions that they would probably not entertain if made by the
providers themselves. In Rozema v. Marshfield Clinic, a Medicaid recipient
sued a physician multispecialty clinic and its affiliated health plans, alleging an illegal conspiracy to divide markets.

244

Specifically, the plaintiff

challenged defendants' policy of forcing all chiropractors who wanted to
provide covered services to join a single practice group. Plaintiffs chiropractors (who allegedly had relieved her lower back and leg pain with a
special technique) did not merge into the practice, and defendants refused to provide continued coverage. 24 5 Even on these unremarkable
facts, the district court denied the defendants' motion to dismiss the
claim.246

241. No. 95 CIV. 6631 (DLC), 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7274, at *12-*14 (S.D.N.Y. May
28, 1996), vacated, remanded, No. 96-7778, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 1048 (2d Cir. Jan 24,

1997).
242. Id. at *14.
243. Id. at *30-*31.

244. No. 96-C-592-C, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8261, at *1 (W.D.Wis. Mar 10, 1997).
245. Id. at *11-*12.
246. Id. at *47. Subsequently, the district court granted the plaintiffs' motion for class

certification on their amended complaint, Rozema v. Marshfield Clinic, 176 F.R.D. 295,
297 (W.D. Wis. 1997), and denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment in all
respects, except for the dismissal of one of the defendants due to insufficient evidence
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On the whole, however, there is little evidence in our data either that
courts have developed usable models of quality competition in non-managed care cases that can be applied to managed care, or that courts in
recent cases involving managed care are productively climbing a learning
curve with respect to quality. Some progress has been made in evaluating
the competitive significance of restricting consumer choice within managed care plans, which is important to the process of "selective contracting" between insurers and physicians or hospitals. And courts remain skeptical about health care providers' efforts to secure legal
exemptions from managed care for the sake of quality, although it remains to be seen whether popular distrust of managed care will cause
judges to reevaluate their biases. Still, antitrust law is not yet being used
affirmatively to defend quality competition in managed care, even
though business conduct that raises quality concerns is increasingly
common.
CONCLUSION

This Article has reported the results of a comprehensive empirical
review of judicial opinions in medical antitrust litigation between 1985
and 1999, with specific attention to courts' handling of quality and other
nonprice issues. In brief, we found that the bulk of medical antitrust litigation involves private plaintiffs rather than public enforcement agencies,
that most claims relate to longstanding issues of physician-hospital relations rather than novel commercial practices involving technology or
managed care, and that few cases generate outcomes favorable to plaintiffs. Our data confirm previous studies of antitrust claims and extend
those findings to the health care arena, which has not been investigated
empirically through the lens of antitrust law. With respect to quality, the
results of our investigation lead us to conclude that no cogent theory of
nonprice competition has been developed to guide courts in specific
cases, that historical factors and legislative interventions often cause
courts to divorce quality from competition rather than factoring it into a
competitive mix, that judicial decisions granting the health care industry
special prerogatives to preserve quality despite anticompetitive effectsaberrant in economic if not health services theory-are localized to a
small number of hospital merger cases, and that courts have made some
progress analyzing consumer choice and information as procompetitive
nonprice characteristics. These issues have not been explored previously
in empirical research.
In this concluding Section, we shift away from the social science
mode of reporting and discussing empirical findings characteristic of the
rest of the Article, and offer our impressions of what our results suggest
with respect to the conceptual nexus between antitrust law and health
linking it to the alleged conspiracy. Rozema v. Marshfield, 977 F. Supp. 1362, 1365 (W.D.
Wis. 1997).
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policy. Our study focuses on the American health care system, which has
recently undergone a wrenching transformation from a professionally
dominated to a market driven paradigm. In particular, the rise of managed care and the accelerating pace of technological progress in
medicine make it necessary to determine whether, as a matter of public
policy, an acceptable combination of price and quality characteristics will
emerge from competition involving health care products, medical services, and insurance. We believe that our study sheds some light on this
question.
Our study confirms that antitrust law cannot be expected to serve as
the sole oversight mechanism for industries as complex and quality dependent as health care. Part of the problem, at least from the standpoint
of private litigation, is structural. The existing constellation of factors
(damage provisions, fee shifting rules, and standing and injury requirements) that determine which private cases will be pursued, which issues
will be litigated, and how those issues will be framed for resolution are
not fully meeting social needs. Another part of the problem is intellectual. Courts possess a limited grasp of what constitutes health care quality
and how competition can be designed to further it. In time, antitrust
courts and lawyers may be the residual beneficiaries of increasingly sophisticated understandings of nonprice competition in economic theory
and more refined models of quality from the health services research
literature, but theory will continue to confront serious institutional constraints in litigation. Unless theoretical and empirical advances can be
translated into fairly simple decisionmaking heuristics, they will be of little practical use to the courts. A final part of the problem is ideological.
Thinking about health care quality as a component of competition rather
than a professional or regulatory matter requires a conceptual shift. Our
data suggest that some courts have started to make this transition, particularly in the area of exclusive contracting.
We also believe that our research offers valuable, generalizable lessons for many regulated or previously regulated industries regarding the
border between competition, which is monitored and safeguarded primarily by antitrust law, and regulation, which modifies competitive conditions to serve other socially desirable ends. The most important lesson is
that competition can and should meet regulation at an interface, not a
boundary. For several decades, health economists have argued about the
"marketability" of medical care, the extent to which competition can
function effectively given the many imperfections of medical markets. In
his seminal 1963 article, for example, Kenneth Arrow posited that information asymmetries render health care largely nonmarketable, and that
other social and legal institutions are needed to fill the "optimality gaps"
created by nonmarketability.2 47 Although the marketability of health
care has been vigorously contested since Arrow's exposition, analyses of
247. Arrow, supra note 9, at 946-47.
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this type have been used by scholars and policymakers of all ideological
persuasions to justify a sharp demarcation between the province of competition and that of government regulation (or professional selfregulation).
We disagree. Even in Arrow's time, it was difficult to discern whether
regulatory and self-regulatory processes were supplanting competition or
assisting it. For example, the beneficial effect exerted by professional ethical codes on physician-patient trust can be viewed either as an externally
derived substitute for markets rendered nonfunctional by lack of information, or as an internal adaptation by economically self-interested physicians to convey reputational information credibly and allow patients to
make market choices. Our empirical data evidence similar ambiguities
across fifteen years, many forms of market structure, and a variety of commercial behaviors. It is clear from our study that, as we expected, quality
sits at the interface between competition and regulation, incapable of being fully incorporated into competitive analysis but impossible to partition from the more familiar forms of competition over price and output.
Courts are often inconsistent in how they assign particular situations that
present quality concerns to market or nonmarket (regulatory) categories,
but overall they show a fair amount of resilience in their attempts to
blend competitive and regulatory perspectives and determine the effect
of challenged conduct on nonprice as well as price competition.
How can one create a robust interface? Another lesson that emerges
from our data is that one must pay attention both to substantive law and
to legal institutions. With respect to the former, there is a tendency
among health policy experts to compile lists of "market failures" in the
health care system, and then look to law to remedy or circumvent them.
We see in our data a more fluid if theoretically unformed process that
brings the existence of market failure into the competitive analysis of conduct challenged under antitrust law, an approach arguably made explicit
in the Supreme Court's opinion in California Dental Ass'n. Information
failures and agency failures (perhaps including moral hazard in insurance relationships) seem best suited to be treated in this fashion. Our
data suggest that the DOJ and FTC are taking the lead in formulating
enforcement policies that preserve consumer choice, promote market entry, facilitate the free flow of information, and foster technological and
organizational innovation. This finding is most apparent in the decisionmaking heuristics that emerge from our examination of enforcement
agency consent decrees. While a number of these factors register in judicial opinions as well, courts seem implicitly to assume, probably incorrectly, that price-quality decisions made by insurance companies, hospitals, and physicians coincide with consumer preferences. While managed
care is certainly market driven, it is not necessarily any more patient
driven than the traditional professional paradigm it displaced. On the
other hand, courts appear to be successfully managing the competitionregulation interface in terms of consumer choice aspects of quality, de-
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spite the fact that choice has historically been regulated as intensively as
any other quality parameter in health care. A possible explanation is that
courts have greater confidence in their nonexpert perceptions of choice
than in aspects of quality that require greater technical medical
knowledge.
On the other hand, certain market failures may be incompatible with
competitive analysis, and therefore may require separate treatment under
substantive law. The clearest examples in our case sample involve distributional considerations such as access and availability (perhaps also including adverse selection in insurance relationships, and likely including
public goods) and situations involving personal integrity and motivation.
The nonprofit hospital merger cases demonstrate these problems. In several of these cases, courts felt obligated to ensure that competition benefited patients who were not consumers (the underinsured and the uninsured) as well as those who were, and consequently strayed from a sound
competitive analysis-which has no place for cross-subsidies-in order to
promote post merger charity care. Similarly, courts evaluating conduct
by nonprofit organizations, whose trustees were pillars of their communities, often found it impossible to limit their analysis to objective effects
and ascribed undue importance to the motives of the participants (far
beyond the extent to which motive might shed light on likely competitive
consequences).
Turning to the question of legal institutions, our empirical method
of combining aggregate information about antitrust litigation with
nuanced readings of individual judicial opinions is an apt metaphor for
the problem we are addressing. Antitrust is one of those areas in which
courts must address problems whose scope extends to communities if not
whole societies through the adjudication of private, partisan disputes.
Significantly, it is our impression in reviewing the cases in conjunction
with the results of the survey instrument that courts deciding medical antitrust issues managed to get the big picture right. By applying traditional
antitrust principles to health care markets, courts helped break down
professional resistance to price competition. After managed care took
hold, courts by and large were not deceived by self-interested efforts to
use the antitrust laws to undermine its growth. Moreover, some courts
have begun to sense and address the competitive risks of integration and
consolidation within managed care.
Some of this success may be attributable to the overlapping forms of
accountability among the institutions that determine antitrust law. At
their best, antitrust courts combine categorical and contextual approaches to the cases before them, applying economic principles, factoring in legislative rules and exceptions, paying attention to agency expressions of administrative priorities, but ultimately dealing with issues at the
competition-regulation interface such as quality using the instincts and
sensitivities of their equitable authority. The ability of federal courts to
manage complex issues under the organic, common-law-type mandate of
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the antitrust laws is quite substantial, even if our study reveals that such
promise has only been partially realized.
What does the future hold? Whether in health care or other sectors
of the economy, courts will not be able to avoid increasingly complicated
questions of quality and nonprice competition. In health care alone,
courts will have to deal with the intersection of patent and antitrust law in
the area of generic drugs, issues of prescription drug pricing and distribution, and the effects of managed care in increasingly concentrated markets. Outside of health care, courts will be faced with evolving and complex markets in information technology, intellectual property, energy,
and telecommunications. Our study suggests that antitrust courts cannot
handle these tasks by themselves. This fact highlights the importance of
developing a broader "competition policy" for health care and other transitional industries in which antitrust law would work in concert with regulatory, private purchasing, and self-regulatory initiatives to assure that
both price competition and nonprice competition are vigorous, and that
social objectives not reducible to competition are addressed.
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REVIEW OF JUDICIAL DECISIONS INVOLVING HEALTH CARE ANTITRUST
CASE CODING FORM
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General Instructions:
* Codes should be hand-written in red or blue ink in the margin of each
printed case, adjacent to where information appears.
" Codes should be written in the form Numeral-Numeral-Numeral. For
example, a case brought by the FTC as plaintiff should be marked 1-1-2.
* After you have completed coding each case, the coding information
should be copied onto a properly labeled cover sheet, which should be
stapled to the first page of the case.
* When requested in the coding form, relevant text should be highlighted in yellow. Please limit actual highlighting to specifically requested items.
" If you find language in the opinion that deals with quality issues but
does not exactly match a requested code, or any other information that
you would like to draw the Project Directors' attention to, feel free to
underline it in pen or make a pen mark in the margin. You should also
feel free to write comments in the indicated section of the cover sheet.
"SECTION 0": GENERAL ITEMS

0. General Items (write at top of case rather than in margin)
1. Coder (full name)
2. Date of coding (mm/dd/yy)
3. Is the opinion about antitrust law?
1. "Mostly antitrust"
2. "Some antitrust"
3. "Antitrust mentioned, but specific antitrust question not
before the court"
4. "Essentially no antitrust"
4. Is the opinion about health care?
1. "Mostly health care"
2. "Some health care"
3. "Essentially no health care"
4. "Health care discussed, but only as an analogy or comparison"
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Helpful hints:
* Items 0-3 and 0-4 can only be completed after you have read the
opinion.
" Items 0-3 and 0-4 require judgment on your part. You should answer
them based on the specific opinion you are coding, not the larger dispute of which it is a part. For example, a complicated dispute may give
rise to many opinions, most dealing with discovery motions. If a particular opinion discusses only rules of civil procedure or some other tangential matter, it should be coded 0-3-4 and 043, even if the overall
dispute is about both health care and antitrust law.
" If you code a case 0-3-3, indicating that the case is primarily about an
area of law other than antitrust (e.g., patent law, FDA regulation), feel
free to add a comment to that effect on the cover sheet.
"SECTION 1": PLAINTIFF
1. Plaintiff

1. Type of plaintiff (note all that apply)
1. Department of justice (United States)
2. Federal Trade Commission
3. State Attorney General
4. Private Plaintiff
5. Other (specify)
2. If private, plaintiff's business (note all that apply; if possible, indicate principal plaintiff as (PP) in margin and circle entry on cover
sheet)
1. Hospital, academic medical center or hospital system/chain
2. Skilled nursing facility
3. Other health care facility (specify)
4. Physician solo or small-group practice (<25 physicians)
5. Physician large group practice (25 or more physicians)
6. HMO
7. Insurance company (including Blue Cross/Blue Shield)
8. Contracting intermediary (e.g., PPO, IPA, PPMC, MSO,
PHO)
9. Pharmaceutical/medical device/biotechnology company
(inc. pharmacy, PBM)
10. Other medical supplier (e.g., ambulance, DME) (specify)
11. Professional/trade association
12. Non-physician health professionals (nurses, chiropractors,
dentists, etc.)
13. Hospital medical staff (as an entity)
14. Hospital-based department (e.g., radiology, pathology, anesthesia, ER)
15. Other (specify)
3. If private, plaintiff's governance structure (note all that apply)
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1. For-profit (inc. individuals, partnerships and mutual insurers)
2. Nonprofit corporation
3. Not determinable (e.g., hospital status not identified)
"SECTION 2": DEFENDANT
2. Defendant
1. Defendant's business (note all that apply; if possible, indicate
principal defendant as (PD) in margin and circle entry on cover
sheet)
1. Hospital, academic medical center or hospital system/chain
2. Skilled nursing facility
3. Other health care facility (specify)
4. Physician solo or small-group practice (<25 physicians)
5. Physician large group practice (25 or more physicians)
6. HMO
7. Insurance company (including Blue Cross/Blue Shield)
8. Contracting intermediary (e.g., PPO, IPA, PPMC, MSO,
PHO)
9. Pharmaceutical/medical device/biotechnology company
(inc. pharmacy, PBM)
10. Other medical supplier (e.g., ambulance, DME) (specify)
11. Professional/trade association
12. Non-physician health professionals (nurses, chiropractors,
dentists, etc.)
13. Hospital medical staff (as an entity)
14. Hospital-based department (e.g., radiology, pathology, anesthesia, ER)
15. Regulatory agency or other government entity
16. Other (specify)
2. Defendant's governance structure (note all that apply)
1. For-profit (inc. individuals, partnerships and mutual insurers)
2. Private nonprofit corporation
3. Public (inc. public hospital, government agency)
4. Not determinable (e.g., hospital status not determinable)
5. Geographic location of defendant's business
6. Large city
7. Suburban area
8. Small city/town
9. Rural area
10. Statewide/Regional
11. National/global
12. Not determinable (specify place name and state)
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"SECTION 3": BUSINESS AND LEGAL CONTEXT
3. Business and Legal Context
1. Type of behavior involved (note all that apply)
1. Corporate merger or acquisition
2. Corporate joint venture
3. Medical staff privileges, including denial or termination (hospitals only)
4. Exclusive/selective contracting, including refusals to refer patients (hospital, other health facility, medical group, pharmacy, supplier, or other corporate entity)
5. Network participation, including termination (individual
health professionals)
6. Joint contract negotiation (inc. conduct of providers dealing
with payors)
7. Unilateral imposition of contract terms (e.g., most favored
customer clause)
8. Payor standards and practices (conduct of payor)
9. Private credentialing, standard-setting, or accreditation (inc.
by professional associations)
10. Professional organization rules/membership
11. Joint purchasing
12. Sharing of information
13. Advertising and marketing (including prohibitions on such)
14. Other (specify)
2. Procedural status (note all that apply)
1. Motion for injunction
2. Motion for summary judgment or motion to dismiss
3. Post-trial motion
4. Appeal by plaintiff
5. Appeal by defendant
6. Other (inc. minor motions) (specify)
3. Disposition of case (note all that apply)
1. Significant judgment/verdict for plaintiff
2. Significant judgment/verdict for defendant
3. Remand (unless purely ministerial)
4. Other (inc. minor motions) (specify)
4. Remedies ordered by the court (note all that apply)
1. Injunction (specify)
2. Cease and desist order
3. Divestiture
4. Compulsory licensing
5. Damages
6. Criminal penalties
7. Other (specify)
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Helpful hints:

" Coding of procedural status (Item 3-2) and disposition (Item 3-3) requires judgment on your part.
" Interim motions (e.g., discovery, exclusion of evidence) should be
coded procedurally as 3-2-6 and briefly specified, as should opinions
dealing with minor counterclaims or cross-appeals.
" Disposition codes 3-3-1 and 3-3-2 should be reserved for significant outcomes of litigation, such as complete or near-complete dismissals or
grants of summary judgment (even if reversed on appeal in another
opinion), affirmances on appeal, and reversals on appeal where remand, if any, is purely ministerial and will not affect the ultimate outcome. Rulings on minor motions, minor claims/counterclaims, minor
appeals/cross-appeals, and other interim matters should be coded 3-3-4
and briefly specified.
* Disposition code 3-3-3 should be used where the court to which the
case is remanded must engage in significant activity whose outcome
remains uncertain. Rulings on interim matters such as motions.
"SECTION 4": ANTITRUST ANALYSIS
4. Antitrust Analysis
1. Allegations addressed substantively by court (mark all that apply)
1. Price fixing (Sherman § 1)
2. Geographic market allocation (Sherman § 1)
3. Product market allocation (Sherman § 1)
4. Concerted refusal to deal (boycott) (Sherman § 1)
5. Tying (Sherman § 1, Clayton § 3)
6. Vertical price restraints (e.g. resale price maintenance) (Sher-

man § 1)
7. Vertical nonprice restraints (e.g. exclusive dealing) (Sherman, Clayton § 3)
8. Other unreasonable restraint of trade (Sherman § 1)
9. Monopolization (willful acquisition or maintenance of market
power) (Sherman § 2)
10. Attempted monopolization (Sherman § 2)
11. Anticompetitive merger or acquisition (Clayton § 7)
12. Price discrimination (Sherman § 2, Robinson-Patman)
13. Unfair trade practices (FTC Act § 5)
14. State law antitrust claims
15. Other (specify)
2. Violations found by court (mark all that apply)
1. Price fixing (Sherman § 1)
2. Geographic market allocation (Sherman § 1)
3. Product market allocation (Sherman § 1)
4. Concerted refusal to deal (boycott) (Sherman § 1)
5. Tying (Sherman § 1, Clayton § 3)
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6. Vertical price restraints (e.g. resale price maintenance) (Sherman § 1)
7. Vertical nonprice restraints (e.g. exclusive dealing) (Sherman, Clayton § 3)
8. Other unreasonable restraint of trade (Sherman § 1)
9. Monopolization (willful acquisition or maintenance of market
power) (Sherman § 2)
10. Attempted monopolization (Sherman § 2)
11. Anticompetitive merger or acquisition (Clayton § 7)
12. Price discrimination (Sherman § 2, Robinson-Patman)
13. Unfair trade practices (FTC Act § 5)
14. State law antitrust claims
15. Other (specify)
Helpful hint: "Addressed substantively" means that the opinion considers
the allegations in greater detail than just listing them when reciting the
history of the dispute.
3. Analysis of plaintiffs case actually performed by court (note each as it

arises; do not highlight text)
1. Per se analysis
2. Quick-look rule of reason
3. Traditional rule of reason (inc. Chicago Board of Trade test)
4. Market definition process
5. Market concentration analysis (HHI, Elzinga-Hogarty) or
other test of market power
6. Oligopoly/cartel agreement
7. Other conspiracy or collusion on price or nonprice
characteristics
8. Exclusionary conduct (e.g., boycott)
9. Barriers to entry
10. Monopsony power (buyer monopoly)
11. Essential facility doctrine (Terminal Railroad)
12. Conduct of monopolist or attempted monopolist
13. Other (specify)
4. Analysis of defenses actually performed by court (note each as it arises;

do not highlight text)
1. No antitrust injury/standing
2. Intra-enterprise "conspiracy" only (Copperweld)
3. Efficiencies under rule of reason (lower costs, economies of
scope and scale)
4. Other procompetitive effects under rule of reason (e.g., improved quality)
5. Legitimate business justification (Aspen Ski)
6. Action was as buyer, not seller
7. Natural monopoly
8. State action immunity defense (Parker)
9. Political action defense (Noerr-Pennington)
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10. Health Care Quality Improvement Act
11. McCarran-Ferguson Act (immunity for the business of
insurance)
12. Failing firm defense
13. Labor (collective bargaining) exemption
14. Other defense (e.g., renounced conspiracy) (specify)
"SECTION 5": DISCUSSION OF COMPETITION IN HEALTH CARE
IMPORTANT: For this Section only, add the following supplemental
codes if applicable:
CON: Concurring opinion
DIS: Dissenting opinion
If a code is not marked "con" or "dis," we will assume that it is contained
in the opinion of the court or majority opinion.
5. JudicialDiscussion of Health Care Competition and Price, Output or
Quality
1. General beliefs about competition in health care (note each as it arises; do
not highlight text)

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Competition decreases health care prices
Competition increases health care prices
Competition decreases total health care costs
Competition increases total health care costs ("medical arms
race," wasteful duplication)
Competition increases health care quality
Competition decreases health care quality
Courts should be cautious applying antitrust rules to health
care because of medical professional values
Courts should be cautious applying antitrust rules to health
care because of social imperatives
Courts should strictly apply antitrust rules to health care unless
Congress directs otherwise (legislatures, not courts, should create exemptions)

Helpful hints:

" This section is the most important to the success of the project. When in
doubt, please be overinclusive. We can delete unwarranted codes later if
needed, but we cannot find material that was incorrectly omitted.
" That said, particularly with respect to discussions of quality (the critical
item in the study), you should code and/or highlight material only if it
is connected to a discussion of competition. For example, an opinion
dealing with hospital staff privileges and peer review activities may discuss quality at length, but only in connection with peer review immunities rather than competitive considerations. In that case, you should
not code the discussion, but you should feel free to make pen marks in
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the margin and comments on the cover sheet to indicate interesting
text.
* Item 5-1 requires judgment on your part. Unlike most other items,
courts' general beliefs about competition will not always be stated
explicitly.
* For all the items in this section, "variety" and "choice" are important
attributes of quality, even though discussions of them will not always
use the word "quality" in connection with them. Please include these discussion in your coding/highlighting.
2. Price and output effects discussed by the court (note each as it arises, do
not highlight text)
1. Challenged conduct will increase prices (insurance premiums,
co-payments, fees paid to health care providers/suppliers, etc.)
2. Challenged conduct will decrease prices
3. Challenged conduct will decrease output (quantity)
4. Challenged conduct will increase output (quantity)
5. Challenged conduct will allow price discrimination (unjustified differences in prices among buyers)
6. Discussion of relationship between price and output (quantity)
7. Discussion of relationship between price and quality
8. Other price or output concerns (specify)
3. Discussion of firm-specific quality characteristics relating to clinical
structure (note each as it arises and HIGHLIGHT RELEVANT
TEXT)
1. Advanced technology (adoption, dissemination or availability)
2. Qualifications of physicians or other licensed health professionals (education, board certification, specialization)
3. Adequacy of staffing (e.g., nursing care)
4. Adequacy of physical facilities (other than amenities)
5. Continuity of care (preservation of "provider-patient
relationship")
6. Accreditation by private entity (JCAHO, NCQA)
7. Certification/approval by government (FDA, state health
department)
of firm-specific quality characteristics relating to clinical
Discussion
4.
processes (note each as it arises and HIGHLIGHT RELEVANT
TEXT)
1. Malpractice or negligence of providers (adverse events)
2. Ranking in quality surveys (state report cards, consumer
reports)
3. Quantitative success scores (HEDIS, cure rates, mortality, other
outcomes)
4. Preventive services (immunization, screening)
5. Product defects
6. Potential for clinical innovation (pharmaceuticals, clinical procedures, practice protocols/guidelines, etc.)
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7. Unspecified quality of patient care concerns
5. Discussion of firm-specific quality characteristics relating to administration (note each as it arises and HIGHLIGHT RELEVANT
TEXT)
1. Solvency
2. Nonprofit governance
3. Provision of charity care (uncompensated care)
4. Administrative restrictions (bureaucracy)
5. Health education
6. Consumer information, including advertising (search costs)
7. Amenities
8. Grievance and complaint processes
9. Legal rights and remedies for injury
6. Discussion of firm-specific characteristics relating to overall quality
(note each as it arises and HIGHLIGHT RELEVANT TEXT)
1. General reputation for quality or service
2. Duration of existence/stability ("business history"/"community presence")
3. Other (specify)
7. Discussion of market-wide or system-wide quality characteristics
(note each as it arises and HIGHLIGHT RELEVANT TEXT)
1. Range of products/services available (product differentiation)
2. Location or geographic reach
3. Freedom of choice among health care providers (physicians,
chiropractors, hospitals, etc.)
4. Aids to consumers in making informed choices (including advertising, other information that lowers search costs, access to
agents and intermediaries)
5. Technologic or organizational innovation (incl. research and
development)
6. Professionalism (ethics)
7. Overall qualifications of physicians or other licensed health
professionals
8. Overall quality of hospitals or other health facilities
9. Unspecified quality concerns or quality mentioned in passing
only
10. Other (specify)
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